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PRAGMATISM, ECONOMICS, AND THE DROIT
MORAL
THOMAS F. COTTER7
Under the continental doctrine of droit moral, or moral right, the
creator of a work of authorship (such as a literary work, a
painting, or a film) is viewed as having an inalienable right to
prevent others from, among other things, modifying, distorting, or
otherwise interfering with the integrity of that work-even after
the creator alienates both the physical object in which the work is
embodied and its copyright. Over the past two decades, a
somewhat weaker version of the doctrine has begun to make
inroads into American law as well, culminating in the passage of
the Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990. In this Article, Professor
Cotter examines the doctrine of moral right through the lens of
philosophical and legal pragmatism. Applying first the insights of
pragmatic aesthetic theorists, he considers the implications of the
droit moral on "art as experience." Second, he applies economic
analysis in an effort to predict the likely consequences of moral
rights upon the well-being of artists, patrons, and audiences. He
concludes that the weak version of the doctrine adopted in the
United States has much to recommend it from both a
philosophical and economic perspective, but that the more robust
version adopted in France and Germany imposes too substantial a
risk of stifling artistic innovation and experimentation.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In a collection of essays entitled Testaments Betrayed, the
novelist Milan Kundera quotes from correspondence between the
composer Igor Stravinsky and the conductor Ernest Ansermet
concerning Ansermet's plan to make certain cuts in Stravinsky's
composition Jeu de Cartes during a performance that was to take
place in Paris on October 27, 1937.1 In a letter to Ansermet dated
October 14, 1937, Stravinsky forbade the proposed alterations,
stating that they were likely to distort the work and that it would be
"'better not to play it at all than to do so reluctantly.' ,2 A few days
later, Stravinsky refused Ansermet's amended request to make one
"'small cut in the March from the second measure of 45 to the
second measure of 58,' " arguing that even this relatively modest
alteration would "'cripple[ ] my little March, which has its form and
its structural meaning in the totality of the composition (a structural
meaning that you claim to be protecting).' "" In conclusion,
Stravinsky wrote:
You cut my March only because you like the middle section
and the development less than the rest. In my view, this is
not sufficient reason, and I would like to say: "But you're
not in your own house, my dear fellow"; I never told you:
"Here, take my score and do whatever you please with it."5
1. See MILAN KUNDERA, TESTAMENTS BETRAYED 243-46 (Linda Asher trans.,
1995).
2. Id. at 244 (quoting Letter from Igor F. Stravinsky to Ernest Ansermet (Oct. 14,
1937), in 1 STRAVINSKY: SELECTED CORRESPONDENCE 226 (Robert Craft ed., 1982),
with several minor word changes).
3. Id. at 245 (quoting Letter from Ernest Ansermet to Igor F. Stravinsky (Oct. 15,
1937), in 1 STRAVINSKY: SELECTED CORRESPONDENCE, supra note 2, at 227).
4. Id, (quoting Letter from Igor F. Stravinsky to Ernest Ansermet (Oct. 19, 1937), in
1 STRAVINSKY: SELECTED CORRESPONDENCE, supra note 2, at 226).
5. Id.; cf. Bernard Holland, Updated, and That's Not All, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 7, 1996, at
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For a contrasting perspective, consider the case of the late
nineteenth/early twentieth-century composer and conductor Gustav
Mahler. Although one might expect Mahler, as a composer, to have
shared Stravinsky's passion for faithful adherence to the score, at
least in his role as conductor Mahler exhibited few inhibitions when it
came to altering the works of other composers-for example, by
introducing thematic alterations and suggested cuts into the works of
Schumann,6 by making cuts to the second and fourth movements of
Bruckner's Romantic Symphony,' and by altering the orchestration
of Beethoven's Ninth Symphony.8 Many of Mahler's contemporaries
objected to these alterations,9 although at least one critic thought that
Mahler had shown the Bruckner work "love and comprehension,
whereas others battled 'for the letter of the law, and against
Bruckner.' ,,1o Mahler himself responded to critics of the Beethoven
interpretation by arguing that Beethoven's deafness had caused him
to lose contact with the reality of physical sound; that, in light of the
improvement in the quality of brass instruments since Beethoven's
day, "it would be a crime not to use them to give a more perfect
rendering of Beethoven's works"; and that the "customary increase
in the number of stringed instruments has made it equally necessary
to increase the number of wind instruments, and this was done solely
to balance the volume of sound and not to give instruments a new
significance."'1
Cl (speculating whether Stravinsky's heirs would sue over director Peter Sellars's
inventive production of Stravinsky's opera The Rake's Progress).
6. See KURT BLAUKOPF, GusTAv MAHLER 155-56 (1973) (discussing Mosco
Carner's investigations into Mahler's Schumann arrangements).
7. See 2 HENRY-LOUIS DE LA GRANGE, GUSTAV MAHLER 231 (1995).
8. See BLAUKOPF, supra note 6, at 150-56; 2 DE LA GRANGE, supra note 7, at 232-
37; MICHAEL KENNEDY, MABLER 63-64 (1990).
9. See BLAUKOPF, supra note 6, at 150-52, 156; 2 DE LA GRANGE, supra note 7, at
231,233-37.
10. 2 DE LA GRANGE, supra note 7, at 232 (paraphrasing and quoting uncited review
by Wiener Abendpost music critic Robert Hirschfeld, following January 28, 1900,
performance of Vienna Philharmonic Orchestra). Compare the following story told by
Alastair Reed, concerning his English translation of Pablo Neruda's poetry:
[Neruda] was always ready to answer any questions I had about [the poems],
even to talk about them, fondly, as about lost friends, but he was not much
interested in the mechanics of translation. Once, in Paris, while I was explaining
some liberty I had taken, he stopped me and put his hand on my shoulder.
"Alastair, don't just translate my poems. I want you to improve them."
Alastair Reid, Neruda and Borges, NEW YORKER, June 24 & July 1, 1996, at 56, 70.
11. KENNEDY, supra note 8, at 208 (quoting leaflet prepared by Mahler and
distributed prior to Vienna Philharmonic Orchestra concert of February 22, 1900); see
also BLAUKOPF, supra note 6, at 153-55 (describing controversy over Mahler's
interpretation of Beethoven); 2 DE LA GRANGE, supra note 7, at 232-37 (same).
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In a nutshell, these stories illustrate the tension that often arises
between the "author"12 of a creative work, on the one hand, and those
who would like to perform, display, or otherwise use the work, on the
other. Should Stravinsky have had the right to stop Ansermet from
performing an altered version of Jeu de Cartes-even if, let us
suppose, Stravinsky no longer owned the copyright to the work-or
should the conductor have had free rein to use Stravinsky's work to
express the conductor's own creative vision?13 Should someone-
Beethoven's nearest living relatives? the state?-have had the right
to prevent Mahler's experimentation? Should a painter or sculptor
who sells her work to another be able to enjoin the buyer from
subsequently altering the work, even though the artist no longer
retains ownership of the physical object in which the work is
embodied? Should a novelist or dramatist who purports to sell the
right to adapt or perform his work nevertheless retain some veto
power over an adaptation that renders his work trivial or vulgar?14
Blaukopf argues that Mahler's retouching of the Ninth Symphony was a laudable attempt
to better discern the composer's vision, which had become distorted over the years due in
part to the changed acoustics of the late nineteenth-century concert hall. See BLAUKOPF,
supra note 6, at 153-55. Mahler himself argued that his interpretation of Beethoven was
neither a "re-orchestration" nor an "improvement," but rather a more faithful rendering
of "what the Master demands." KENNEDY, supra note 8, at 208 (quoting Mahler's
leaflet).
12. Throughout this Article, I shall use the terms "author," "artist," and "creator"
interchangeably to refer to any person who creates a literary work, musical composition,
motion picture, or other "work of authorship" as that term is defined under the Copyright
Act. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1994).
13. Under United States law, copyright in works created on or after January 1, 1978,
subsists from creation of the work and, subject to certain exceptions, endures for a term
consisting of the life of the author plus 50 years. See id. § 302(a). For most works created
prior to January 1, 1978, and not yet in the public domain as of that date, the copyright
term endures for a total period of 75 years. See id. § 304(a)-(b). The owner of the
copyright acquires the exclusive right to reproduce the work in copies or phonorecords, to
prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work, to distribute copies or
phonorecords of the work to the public, and, with respect to most works of authorship, to
publicly perform and display the work. See id. § 106. Thus, in the above example, if
Stravinsky had assigned or licensed the copyright to Jeu de Cartes to Ansermet without
restriction, then under U.S. copyright law Ansermet would have had the right to perform
the work publicly however he saw fit, over Stravinsky's objections.
I do not know whether, as a matter of historical fact, Stravinsky owned the copyright
to Jeu de Cartes at the time of his quarrel with Ansermet, or whether he had assigned or
licensed it to someone else. Presumably, any issues relating to the performance would
have been governed by French law.
14. Cf John Lyttle, 'Mike Same? Mike Same? Why?', INDEP. (London), July 17,
1993, at 30, available in LEXIS, News Library, Arcnws File (quoting novelist Gore Vidal
as stating that the film version of his novel Myra Breckinridge is "one of the worst films
ever made"); Gary Arnold, All Rogues Lead to Rome, WASH. POST, Mar. 31, 1980, at B1,
available in LEXIS, News Library, Arcnws File (discussing Vidal's disavowal of film
Caligula). One can only guess the reaction of Nathaniel Hawthorne, from whatever
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Under the doctrine of droit moral or "moral right," the author
would prevail in disputes of this nature, regardless of whether she
continues to own the physical embodiment of or copyright to the
work.' Originally developed in the courts of France and later
adopted throughout continental Europe, the droit moral in recent
years has begun to win acceptance, albeit on a relatively modest
scale, in the United States as well.16 Whether to encourage the
further expansion of the droit moral in this country as a means of
defending and preserving the integrity of artistic visions, or to reject
the doctrine out of preference for the alternative visions of owners,
interpreters, and audiences, has been the subject of considerable
scholarly debate."
In this Article, I consider an aspect of the droit moral known as
the right of integrity from the standpoint of philosophical and legal
pragmatism. As discussed in greater detail herein, I view pragmatism
as a perspective that conceives of human thought as both a
contingent human construction, emerging from the context of past
experience, and as an instrument that enables the human organism to
predict, control, and cope with its environment; 8 and I have argued
before that pragmatism provides a framework for simultaneously
reaffirming and mediating among our commitments to such
conflicting values as individuality and community, efficiency and
egalitarianism. 9  I shall demonstrate that pragmatism, and in
particular a pragmatic approach to aesthetics, helps to illuminate
some of the tensions inherent in the moral rights dilemma in
surprising ways. I also shall argue that a pragmatic commitment to
realm his spirit now inhabits, to the 1995 retelling of The Scarlet Letter featuring Demi
Moore.
15. See infra notes 54-70 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 40-144 and accompanying text.
17. See, e.g., Lawrence Adam Beyer, Intentionalism, Ar4 and the Suppression of
Innovation: Film Colorization and the Philosophy of Moral Rights, 82 Nw. U. L. REV.
1011 (1988); Edward J. Damich, The Right of Personality: A Common-Law Basis for the
Protection of the Moral Rights of Authors, 23 GA. L. REV. 1 (1988); Russell J. DaSilva,
Droit Moral and the Amoral Copyright A Comparison of Artists' Rights in France and the
United States, 28 BULL. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y 1 (1980); Roberta Rosenthall Kwall, Copyright
and the Moral Right: Is an American Marriage Possible?, 38 VAND. L. REV. 1 (1985);
John Henry Merryman, The Refrigerator of Bernard Buffet, 27 HASTINGS L.J. 1023
(1976); Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright Alienability Restrictions and the Enhancement
of Author Autonomy: A Normative Evaluation, 24 RUTGERS L.J. 347 (1993); Martin A.
Roeder, The Doctrine of Moral Right. A Study in the Law of Artists, Authors and
Creators, 53 HARv. L. REv. 554 (1940).
18. See infra notes 146-56 and accompanying text.
19. See Thomas F. Cotter, Legal Pragmatism and the Law and Economics Movement,
84 GEO. L.J. 2071,2073-98 (1996).
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instrumentalism recommends a greater use of the methods of social
science, for the purpose of trying to predict the consequences of
alternative systems of moral rights, than has been evidenced in most
discussions of moral rights to date.
I begin in Part II with a brief overview of the history of the droit
moral and its development in the courts and legislatures of France,
Germany, and the United States. In Part III, I discuss the principal
tenets of pragmatism, with special attention to pragmatic aesthetic
theory; the implications of pragmatic aesthetics for the doctrine of
moral rights; and, through the application of economic analysis, the
likely welfare and distributional consequences of alternative moral
rights regimes. In Part IV, I attempt to mediate among the pragmatic
arguments for and against moral rights recognition. I will argue,
among other things, that a waivable moral right offers small positive
benefits to artists and the rest of society; that the effects of a
nonwaivable right may vary somewhat from one culture to another,
but that nonwaivability threatens to harm both the producers and
consumers of works of art; and that one of the benefits of having
several different models of moral rights regimes in place in the
United States and Europe may be to provide empirical evidence
concerning the advantages and disadvantages of the various possible
methods of securing artists' rights. I conclude that the limited
recognition accorded moral rights under current United States law is
close to the optimal system for this country at this time-not because
the status quo is always preferable to change, but rather because
under the particular circumstances in which we find ourselves today a
more vigorous system poses substantial risks to the well-being of both
artists and audiences.
II. AN OVERVIEW OF THE DROITMORAL
A. Philosophical Antecedents
In the United States, rights in works of authorship and
inventions traditionally have been viewed as resting upon either a
natural-law or an instrumentalist theory (or both). Natural law
theorists claim that an author or inventor is morally entitled to enjoy
the fruits of her labor and therefore that she has an inherent right to
exclude others from copying her work? Instrumentalist theorists
20. Attempts to ground intellectual property rights in natural law typically rely upon
a Lockean theory of property rights, in which a person is deemed to be morally entitled to
private ownership of an object appropriated from the common when she joins her labor to
[Vol. 76
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argue instead that the state creates intellectual property rights to
induce people to create or disseminate works of authorship and
inventions-the assumption being that, in the absence of intellectual
property rights, free riding would discourage the creation or
dissemination of these works.2'
European intellectual property law, by contrast, derives in large
part from a concept of property developed by Immanuel Kant and
Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. As viewed by Kant and Hegel,
private property is acquired not necessarily by labor, but rather by
one's joining of his individual Will to some object external to the
self.' As a result of this process, the thing possessed comes to
embody the owner's personality;n and by like reasoning a person may
alienate property by removing his Will from the thing possessed.24 As
Margaret Radin notes, however, for Kant and Hegel "only objects
separate from the self are suitable for alienation."' Thus, in the
words of Hegel:
[T]hose goods, or rather substantive characteristics, which
constitute my own private personality and the universal
essence of my self-consciousness are inalienable and my
right to them is imprescriptible. Such characteristics are my
it, so long as "enough and as good" remains in the common for others to use. In the
context of copyright law, for example, the creator of a work of authorship is viewed as
deserving some form of copyright protection as a reward for her intellectual labor. For
discussions of natural law/desert-based theories of copyright, see Wendy J. Gordon, A
Property Right in Self-Expression: Equality and Individualism in the Natural Law of
Intellectual Property, 102 YALE L.J. 1533, 1540-83 (1993); Justin Hughes, The Philosophy
of Intellectual Property, 77 GEo. LJ. 287, 296-330 (1988); Tom G. Palmer, Are Patents
and Copyrights Morally Justified? The Philosophy of Property Rights and Ideal Objects,
13 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 817, 821-35 (1990); Stewart E. Sterk, Rhetoric and Reality in
Copyright Law, 94 MICH. L. REV. 1197, 1227-39 (1996); Alfred C. Yen, Restoring the
Natural Law: Copyright as Labor and Possession, 51 OHio ST. L.J. 517,522-24 (1990).
21. For discussions of instrumentalist theories of copyright, see Hughes, supra note
20, at 302-05, William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of
Copyright Law, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 325, 344-47 (1989), Neil Weinstock Netanel,
Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society, 106 YALE LJ. 283, 308-11 (1996), and Sterk,
supra note 20, at 1204-09.
22. See G.W.F. HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT §§ 44, 50, 51-58 (T.M. Knox trans.,
Oxford Univ. Press 1952) (1821); IMMANUEL KANT, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 81-84 (W.
Hastie trans., Augustus M. Kelley Publishers 1974) (1796); see also Hughes, supra note
20, at 334 (noting that, for Hegel, labor is a sufficient but not necessary condition for
occupation of object by Will); Palmer, supra note 20, at 838 (same). In Hegel's
philosophy, it is specifically through the acquisition of private property that the Will
comes to actualize itself as Idea, allowing the individual to attain a higher sphere of
freedom. See HEGEL, supra, §§ 41,44-46.
23. See HEGEL, supra note 22, § 51.
24. See id. §§ 53,65; KANT, supra note 22, at 101.
25. MARGARET JANE RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODrTIES 34 (1996).
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personality as such, my universal freedom of will, my ethical
life, my religion.2
Both Kant and Hegel devoted some attention to the subject of
property rights in works of authorship. Kant, in the Rechtslehre and
in his essay Von der Unrechtmissigkeit des Bachernachdrucks ("On
the Injustice of Copying Books"), distinguished between the book as
an external thing-which the publisher (and, thereafter, the
purchaser) may possess and alienate just as he may possess and
alienate other external things-and the book as the author's
discourse or speech (Rede). 7 In Kant's view, the mere ownership or
possession of a book does not entitle one to copy it, because copying
would interfere with the author's prerogative of deciding when and
how he will communicate, through his authorized publisher, with the
public.2 Kant viewed the author's interest in deciding how and when
to speak as an inalienable part of his personality,2 9 concluding that the
author may license, but not alienate, the right to copy his work? As
an agent, the publisher is obligated to present the work according to
26. HEGEL, supra note 22, § 66; see also KANT, supra note 22, at 98-99 (discussing
man's ability to dispose of his property, but not himself, at will); RADIN, supra note 25, at
36 (describing man's inability to "dispose [of] himself because he is not a thing") (quoting
IMMANUEL KANT, LECrURES ON ETHICS 165 (Louis Infield trans., J. Macmurray ed., rey
ed. 1930)).
27. See KANT, supra note 22, at 129-31; IMMANUEL KANT, Von der Unrechtmlnssigkeit
des Biichernachdrucks [hereinafter KANT, Injustice], in 4 IMMANUEL KANTS WERKE 213,
215, 218-21 (Artur Buchenau & Ernst Cassirer eds., 1922); see also Netanel, supra note
17, at 374 (noting that, for Kant, "an author's words are a continuing expression of his
inner self'); Palmer, supra note 20, at 839 (discussing Kant's distinction between book as
external thing and as discourse).
28. See KANT, supra note 22, at 130; KANT, Injustice, supra note 27, at 219. In places,
Kant seems to be saying that the plagiarist injures only the authorized publisher. See
KANT, supra note 22, at 130 (arguing that "unauthorized Publication is a wrong
committed upon the authorized and only lawful Publisher, as it amounts to a pilfering of
the Profits which the latter was entitled and able to draw from the use of his proper
Right"); KANT, Injustice, supra note 27, at 216 (arguing that "the pirate causes injury to
the publisher in regard to his rights, not to the author") (my translation). Neil Netanel
argues, however, that for Kant the publisher's rights are "derived from those of the
author, and do not amount to an independent proprietary interest." Netanel, supra note
17, at 376 n.122 (citing KANT, supra note 22, at 21).
29. See KANT, Injustice, supra note 27, at 221 (stating that the author has inalienable
right "to speak for himself through another, that is, that no one else may publicly perform
the same speech as if in the author's name"); see also Netanel, supra note 17, at 376
(finding "inalienability of the author's rights in his work ... implicit in Kant's
categorization of a literary work as part of the author's person instead of an external
thing").
30. See KANT, Injustice, supra note 27, at 215; Netanel, supra note 17, at 376; Palmer,
supra note 20, at 839.
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the author's wishes.31
Hegel similarly contended that literary works, as well as other
works such as inventions, embody the author's "[a]ttainments,
erudition, talents, and so forth," and that these attributes are "owned
by free mind and are something internal and not external to it."32
Hegel differed from Kant, however, in arguing that the author's
expression of his mental aptitudes, as embodied in a work of
authorship, is external to the author and therefore freely alienable.33
Hegel thus concluded that the author may alienate the copyright in
his work to the same extent that he may alienate any other product of
his labor. 4
Expanding upon the Kantian view that an author's copyright is a
single, personal, and inalienable right, one school of theorists in the
late nineteenth century concluded that an author may license her
work for publication but may not assign or waive her rights in it.3
31. See KANT, Injustice, supra note 27, at 219-20. Kant did not envision, however,
many restrictions upon the publication of derivative works (that is, works based upon one
or more preexisting works, such as translations, see 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994) (defining
"derivative works")). Kant argued that one may publish an abridgement, enlargement, or
other adaptation of an author's book, without obtaining permission from the author or his
authorized publisher, as long as the work does not purport to speak in the author's name,
and that translations do not infringe because they are not "the same speech of the author,
even though the thoughts are likely to be the same." KANT, Injustice, supra note 27, at
221-22.
32. HEGEL, supra note 22, § 43.
33. See id §§ 43, 68, 69. Hegel also noted with apparent approval the instrumental
argument that patents and copyrights help to spur creativity and compared these rights to
capital assets. See id § 69; see also Hughes, supra note 20, at 338-39 (discussing these
aspects of Hegel's theory); Palmer, supra note 20, at 841 (discussing capital asset theory).
34. See HEGEL, supra note 22, § 69. For Hegel, the only restriction on the
alienability of such external works is that no one may alienate all of his labor because this
would be tantamount to agreeing to sell oneself into slavery. See idL §67. Radin notes,
however, that this position raises some conundrums; for example, why is the partial
alienation of property that one has infused with one's personality not forbidden? See
RADIN, supra note 25, at 37-38.
Interestingly, neither Kant nor Hegel believed that it was wrong to copy works of
visual art, such as painting and sculpture. Kant distinguished a work of art (Kunstwerk)
from a literary work by characterizing the former as an author's "work" (opus)-an
external thing-and the latter as an "action" or exercise of authorial power (opera). See
Kant, Injustice, supra note 27, at 220-21; see also Netanel, supra note 17, at 374 n.110, 377
n.126; Palmer, supra note 20, at 839-40. Hegel argued that a copy of a "work of art,"
unlike an infringing literary work or invention, "is essentially a product of the copyist's
own mental and technical ability." See HEGEL, supra note 22, § 68 (emphasis added); see
also Hughes, supra note 20, at 338 n.209 (suggesting that, due to the technology of his day,
"Hegel did not consider the possibility of mass production capable of imitating an artist's
work").
35. See STEPHEN LADAS, THE INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF LITERARY AND
ARTISTIC PROPERTY 8-9 (1938); Damich, supra note 17, at 27; DaSilva, supra note 17, at
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This theory is reflected in the modern German copyright statute.36
Other theorists, such as Josef Kohler, followed Hegel's view that an
author rhiay alienate the copyright to her work.' Kohler argued,
however, that because works of authorship embody the author's
inalienable personality, the author retains the right that "no strange
work be presented as his, but that his own work not be presented in a
changed form," even after the author transfers both the physical
embodiment of the work and its copyright.38 Kohler's theory-which
posits two classes of rights, one alienable, the other not-is reflected
in the modem French copyright statute. 9
B. Moral Rights in France and Germany
While scholars refined these ideas, French and German courts
developed a body of legal doctrine based on the principle that
authors have inalienable rights in their works. Over time, the courts
came to recognize four aspects of the author's "moral right": the
10-11; Netanel, supra note 17, at 378-79.
36. See Gesetz fiber Urheberrecht und verwandte Schutzrechte v. 9 Sept. 1965
[hereinafter German Act], translated and reprinted in UNESCO, 2 COPYRIGHT LAWS AND
TREATIES OF THE WORLD, at Germany: Item 1-Page 8, art. 29 (1987). Several authors
have discussed the influence of Kantian theory on German copyright law. See, e.g.,
Damich, supra note 17, at 30; DaSilva, supra note 17, at 11; Adolf Dietz, Germany, in 1
INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACTICE, § 4[2], at GER-48 to -49 (Melville B.
Nimmer & Paul Edward Geller eds., 1996); Netanel, supra note 17, at 379.
37. See LADAS, supra note 35, at 9-10; Damich, supra note 17, at 27-29; DaSilva,
supra note 17, at 10-11; Arthur S. Katz, The Doctrine of Moral Right and American
Copyright Law-A Proposal, 24 S. CAL. L. REV. 375, 401-04 (1951); Netanel, supra note
17, at 379-81; Palmer, supra note 20, at 842.
38. JOSEF KOHLER, URHEBERRECHT AN SCHRIF11VERKEN UND VERLAGSRECHT 15
(1907), quoted in Katz, supra note 37, at 402 & n.148.
39. See Code de la propridt6 intellectuelle [hereinafter French Act], reprinted in
ANDRP FRANqON, COURS DE PROPRItTP, LrITrRAIRE, ARTISTIQUE ET INDUSTRIELLE
289-322 (1993). For discussions of the influence of Hegelian theory on French copyright
law, see, for example, Damich, supra note 17, at 30, DaSilva, supra note 17, at 11, and
Netanel, supra note 17, at 381.
40. "Moral right" is a translation of the French droit moral, a term coined by the
French jurist Andr6 Morillot and subsequently codified in the French Intellectual
Property Code. See Damich, supra note 17, at 29; Andr6 Lucas & Robert Plaisant,
France, in 1 INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 36, § 7, at
FRA-97. The analogous German term, Urheberpersonlichkeitsrecht, means "author's
right of personality." Dietz, supra note 36, § 7[1], at GER-85. Although the term
"author's right of personality" seems preferable to the term "moral right" for conveying
the idea that the rights at issue are viewed as arising out of the creator's personality, see
Netanel, supra note 17, at 383 n.162, in this Article I follow the convention of using the
term "moral right."
Neil Netanel has pointed to four other continental alienability restrictions that
protect an author's artistic control over her work: the author's right to revoke a transfer
if the transferee fails to exploit the work in certain ways; rules that require courts to
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droit de divulgation, or right of disclosure;41 the droit de repentir ou de
retrait, or right to correct or withdraw works previously disclosed to
the public; 42 the droit de paternitM, or right of attribution; and the droit
au respect de l'oeuvre, literally "the right to respect of the work,"
usually translated as the right of integrity.43 These rights are
inalienable and, to the extent that at least some purported waivers
construe contractual provisions against the transferee, or to narrow the scope of a
transfer; the prohibition against retransfer of a work without the copyright owner's
permission; and restrictions on the transferability of rights in works not yet created. See
Netanel, supra note 17, at 388-92. Many countries, including France and Germany, also
accord visual artists a right, known as the droit de suite, to share in the proceeds from the
resale of their works. See French Act, supra note 39, art. 42; German Act, supra note 36,
art. 26; see also Dietz, supra note 36, § 4[3][e], at GER-61 (discussing German law of droit
de suite); Lucas & Plaisant, supra, § 4[3][e], at FRA-83 (discussing French law of droit de
suite). These additional rights are beyond the scope of this Article.
41. This right, codified in article L.121-2 of the French Act, supra note 39, and article
12(1) of the German Act, supra note 36, recognizes the artist's exclusive right to
determine when his work is completed and to determine when, if ever, the work is ready
to be disclosed to the public. For representative cases, see, for example, Cass. le civ.,
Mar. 13, 1900, D.P. I 1900, 497 (the Whistler case) (refusing to compel artist to deliver a
promised canvas, in light of artist's representation that it was not complete) and CA Paris,
le, Mar. 6, 1931, D.P. II 1931, 88 (ordering destruction, in accordance with artist's wishes,
of paintings defendants had found and restored after artist had discarded them). The
relevant legal principles have been explored extensively elsewhere. See, e.g., Frangon,
supra note 39, at 214; Damich, supra note 17, at 8-12; DaSilva, supra note 17, at 17-20;
Dietz, supra note 36, § 7[1][a], at GER-85 to -86; Lucas & Plaisant, supra note 40,
§ 7[1][a], at FRA-99 to -100; Merryman, supra note 17, at 1024-25, 1028; Netanel, supra
note 17, at 383-85; Roeder, supra note 17, at 558-60; Raymond Sarraute, Current Theory
on the Moral Right of Authors and Artists Under French Law, 16 AM. J. COMP. L. 465,
467-70 (1968); William Strauss, The Moral Right of the Author, 4 AM. J. COMP. L. 506,
511-13 (1955).
42. This right, codified in the French Act, guarantees the author a right of correction
or retraction even after she has transferred the copyright to her work, on condition that
she "indemnify the transferee beforehand for the loss that the correction or retraction
may cause him." French Act, supra note 39, art. L.121.4. The German Act provides a
similar retraction right but does not state whether the author is entitled to correct his
work. In practice, these rights are rarely invoked. See German Act, supra note 36, § 42.
For discussions, see Danich, supra note 17, at 24-25, DaSilva, supra note 17, at 25,
Netanel, supra note 17, at 385-86, Sarraute, supra note 41, at 477, and Strauss, supra note
41, at 513.
43. Article L.121.1 of the French Act codifies these latter two rights, stating that
"[t]he author shall enjoy the right of respect for his name, his authorship, and his work,"
and that "[t]his right shall be attached to his person." French Act, supra note 39, art.
L.121.1. The analogous provision of the German Act is article 13, which states that the
author "shall have the right of recognition of his authorship of the work," may "determine
whether the work is to bear an author's designation and what designation is to be used,"
and "shall have the right to prohibit any distortion or any other mutilation of his work
which would prejudice his lawful intellectual or personal interests in the work." German
Act, supra note 36, art. 13.
44. See French Act, supra note 39, art. 6; Dietz, supra note 36, § 7[4], at GER-92;
Lucas & Plaisant, supra note 40, § 7[4][a], at FRA-110.
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may be deemed unenforceable or revocable, nonwaivable." In
France, the moral right also is perpetual," while in Germany it
expires when the author's copyright expires, seventy years after the
author's death."
The most important aspects of the moral right are the rights of
attribution and integrity. With respect to the former, French and
German law recognize (1) a right against misattribution (being
attributed as the author of another's work,49 or having another
attributed as the author of one's own work);' (2) a right against
nonattribution (the omission of one's name from one's own work);"'
(3) a right to publish anonymously or pseudonymously;52 and (4) a
right to void a promise to publish anonymously or pseudonymously. 3
45. See Edward J. Damich, The New York Artists' Authorship Rights Act: A
Comparative Critique, 84 COLUM. L. REv. 1733, 1744 (1984) (suggesting that waivers are
generally unenforceable under French law); Dietz, supra note 36, § 7[4], at GER-93
("[O]ne can say that the core of moral right protection always remains 'with' the
authors."); Lucas & Plaisant, supra note 40, § 7[4][a], at FRA-110 (discussing
inalienability and waivability), § 7[4][b], at FRA-112 (discussing waivability). But see
Lucas & Plaisant, supra note 40, § 7[4][b], at FRA-113 ("The Cour de cassation, while
reaffirming the principle that the respect due the work 'prohibits any alteration or
change,' has stated that this right is 'subject to limitations of the author's moral right
resulting from agreements which the author may have entered into regarding his works
.... '" (quoting Cass. le civ., Dec. 17, 1991, 152 REVUE INT'L DU DROIT D'AUTEUR
1992, 190)). An author who permits an adaptation of her work, however, may be deemed
to have waived any objection to changes that do not seriously distort that work. See infra
text accompanying notes 68-70.
46. See French Act, supra note 39, art. 6; Lucas & Plaisant, supra note 40, § 713], at
FRA-110.
47. See Dietz, supra note 36, § 7[3], at GER-91.
48. See Damich, supra note 17, at 13; DaSilva, supra note 17, at 26; Merryman, supra
note 17, at 1027; Netanel, supra note 17, at 386-87; Strauss, supra note 41, at 508-09.
49. See DaSilva, supra note 17, at 26; Neil Weinstock Netanel, Alienability
Restrictions and the Enhancement of Author Autonomy in United States and Continental
Copyright Law, 12 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1, 34 (1994); Strauss, supra note 41, at
508. Netanel argues, however, that, strictly speaking, this "right against false attribution
is not properly included in the author's right of attribution, since it pertains to general
reputational interests, rather than to the relationship between an author and his work."
Netanel, supra, at 34 n.170 (citing Damich, supra note 17, at 13).
50. See Damich, supra note 17, at 13 (citing HENRi DESBOIS, LE DROIT D'AUTEUR
ENFRANCE 510 (3d ed. 1978)); Dietz, supra note 36, § 7[1][b], at GER-86 to -87; Lucas &
Plaisant, supra note 40, § 7[1][b], at FRA-102.
51. See Damich, supra note 17, at 13; DaSilva, supra note 17, at 26; Dietz, supra note
36, § 7[1][b], at GER-86; Lucas & Plaisant, supra note 40, § 7[1][b], at FRA-101 to -102;
Merryman, supra note 17, at 1027; Netanel, supra note 17, at 386; Sarraute, supra note 41,
at 478; Strauss, supra note 41, at 508-09.
52. See Dietz, supra note 36, § 7[1][b], at GER-86 to -87; Lucas & Plaisant, supra note
40, § 7[1][b], at FRA-101.
53. See, e.g., CA Paris, le ch., Nov. 15, 1966, Gaz. Pal. 1967, 1, pan. jurisp., 17, note
Sarraute (refusing to enforce agreement to sign works pseudonymously); see also Dietz,
[Vol. 76
THE DROIT MORAL
My principal focus in this Article, however, is on the right of
integrity, the precise scope of which is somewhat more difficult to
define. At a minimum, the right prevents the alteration of the artist's
work in a manner that injures his honor or reputation- Under a
more expansive definition, the right protects against acts that
"mistreat[ ] an expression of the artist's personality, affect[ ] his
artistic identity, personality, and honor, and thus impair[ ] a legally
protected personality interest, "" or against the public presentation of
the artist's work "in a manner or context that is harmful to [the
artist's] reputation or contrary to [the artist's] intellectual interests,
personal style, or literary, artistic or scientific conceptions."56 Still
others argue that the right obligates the transferee of a work to
"preserve and publicly display or disseminate the author's work in
accordance with the author's wishes, notwithstanding any contractual
provision to the contrary. '
Courts have found violations of the artist's right of integrity
when, for example, the defendant painted over s cut up, 9 or
otherwise destroyed the artist's work;+  displayed distorted
supra note 36, § 7[4], at GER-93 (stating that ghost writer's waiver of attribution right is
generally binding, except in "special circumstances" in which "we encounter the core of
an author's moral rights that may not be fully alienable or waivable"); Lucas & Plaisant,
supra note 40, § 7[4][b], at FRA-112 (stating that author may renounce attribution right
temporarily, but that he retains "the right to reveal himself as author of the work at some
subsequent point and in lawful fashion").
54. See, e.g., Roeder, supra note 17, at 569 ("The doctrine of moral rights finds one
social basis in the need of the creator for protection of his honor and reputation.").
55. Merryman, supra note 17, at 1027.
56. Netanel, supra note 17, at 387 (citing Stig Str6mholm, Droit Moral-The
International and Comparative Scene from a Scandinavian Viewpoint, 14 INT'L REV.
INDUs. PROP. & COPYRIGHTL. 1, 30 (1983)).
57. Id. at 388 (citing Damich, supra note 17, at 20-22; Andrd Frangon & Jane C.
Ginsburg, Authors' Rights in France: The Moral Right of the Creator of a Commissioned
Work to Compel the Commissioning Party to Complete the Work, 9 ART & LAW 381, 389(1985)).
58. See RGZ 79, 397, 398 (affirming judgment in favor of artist, when homeowner
who commissioned mural subsequently painted over certain portions of it), discussed in
Merryman, supra note 17, at 1038 n.56, and Geri J. Yonover, The "Dissing" of da Vinci:
The Imaginary Case of Leonardo v. Duchamp: Moral Rights, Parody, and Fair Use, 29
VAL. U. L. REv. 935,948 n.79 (1995). But see CA Paris, le ch., Apr. 27, 1934, D.H. 1934,
385 (rejecting artist's claim for damages for destruction of murals he painted on walls of
church without authorization of diocese that owned church).
59. See Cass. le civ., July 6, 1965, Gaz. Pal. 1965, 2, pan. jurispr., 126 (affirmingjudgment for artist, who objected to owner's separation and sale of one of six panels of
refrigerator artist decorated).
60. Although neither the French nor the German statute expressly forbids the
destruction of the artist's work, some courts have held that destruction violates the
author's rights. See CA Paris, 25e ch., July 10, 1975, D. 1977, 342 (awarding artist
damages for the harm suffered when shopping center owner removed and destroyed
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reproductions of the work;61 staged a play or opera contrary to the
author's6 2 or designer's6 directions, or with substantial additions or
deletions to the text;' colorized a film;' or otherwise presented the
artist's work out of context.66 In some of these cases, the right of
integrity may be viewed as overlapping with the right of attribution-
as, for example, when the artist believes that his work has been so
distorted that it can no longer truthfully be attributed to him.67
Courts have limited the right of integrity in two important
respects. First, the owner of the physical object in which the work is
embodied is generally entitled to use the work in ways that do not
materially impinge upon the work's integrity or that are reasonable
under the circumstances.6 Second, the courts generally permit one
fountain designed by the artist); Conseil d'Etat, Apr. 3, 1936, D.P. III, 57 (recognizing
sculptor's right to damages, when town council failed to properly maintain public
sculpture and subsequently removed it). But see CA Paris, le ch., Apr. 27, 1934, D.H.
1934, 385 (discussed supra note 58); Trib. adm. Grenoble, Feb. 18, 1976, Rev. trim. de
Droit comm. 1976, 120 (rejecting artist's request to order city to reassemble decaying
monument that city had removed on ground of public safety), discussed in Damich, supra
note 45, at 1747 & n.101, and Damich, supra note 17, at 19.
61. See T.G.I. Paris, 3e ch., Mar. 13, 1973, JCP 1974 IV, 224 (providing a summary of
decision holding that department store violated painter's moral right by using distorted
reproductions of painter's works as window displays).
62. See T.G.I. Paris, 3e ch., Oct. 15, 1992, 155 REVUE INT'L Du DROIT D'AUTEUR
1993, 225 (holding that director violated Samuel Beckett's moral right by staging Waiting
for Godot with leads, contrary to Beckett's stage directions, played by two women).
63. See Trib. civ. Seine, Oct. 15, 1954, 6 REVUE INT'L DU DROIT D'AUTEUR 1955,
146 (holding that a theater company violated stage designer's moral right by omitting
scenery from opera without stage designer's permission and awarding damages to the
stage designer), discussed in Merryman, supra note 17, at 1029-30. But see CA Paris, le
ch., May 11, 1965, D. 1967, 555 (denying Salvador Dali's request for relief against theater
that represented, as Dali's work, costumes begun by Dali but completed by others), aff'd,
Cass. le civ., March 5, 1968, D. 1968, 382, discussed in DaSilva, supra note 17, at 34, and
Lucas & Plaisant, supra note 40, § 7[c][i], at FRA-102 to -103.
64. See BGHZ 55, 1 (affirming judgment that defendant violated author's moral right
by producing operetta Maske in Blau with material alterations and deletions), discussed in
Netanel, supra note 17, at 387 & n.181 (citing Paul Goldstein, Adaptation Rights and
Moral Rights in the United Kingdom, the United States and the Federal Republic of
Germany, 14 INT'L REV. INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 43,57 (1983)).
65. See Cass. le civ., May 28, 1991, 149 REVUE INT'L DU DROIT D'AUTEUR 1991, 197
(enjoining broadcast of colorized version of John Huston's film The Asphalt Jungle).
66. See, e.g., CA Paris, le ch., Jan. 13, 1953, Gaz. Pal. 1953, 1, pan. jurispr., 191
(finding defendants violated Soviet composers' moral rights by inserting their musical
compositions into anti-Soviet film); see also Lucas & Plaisant, supra note 40, § 7[c][i], at
FRA-103 (discussing other cases). But see Cass. le civ., Dec. 3, 1968, D. 1969, 73
(rejecting argument that broker must refrain from flooding market with artist's work in
order to drive down price).
67. See, e.g., Strauss, supra note 41, at 509.
68. See Damich, supra note 17, at 23 (noting limitations upon exercise of right of
integrity under French law); DaSilva, supra note 17, at 34 (noting that "many courts limit
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who has been authorized to adapt a work into another medium to
make such changes as may be necessary to transfer the work into that
medium, as long as the adapter does not grossly distort the work.69
As a consequence of these rather vague limitations, a court may be
called upon to make a quasi-aesthetic judgment as to whether a given
use or adaptation is consistent with the spirit of the original work.'
C. Moral Rights in the United States
In comparison with their French and German counterparts,
American courts and legislatures were slow to embrace the concept
of moral right in works of authorship. Writing in the Harvard Law
Review in 1940, Martin Roeder argued that a mix of Anglo-American
common-law doctrines already provided artists in this country with
something akin to moral rights protection under some limited
circumstances.7 The authorities Roeder cited in support of an
attribution right, however, were precarious, and he conceded that a
the exercise of droit au respect to protection of 'the material integrity of the work'"
(quoting Dominique Giocanti, Moral Rights: Authors' Protection and Business Needs, 10
J. INT'L L. & ECON. 627, 640 (1975))); Dietz, supra note 36, § 7[1][c], at GER-87 (stating
that German law precludes author from asserting moral right "in vexatious legal actions
because of his hypersensitive reactions to slight changes in his work"), § 7[2], at GER-88
to -91 (noting other limitations on exercise of moral right); Robert A. Gorman, Federal
Moral Rights Legislation: The Need for Caution, 14 NOVA L. REV. 421, 426 (1990)
(stating that moral right has "not been enforced when a user is taking action that is
consistent with 'proper usage' or with the 'accepted manner and extent' or that is
'reasonable' or 'de minimis' "); Lucas & Plaisant, supra note 40, § 7[2], at FRA-107 to
-110 (stating that courts have responsibility of preventing authors from abusively
exercising moral right, and that "author's right to respect for his work has to be
reconciled with the rights of the owner of the material object embodying the work");
Netanel, supra note 17, at 397-98 (discussing restrictions on authors' rights under French
and German law).
69. See Damich, supra note 17, at 15-16, 23; DaSilva, supra note 17, at 34-36; Dietz,
supra note 36, §§ 72], 7[4], at GER-88 to -95; Gorman, supra note 68, at 426-27; Lucas &
Plaisant, supra note 40, § 7[4][a], at FRA-110 to -111.
70. See DaSilva, supra note 17, at 36-37; Gorman, supra note 68, at 426-27, 429;
Sarraute, supra note 41, at 482.
71. See Roeder, supra note 17, at 578.
72. For example, Roeder noted one case in which a court, citing a privacy theory, had
upheld the right of a pseudonymous author to prevent the publication under his real name
of certain works that had fallen into the public domain; but he neglected to mention the
fact that, at a later proceeding in the same case, the court expressly reversed itself on this
issue. See id. at 562 (citing Ellis v. Hurst, 121 N.Y.S. 438 (Sup. Ct. 1910)); cf. Ellis v.
Hurst, 128 N.Y.S. 144, 146-47 (Sup. Ct. 1910), affid mem., 130 N.Y.S. 1110 (App. Div.
1911) (holding that the defendants had the right to state the true name of the author).
Roeder also cited, as further support for a common-law right of attribution, a case in
which only one of the three judges of a New York appellate panel had concluded that the
plaintiff author had a right, absent agreement to the contrary, to have his work attributed
to him rather than published without attribution. See Roeder, supra note 17, at 562-63
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plaintiff wishing to vindicate a quasi-right of integrity under a libel or
unfair competition theory would face substantial obstacles.73 In the
decades to follow, courts for the most part narrowly construed these
common-law analogues of moral rights. Except for the occasional
case involving an alleged false attribution,74 courts generally refused
to acknowledge attribution rights' and were equally disinclined to
recognize an expansive right of integrity.7' These decisions led one
prominent scholar to conclude that, as of 1976, "[tlhe moral right of
the artist, and in particular that component called the right of
integrity of the work of art, simply does not exist in our law.""
Over the past twenty years, however, the picture has changed, as
courts and legislatures gradually have begun to recognize, and to
expand upon, an American doctrine of moral right. The first
significant development occurred in 1976, in the case of Gilliam v.
American Broadcasting Cos.,78 when the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit endorsed a limited version of moral
(citing Clemens v. Press Publ'g Co., 122 N.Y.S. 206 (Sup. Ct. 1910)). Roeder did cite
some cases, however, in which courts had affirmed authors' rights to prevent others from
falsely attributing works to them, typically under a libel or unfair competition theory. See
id. at 563-64 (collecting cases).
73. As Roeder explained, in some cases the publication of a deformed version of an
author's work might be viewed as defaming the author's reputation or misrepresenting
the source of the work. See Roeder, supra note 17, at 566-70. Roeder noted, however,
that the defamation theory often would be of limited utility in light of (1) the rule that
equity will not enjoin a libel (thereby limiting the prospective plaintiff to money
damages); (2) certain technical rules relating to pleading and proof in libel cases; and (3)
the inapplicability of libel as a safeguard for the rights of creators of non-literary works or
deceased authors. See id. at 567. Similarly, the law of unfair competition would provide a
remedy only when the deformation of the plaintiff's work caused or threatened economic
harm. See id. at 567-68.
74. See, e.g., Granz v. Harris, 198 F.2d 585,588 (2d Cir. 1952) (stating that defendant
would be liable for unfair competition when defendant, after deleting eight minutes of
music from a recording produced by plaintiff, marketed the altered recording with
attribution to plaintiff).
75. See, e.g., Vargas v. Esquire, Inc., 164 F.2d 522, 526 (7th Cir. 1947). But see
Harms, Inc. v. Tops Music Enters., 160 F. Supp. 77,83 (S.D. Cal. 1958) (citing Clemens for
proposition that courts "protect against ... the omission of the author's name unless, by
contract, the right is given to the publisher to do so").
76. See, e.g., Crimi v. Rutgers Presbyterian Church, 89 N.Y.S.2d 813, 818 (Sup. Ct.
1949) (rejecting claim that artist retained rights in his work following unconditional sale,
when defendant church had painted over mural earlier commissioned from plaintiff);
Shostakovich v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 80 N.Y.S.2d 575, 577-79 (Sup. Ct.
1948) (rejecting Soviet composers' claims that use of their noncopyrighted works as
background music for an anti-Soviet film constituted a violation of their rights of privacy
or a libel, and declining to recognize a separate moral rights doctrine), aff'd mem., 87
N.Y.S.2d 430 (App. Div. 1949).
77. Merryman, supra note 17, at 1035-36 (footnote omitted).
78. 538 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1976).
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fights protection under federal copyright and statutory unfair
competition principles. The plaintiffs, members of the popular
comedy troupe Monty Python, had agreed with the British
Broadcasting Corporation ("BBC") that the troupe would write and
deliver scripts for a series of television programs, subject to the
conditions that BBC could make only minor changes in the work
without prior consultation with the writers, and that the writers
otherwise retained all rights in the scripts." In 1973, BBC licensed
the right to distribute the series in the United States to Time-Life
Films, which in turn licensed the American Broadcasting Company
("ABC") to broadcast two ninety-minute specials, each comprising
three thirty-minute Monty Python programs.' When ABC's
broadcast of the first special, however, omitted twenty-four of the
original ninety minutes of recording-allegedly to make time for
commercials and to delete portions ABC deemed offensive or
obscene-Monty Python sued to enjoin the scheduled broadcast of
the second special, alleging violations of its rights under copyright
law and under § 43(a) of the Lanham Act."
Although unsuccessful in their attempt to convince the district
court to issue a preliminary injunction," the plaintiffs prevailed on
appeal, with the Second Circuit expressly finding a likelihood of
success on the merits for both the copyright and Lanham Act claims.'
With respect to the copyright claim, the court concluded that, just as
a copying of the television programs also would constitute, for
copyright purposes, a copying of the underlying work (the scripts) on
which the programs were based, ABC's editing of the programs also
constituted an editing of those scripts.' In view of the fact that
79. See idU at 17.
80. See id. at 17-18.
81. See id. at 18-20 & n.3, 23-24. In relevant part, the current version of Lanham Act
§ 43(a) states:
Any person who, on or in connection with arny goods or services ... uses in
commerce any word, term, name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof,
or any false designation of origin, false or misleading description of fact, or false
or misleading representation of fact, which ... is likely to cause confusion, or to
cause mistake, or to deceive as to the affiliation, connection, or association of
such person with another person, or as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of
his or her goods, services, or commercial activities by another person ... shall be
liable in a civil action by any person who believes that he or she is or is likely to
be damaged by such act.
15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1) (1994).
82. See Gilliam, 538 F.2d at 18.
83. See id. at 19-26.
84. See id. at 19-23.
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Monty Python had never expressly authorized BBC (or anyone else)
to materially edit the scripts, however, ABC's acts violated the
troupe's exclusive right to editorial control." With respect to the
Lanham Act claim, the court 'agreed with the plaintiffs that the
broadcast of a distorted version of their work falsely represented that
work as originating from Monty Python, concluding that "an
allegation that a defendant has presented to the public a 'garbled,'
distorted version of plaintiff's work seeks to redress the very rights
sought to be protected by the Lanham Act.'' " Subsequent decisions
have expressed agreement with the Gilliam court's view that
substantial unauthorized editing may violate the copyright owner's
exclusive right to adapt her work,' and that § 43(a) provides a cause
of action for passing off a materially distorted version of the
plaintiff's work as the genuine item." Courts also have concluded
that defendants may be liable under § 43(a) for falsely attributing the
plaintiff's work to the defendant, 9 or vice versa;,° for falsely
attributing a jointly authored work to only one co-author;9' and for
falsely advertising a plaintiff's earlier works as recent ones.2
A second development was the passage, beginning in the late
1970s, of state moral rights statutes.' The first of these was the
85. See id. at 21. Although the court did not specify the source of this right of
editorial control, it probably is best viewed as an aspect of the author's exclusive right,
under 17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (1994), to prepare derivative works. See, e.g., 3 MELVILLE B.
NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 8D.04[A][1], at 8D-51 (1996); see
also WGN Continental Broad. Co. v. United Video, Inc., 693 F.2d 622, 626 (7th Cir. 1982)
(stating that if book seller were to inscribe Lord's Prayer on blank inside covers of book
he would infringe publisher's copyright); National Bank of Commerce v. Shaklee Corp.,
503 F. Supp. 533, 542-45 (W.D. Tex. 1980) (holding that unauthorized addition of
advertising materials to copyrighted book constituted infringement).
86. Gilliam, 538 F.2d at 24-25 (citation omitted).
87. See supra note 85 (citing cases).
88. See, e.g., Choe v. Fordham Univ. Sch. of Law, 920 F. Supp. 44, 47-49 (S.D.N.Y.
1995), aff'dper curiam, 81 F.3d 319 (2d Cir. 1996).
89. See, e.g., Waldman Publ'g Corp. v. Landoll, Inc., 43 F.3d 775, 780-85 (2d Cir.
1994).
90. See, e.g., King v. Innovation Books, 976 F.2d 824,828-29 (2d Cir. 1992).
91. See Lamothe v. Atlantic Recording Corp., 847 F.2d 1403, 1405-08 (9th Cir. 1988).
92. See, e.g., Benson v. Paul Winley Record Sales Corp., 452 F. Supp. 516, 517-18
(S.D.N.Y. 1978). For further discussion of the protection of moral rights under § 106(2)
of the Copyright Act and § 43(a) of the Lanham Act, see 3 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY,
MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION §§ 27:77 to :90 (4th ed. 1997);
3 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 85, §§ 8D.03, 8D.04.
93. So far, fourteen states (California, Connecticut, Illinois, Louisiana, Maine,
Massachusetts, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Pennsylvania, Rhode
Island, South Dakota, and Utah) and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico have enacted
some form of moral rights legislation. See Yonover, supra note 58, at 957-61 & n.126; see
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California Art Preservation Act,' which recognizes moral rights in
"fine art," defined as "an original painting, sculpture, or drawing, or
an original work of art in glass, of recognized quality."'95 The Act
recognizes both an attribution right, which allows the artist to "retain
at all times the right to claim authorship, or, for a just and valid
reason, to disclaim authorship of his or her work of fine art,"96 and an
integrity right, which prohibits the intentional "physical defacement,
mutilation, alteration, or destruction of a work of fine art."' These
rights terminate fifty years after the artist's death,98 unless the artist
has chosen to waive them in a signed written instrument.99 In a
provision unique among state and federal moral rights laws,
California law also authorizes "[a]n organization acting in the public
interest" to "commence an action for injunctive relief to preserve or
restore the integrity of a work of fine art" from the acts proscribed
under § 987(c)."®
Among the other state statutes, the one that has generated the
most case law and commentary is the New York Artists Authorship
also P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 31, §§ 1401-1401h (1993) (recognizing that an author has the
exclusive right to benefit from and dispose of his work in accordance with the special laws
in effect on the matter).
94. CAL. CIv. CODE § 987 (West Supp. 1997).
95. Id. § 987(b)(2). Because the Act does not define the word "original," "it is not
clear whether a reproduction of the work, as distinguished from the work as first executed
by the artist, is protected" under the Act. 3 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 85,
§ 8D.07[A], at 8D-99 n.6; cf Damich, supra note 45, at 1741 (concluding that
reproductions are not covered). To decide whether a work is "of recognized quality," the
tiier of fact is directed to "rely on the opinions of artists, art dealers, collectors of fine art,
curators of art museums, and other persons involved with the creation or marketing of
fine art." CAL. CIV. CODE § 987(f).
96. CAL. CIV. CODE § 987(d). For a discussion of what may count as a "just and valid
reason," see 3 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 85, § 8D.08[B], at 8D-107.
97. CAL. CIV. CODE § 987(c)(1). In addition, the Act forbids any person who frames,
conserves, or restores a work of fine art from committing a physical defacement,
mutilation, alteration, or destruction of the work "by any act constituting gross
negligence," defined as "the exercise of so slight a degree of care as to justify the belief
that there was an indifference to the particular work of fine art." Id. § 987(c)(2).
98. See id. § 987(g)(1).
99. See id. § 987(g)(3). The artist is deemed to have waived her rights, however, if
the "work of fine art cannot be removed from a building without substantial physical
defacement, mutilation, alteration, or destruction of the work," unless she expressly has
reserved her rights in a written instrument "signed by the owner of the building,
containing a legal description of the property and properly recorded." Id. § 987(h)(1).
The Act goes on to prescribe various steps to be taken before removing a work that is
capable of being removed from a building without suffering substantial harm. See id.
§ 987(h)(2)-(3).
100. Id. § 989(c); see also id. § 989(b) (discussing further requirements); § 989(e)
(imposing restrictions if work cannot be removed from real property without suffering
substantial harm).
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Rights Act.1"' The New York Act applies not only to original works
of "fine art" (defined as a "painting, sculpture, drawing, or work of
graphic art, and print, but not multiples"), 12 but also to "limited
edition multiples of not more than three hundred copies" ' 3 and to
reproductions." Like the California Act, the New York Act
recognizes an attribution right that allows the artist both to claim
authorship and, "for just and valid reason," to disclaim it."' The New
York Act also recognizes an integrity fight, which forbids anyone
other than the artist (or someone acting with his consent) from
knowingly displaying in a place accessible to the public, or publishing,
such a work
in an altered, defaced, mutilated or modified form if the
work is displayed, published or reproduced as being the
work of the artist, or under circumstances under which it
would reasonably be regarded as being the work of the
artist, and damage to the artist's reputation is reasonably
likely to result therefrom, except that this section shall not
apply to sequential imagery such as that in motion
pictures."6
Unlike the California Act, the New York Act does not create any
statutory exceptions for works that are incorporated into buildings;
does not expressly permit the artist to waive his rights;" and does not
specify when his rights terminate.1 0
A third major development in the history of droit moral in the
101. N.Y. ARTS & CULT. AE. LAW § 14.03 (McKinney Supp. 1997).
102. Id. § 11.01(9).
103. Id. § 14.03(1). In the case of works of fine art, or of limited edition multiples, the
Act applies only if the works or multiples are "knowingly displayed in a place accessible
to the public, published or reproduced" in the State of New York. Id. § 14.03(3)(e).
104. See id. § 11.01(16).
105. Id. § 14.03(2)(a). A "just and valid reason" may include the fact "that the work
has been altered, defaced, mutilated or modified other than by the artist, without the
artist's consent, and damage to the artist's reputation is reasonably likely to result or has
resulted therefrom." Id
106. Id. § 14.03(1). The Act also exempts "[a]lteration, defacement, mutilation or
modification ... resulting from the passage of time or the inherent nature of the
materials," unless such alteration, defacement, mutilation, or modification is the result of
gross negligence in maintaining or protecting the work; any "change that is an ordinary
result of the medium of reproduction"; and any conservation efforts, unless shown to be
negligent. Id. § 14.03(3)(a)-(c).
107. For a discussion of whether waivers are enforceable under New York law, see
Damich, supra note 45, at 1744-45.
108. Damich argues that the author's rights probably terminate upon his death. See id.
at 1748; see also Sarah Ann Smith, The New York Artists' Authorship Rights Act:
Increased Protection and Enhanced Status for VisualArtists, 70 CoRNELL L. REV. 158, 179
(1984) (same).
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United States is the passage of the federal Visual Artists Rights Act
of 1990 ("VARA"),' which amends the Copyright Act of 1976 by
expressly providing for limited federal recognition of moral rights.10
Like the California and New York statutes,"' VARA's scope is
limited, applying only to "works of visual art," which are defined as
(1) paintings, drawings, prints, or sculptures existing in a single copy
or in specified limited edition copies,"' or (2) still photographic
109. Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, §§ 601-610, 104 Stat. 5089,
5128-33 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.).
110. Pressure to enact some form of federal moral rights protection increased
following the United States's accession in 1988 to the Berne Convention, article 6bis of
which requires signatory nations to provide authors with "the right to claim authorship of
the work and to object to any distortion, mutilation or other modification of, or other
derogatory action in relation to, the said work, which would be prejudicial to his honor or
reputation." Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9,
1886, art. 6bis, as last revised, Paris, July 24, 1971, 25 U.S.T. 1341, 828 U.N.T.S. 221, 235.
In ratifying the Convention, Congress initially took the position that existing laws were
sufficient to satisfy the obligations imposed by article 6bis. See Berne Convention
Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568, § 2(3), 102 Stat. 2853 (1989) (published
in the notes following 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994)); S. REP. No. 100-352, at 9-10, 38-39 (1988),
reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3706, 3714-15, 3735-36; H.R. REP. No. 100-609, at 32-40
(1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3749, 3773-80; 3 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note
85, § 8D.02[D][1], at 8D-16 n.39. The decision to enact VARA shortly thereafter may be
viewed as a reversal of this interpretation of article 6bis, although it is doubtful that
VARA would have passed when it did, had the sponsors of a bill creating 85 new federal
judgeships not agreed to include in their bill several unrelated pieces of legislation,
including VARA, in order to appease senators who otherwise threatened to withhold
their support. See Yonover, supra note 58, at 965-66 (quoting George C. Smith, Let the
Buyer of Art Beware: Artists' Moral Rights Trump Owners' Property Rights Under the
VisualArtists Rights Act, RECORDER, Jan. 10, 1991, at 4).
111. Although VARA preempts "all legal or equitable rights that are equivalent to
any of the rights conferred by section 106A with respect to works of visual art to which
the rights conferred by section 106A apply," 17 U.S.C. § 301(f)(1), it leaves intact any
state laws with respect to "activities violating legal or equitable rights that are not
equivalent to any of the rights conferred by section 106A with respect to works of visual
art," and "activities violating legal or equitable rights which extend beyond the life of the
author." Id. § 301(f)(2)(B)-(C). Generally speaking, then, it would appear that a state
may extend moral rights protection to works that do not qualify as "works of visual art"
under VARA and may recognize moral rights, in addition to the rights of attribution and
integrity established under VARA, in works of visual art and other works of authorship.
Several preemption puzzles, however, which are beyond the scope of this Article, persist.
For further discussion of preemption issues, see, for example, 3 NIMMER & NIMMER,
supra note 85, § 8D.06[FJ[2], at 8D-91 to -94, Edward J. Damich, The Visual Artists Rights
Act of 1990: Toward a Federal System of Moral Rights Protection for Visual Art, 39 CATH.
U. L. REV. 945, 972-73 (1990), Robert A. Gorman, Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990, 38 J.
COPYRIGHT Soc'y 233, 239-41 (1991), and Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, How Fine Art Fares
Post VARA, 1 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REv. (forthcoming 1997).
112. See 17 U.S.C. § 101. Limited editions of "200 copies or fewer that are signed and
consecutively numbered by the author, or, in the case of a sculpture, in multiple cast,
carved, or fabricated sculptures of 200 or fewer that are consecutively numbered by the
author and bear the signature or other identifying mark of the author" fall within the
1997]
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images produced for exhibition purposes only, existing in a single
copy signed by the author or in certain limited edition copies.1 3 All
other works (including motion pictures, literary works, and all "works
made for hire") are outside the scope of the Act,1 4 as are
reproductions of works of visual art other than the specified limited
edition copies " and any work created before the Act's effective date
(June 1, 1991) if the author had transferred title to it prior to that
date.1
6
Like the state statutes, VARA recognizes both attribution and
integrity rights. The former include the rights to claim authorship of
the work and to prevent the use of one's name as the author of a
work created by another;"7 in addition, the statute recognizes an
overlapping attribution/integrity right similar to the right at issue in
Gilliam, which allows the author to prevent the use of his or her
name as the author of the work in the event of a "distortion,
mutilation, or other modification ... which would be prejudicial to
his or her honor or reputation."1 8 Finally, VARA establishes an
integrity right "to prevent any intentional distortion, mutilation, or
other modification of that work which would be prejudicial to his or
her honor or reputation" and "to prevent any destruction of a work
of recognized stature."1 9 Unlike her French or German counterpart,
statutory definition. lId
113. See id. Limited editions of "200 copies or fewer that are signed and consecutively
numbered by the author" fall within this definition. Id.
114. See id. A "work made for hire" is "a work prepared by an employee within the
scope of his or her employment" or "a work specially ordered or commissioned" for
certain specified uses. Id.
115. See id. § 106A(c)(3); see also Damich, supra note 111, at 952 (discussing the
exclusion of most reproductions from protection under VARA); Gorman, supra note 111,
at 236 (same).
116. See 17 U.S.C. § 106A(d)(2).
117. See id. § 106A(a)(1)(A)-(B).
118. Id. § 106A(a)(2).
119. Id. § 106A(a)(3)(A)-(B). An intentional distortion, mutilation, or modification of
the work violates the first of the two integrity rights; an intentional or grossly negligent
destruction of the work violates the second. See id Both rights are subject to certain
limitations applicable to works that have been incorporated into or made part of buildings
and that cannot be removed from the building without being destroyed, distorted,
mutilated, or otherwise modified. If the author consented to the installation of such a
work (1) prior to June 1, 1991, the effective date of VARA, or (2) in a written instrument
executed on or after that date, signed by both the author and the owner of the building,
and specifying that installation may subject the work to destruction, distortion, mutilation,
or other modification by reason of its removal, the work is not protected by either the
quasi-integrity right of § 106A(a)(2) or the integrity rights of § 106A(a)(3). See Id
§ 113(d)(1). If the work can be removed without damage, the author retains his integrity
rights unless "the owner has made a diligent, good faith attempt without success to notify
the author of the owner's intended action," or "the owner did provide such notice in
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however, the American author may waive her rights, as long as she
does so in a signed written instrument specifically identifying the
work and the uses to which the waiver applies."2 If not waived, her
rights terminate at death, if the work was created after June 1, 1991.121
Thus far, there have been only two reported cases interpreting
the substantive provisions of VARA. The one, Pavia v. 1120 Avenue
of the Americas Associates,'" holds only that the continued display of
a work that was mutilated prior to June 1, 1991, does not create an
ongoing actionable wrong under VARA.1 The other, Carter v.
Helmsley-Spear, Inc.,24 involved the threatened alteration or removal
writing and the person so notified failed, within 90 days after receiving such notice, either
to remove the work or to pay for its removal." Id § 113(d)(2). In other words, in such a
case the owner may destroy the work if the author is not willing to pay for its removal. In
all other circumstances, the work may not be destroyed without consent of the author.
Modifications resulting from the passage of time or the inherent nature of the
materials used, as well as those resulting from conservation or public presentation (unless
caused by gross negligence), do not violate the artist's right of integrity. See id
§ 106A(c)(1)-(2). These qualifications were added to avoid the situation that arose in a
Canadian case in which the court held that a shopping center violated the moral rights of
a sculptor by decorating his sculpture with ribbons during the Christmas season. See H.R.
REP. No. 101-514, at 17 (1990) (citing Snow v. Eaton Ctr., Ltd., 70 Can. Pat. Rptr. 2d 105
(Ont. High Ct. 1982)), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6915,6927.
120. See 17 U.S.C. § 106A(e)(1). Alternatively, if the author of a work of visual art
that "has been incorporated in or made part of a building in such a way that removing the
work from the building will cause the destruction, distortion, mutilation, or other
modification of the work" consents to the installation "in a written instrument ... that is
signed by the owner of the building and the author and that specifies that installation of
the work may subject the work to destruction, distortion, mutilation, or other
modification, by reason of its removal," the author may not assert a violation of her right
of integrity attributable to such removal. Id § 113(d)(1).
The House report on VARA states that a waiver of moral rights "applies only to the
specific person to whom waiver is made," so that if A, upon selling his work to B, agrees
to waive his moral rights, and B then resells the work to C, A would not be deemed to
have waived his rights as to C. H.R. REP. No. 101-514, at 18-19, reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6928-29. The portion of the report specifically addressing the waiver of
moral rights in works incorporated into buildings, however, states that the § 113(d)(1)(A)
waiver "in effect extends to all subsequent owners of that building." H.R. REP. No. 101-
514, at 20, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6930. The statutory text is silent on the issue
of whether a waiver applies to subsequent purchasers, and it remains to be seen whether
or to what extent the courts will defer to these portions of the legislative history. See
generally 3 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 85, § 8D.06[C][3], at 8D-81; § 8D.06[D], at
8D-84 (discussing legislative history concerning transfers of waivers).
121. See 17 U.S.C. § 106A(d)(1). Works created before June 1, 1991, are covered only
if the author did not transfer title to them prior to that date. Apparently due to a drafting
oversight, moral rights in these earlier-created works do not terminate until 50 years after
the author's death. See icL § 106A(d)(2); 3 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 85,
§ 8D.06[E], at 8D-88 to -89 & n.198.
122. 901 F. Supp. 620 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
123. See 1i. at 628-29.
124. 861 F. Supp. 303 (S.D.N.Y. 1994), affd in part, vacated and rev'd in part, 71 F.3d
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of a sculpture from the lobby of a commercial building located in
Queens, New York. In 1991 the managing agent of the building's
lessee had hired the plaintiff artists to "design, create and install
sculpture and other permanent installations" in the building.,2
Before the work was completed, however, the lessor and its agent
fired the artists and announced their intention to alter or remove the
work, prompting the artists to file suit.'26 Following a bench trial, the
court concluded that the work was a "work of visual art" and not a
work made for hire,'27 that the distortion or mutilation of the work
would be prejudicial to the artists' reputations," and that the work
was of sufficient stature that its destruction also would violate the
act. 29 On the basis of these findings, the court entered an order
forbidding the distortion, mutilation, modification, destruction, or
removal of the work until the last-surviving plaintiff's death.'" On
appeal, however, the Second Circuit reversed, concluding that the
sculpture was a work made for hire, and therefore outside the scope
of VARA.
31
Whether these developments have made a significant difference
in the lives of American artists remains to be seen. Even under the
Gilliam court's expansive reading of the Copyright Act, the author's
right to adapt or edit her work is completely alienable and is
77 (2d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1824 (1996).
125. Id. at 312.
126. See id. at 313.
127. See id. at 314-23.
128. See id. at 323-24. On the basis of the legislative history of VARA, the court
concluded that a plaintiff may prevail under § 106A(a)(3)(A) without having to show that
his reputation is "derived independently of the art work that is the subject of this dispute"
or that he has any "pre-existing standing in the artistic community." Id. at 323 (citing
H.R. REP. No. 101-154, at 15 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6915, 6925). Thus,
the court accepted the testimony of the plaintiffs' expert witnesses that "plaintiffs' honor
and reputation in the artistic community would be damaged if the Work is modified
because the Work would then present to viewers an artistic vision materially different
from that intended by plaintiffs." 1d. at 324.
129. See id. at 324-26. To determine whether a work qualifies as a "work of
recognized stature," the court stated that "a plaintiff must make a two-tiered showing:
(1) that the visual art in question has 'stature,' Le.[,] is viewed as meritorious, and (2) that
this stature is 'recognized' by art experts, other members of the artistic community, or by
some cross-section of society." Id. at 325.
130. See id. at 336-38.
131. See Carter v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 71 F.3d 77, 85-88 (2d Cir. 1995). Specifically,
the court concluded that the artists were employees who had created the sculpture in the
course of their employment, thus rendering the work a work made for hire. See id at 86-
88. Several writers have forcefully criticized this reading of the evidence. See Kwall,
supra note 111, at 6-12; Note, Recent Case, 109 HARV. L. REV. 2110, 2113-15 (1996);
Sculpture Installed in Building Lobby Is Work for Hire, Not Covered by VARA, 51 Pat.
Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) 139, 141 (Dec. 7, 1995).
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enforceable only by the copyright owner, who may be different than
the author.12  Future Monty Pythons who assign their adaptation
rights therefore will have no right under the Copyright Act to prevent
the performance of their scripts in truncated form. And while the
same court's reading of § 43(a) provides the author with a claim
against one who represents a distorted version of the author's work
as genuine, § 43(a) arguably provides no affirmative right of
attribution,' may authorize the court to allow the publication or
performance of an altered work with a disclaimer,13' and may provide
no relief for an author who cannot show some injury to her
reputation.'35 Section 43(a) also would appear to provide no recourse
for a plaintiff who is injured by a defendant's noncommercial activity,
such as (perhaps) the display of an altered work in a not-for-profit
museum.
3 6
The state statutes and VARA also fall short of establishing the
extensive protection guaranteed under French and German law.
Among the deficiencies of the American 'statutes, as viewed from the
standpoint of moral rights advocates, are that the California, New
132. See Note, Protection of Artistic Integrity: Gilliam v. American Broadcasting Cos.,
90 HARV. L. REv. 473,480 n.51 (1976).
133. See Cleary v. News Corp., 30 F.3d 1255, 1260-61 (9th Cir. 1994) (dictum); 3
MCCARTHY, supra note 92, § 27:08[2][c][iii], at 27-113 to -114; § 27:08[3], at 27-124 to
-125 (citations omitted). But see Lamothe v. Atlantic Recording Corp., 847 F.2d 1403,
1407 n.2 (9th Cir. 1988) (suggesting that failure to attribute may be actionable under
§ 43(a) on an implied reverse passing off theory (citing Smith v. Montoro, 648 F.2d 602,
605-06 & n.5 (9th Cir. 1981))).
134. Compare Gilliam v. American Broad. Cos., 538 F.2d 14, 25 n.13 (2d Cir. 1976)
(expressing doubt whether a disclaimer aired at the beginning of ABC's Monty Python
special would have been sufficient to absolve ABC of liability), with id. at 26-27 (Gurfein,
J., concurring) (endorsing disclaimer theory), and Rosenfeld v. Saunders, 728 F. Supp.
236, 243-44 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (denying preliminary injunction, in case involving medical
textbook, on ground that disclaimer was sufficient to prevent consumers from mistakenly
attributing plaintiff's work to defendants), afJ'd mem., 923 F.2d 845 (2d Cir. 1990).
135. See, e.g., Henry Hansmann & Marina Santilli, Authors' and Artists' Moral Rights:
A Comparative Legal and Economic Analysis, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 95, 116 (1997) (stating
that trademark law "might not provide protection to an artist who does not already have a
substantial reputation"); Kwall, supra note 17, at 24 (stating that any protection an author
receives for his personality rights under unfair competition law or § 43(a) is "fortuitous");
cf. Edward J. Damich, A Critique of the Visual Artists Rights Act of 1989, 14 NovA L.
REV. 407, 410-11 (1990) (arguing that author whose communication is distorted suffers
injury to personality, even if she suffers no injury to reputation).
136. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1994) (holding liable only those persons whose activities
constitute a "use[ ] in commerce"); id. § 1127 (defining "use in commerce" to mean "bona
fide use of a mark in the ordinary course of trade"); see also Tax Cap Comm. v. Save Our
Everglades, Inc., 933 F. Supp. 1077, 1080-81 (S.D. Fla. 1996) (holding that nonprofit
political organization's petitions were not "used in commerce" for purposes of § 43(a)). I
thank Margreth Barrett for calling this point to my attention.
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York, and federal acts apply only to visual art; that the protection
afforded under the California Act and portions of VARA is
specifically limited to works of recognized quality or stature; that the
New York Act arguably provides no remedy for alterations that
cause no injury to the artist's reputation; and that both VARA and
the California Act allow the artist to waive her rights.'37 Moreover,
none of the statutes has generated a substantial body of reported case
law,"' and perhaps this fact suggests that they have had little effect
thus far.
The suggestion that the statutes have had little effect is
consistent with some of the findings disclosed in a recent Copyright
Office Report on the Waiver of Moral Rights in Visual Artworks."9
The report discloses that more than one quarter of the respondents
surveyed by the Copyright Office in 1994-95 were unaware that
artists who create certain works of art have moral rights," and it
suggests that written waivers may become increasingly common with
respect to commissioned 'works and works incorporated into
buildings."' Inasmuch as VARA renders oral waivers ineffective,
however, artists who have sold their works pursuant to entirely oral
contracts presumably have not waived their moral rights, whether
they realize those rights exist or not. The fact that oral contracts for
the sale of movable works of art appear to be more common than
137. See, e.g., Damich, supra note 45, at 1735-37.
138. However, case law on the subject is not entirely lacking. See, e.g., Chamberlain v.
Cocola Assocs., 958 F.2d 282, 283-85 (9th Cir. 1992) (rejecting claim that California Act
requires all contracts for the sale of works of art governed by the Act to be in writing);
Pavia v. 1120 Avenue of the Americas Assocs., 901 F. Supp. 620, 624-25 (S.D.N.Y. 1995)
(discussing allegations that defendants publicly displayed plaintiff's sculpture in altered
form stated claim under New York Act); Wojnarowicz v. American Family Ass'n, 745 F.
Supp. 130, 136-41 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (holding that publishing cropped images of plaintiff's
photographs violates New York Act); Morita v. Omni Publications Int'l, Ltd., 741 F.
Supp. 1107, 1114-15 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (holding that publishing photograph of anti-nuclear
sculpture on cover of magazine promoting pro-nuclear stance violates New York Act),
vacated, 760 F. Supp. 45 (S.D.N.Y. 1991); Lubner v. City of Los Angeles, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d
24, 27-29 (Ct. App. 1996) (denying recovery under California Act for negligent
destruction of artist's work); Botello v. Shell Oil Co., 280 Cal. Rptr. 535, 538-40 (Ct. App.
1991) (holding that murals are protected works under California Act); Robert H. Jacobs,
Inc. v. Westoaks Realtors, Inc., 205 Cal. Rptr. 620, 624 (Ct. App. 1984) (holding that
architectural plans are not protected under California Act).
139. See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, WAIVER OF MORAL RIGHTS IN VISUAL
ARTWORKs: A REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS (1996) [hereinafter REPORT].
140. See ad at 132-33.
141. See, e.g., icL at 134 (discussing survey results concerning frequency of waiver
clauses); id. at 144 (discussing waivers); id. at 164-80 (discussing various types of waiver
provisions); id. at 189 (discussing "consensus ... that waivability is necessary for works
incorporated into buildings").
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written contracts 42 therefore suggests that, at least with respect to this
class of works, VARA has altered the balance of power in favor of
the artist. 43 But whether this putative shift in power is meaningful is
an open issue. If movables are less likely than nonmovables to be
intentionally distorted or to subject their owners to suit in the event
of a violation, even this power shift may be illusory.1'
III. A PRAGMATIcANALYSIS OF MORAL RIGHTS
As we have seen, the doctrine of moral right initially developed
out of efforts to apply principles derived from German idealist
philosophy to the emerging field of intellectual property law. In
previous work, however, I have joined with a growing number of
scholars who advocate the application of a radically different
philosophical perspective-a perspective grounded primarily in the
writings of American pragmatists and neopragmatists-to issues of
law and public policy.45 Thus, in this part of the Article, I shall
consider issues relating to the desirability and scope of moral rights
protection from the standpoint of philosophical and legal
pragmatism. I begin in Part A with a discussion of pragmatism
generally, focusing largely on pragmatic theories of aesthetics. In
Part B, I attempt to tease out some of the implications of these
theories for the doctrine of moral right. I conclude that the
recognition of artists' moral rights is consistent with a pragmatic
aesthetic, but that the optimal contours of the right cannot be fully
assessed without a firmer grasp of the likely consequences of
recognition. In Part C, I predict those consequences through the use
of economic analysis. On the basis of this analysis, and while
recognizing its inherent limitations as a decision-making paradigm, I
conclude that a waivable right probably is preferable to a
nonwaivable right if our goal is to increase the well-being of artists
and audiences.
142. See, e.g., id. at 135 (stating that 61% of visual artists surveyed agreed that oral
contracts were most common in the art world); id. at 191 (noting that "most contracts for
sale of moveable art are oral and thus cannot include a valid waiver").
143. See id at 190 (noting lack of "evidence that galleries are refusing to sell works
without waivers," or that abolition of waivers "would affect established artists to the same
degree as lesser-known artists").
144. Cf. id at 141 (statement of Carol Pulin, director of the American Print Alliance)
(suggesting that artists generally are hesitant to assert violations of their moral rights, due
to lack of economic resources and fear of retaliation).
145. See Cotter, supra note 19.
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A. Pragmatic Aesthetics
The term "pragmatic aesthetics" will no doubt strike some
readers as an oxymoron, particularly if the term "pragmatic" is taken
to be a synonym for words such as "practical," "expedient," or (need
I say) "nonaesthetic." In any sense other than the colloquial,
however, this equation of pragmatism with the merely practical or
expedient is erroneous. As a philosophical term, pragmatism refers
to a set of principles or beliefs commonly shared by, among others
and to varying degrees, the philosophers Charles Sanders Peirce,
William James, and John Dewey, as well as contemporary theorists
such as Richard Rorty, Richard Bernstein, and Cornel West; a
diverse body of legal thinkers including Thomas Grey, Richard
Posner, and Margaret Radin; and literary figures such as the poet
Wallace Stevens and the critic Richard Poirier.' 46 Although differing
in many particulars, these authors generally converge upon a view of
human thought-our theories, our norms, our ways of consciously
interacting with the world-as simultaneously both a contingent
human construct, emerging from the context of past experience, '47
and as an instrument that enables the human organism to predict,
control, and cope with its physical and social environment." This
focus on the simultaneously contextual and instrumental character of
thought leads most pragmatists to reject conventional definitions of
truth as correspondence with reality,1 49 as well as attempts to ground
146. See, e.g., RICHARD J. BERNSTEIN, BEYOND OBJECIVISM AND RELATIVISM
(1983); JOHN DEWEY, THE QUEST FOR CERTAINTY (Capricorn Books 1960) (1929);
THOMAS C. GREY, THE WALLACE STEVENS CASE: LAW AND THE PRACTICE OF POETRY
(1991); WILLIAM JAMES, PRAGMATISM (World Publishing Co. 1961) (1907); RICHARD
POIRIER, POETRY AND PRAGMATISM (1992); RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF
JURISPRUDENCE (1990); RICHARD RORTY, CONSEQUENCES OF PRAGMATISM (1982);
CORNEL WEST, THE AMERICAN EVASION OF PHILOSOPHY (1989); CHARLES SANDERS
PEIRCE, What Pragmatism Is, in 5 COLLECTED PAPERS 272 (Charles Hartshorne & Paul
Weiss eds., Belknap Press 1960); Margaret Jane Radin, The Pragmatist and the Feminist,
in PRAGMATISM IN LAW & SOCIETY 127 (Michael Brint & William Weaver eds., 1991).
147. See, e.g., GREY, supra note 146, at 116 n.11 (describing human thought as "an
activity emergent from a context of tacit and culturally constituted practices, rather than
as a set of logical operations upon foundational mental elements").
148. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 4 (1995); Thomas C. Grey,
Holmes and Legal Pragmatism, 41 STAN. L. REV. 787, 798 (1989).
149. See Cotter, supra note 19, at 2075-76. With respect to the related issue of
whether there is some objective truth "out there" waiting to be discovered, there is some
disagreement within the pragmatist camp. Pragmatists following in the tradition of
Dewey and Rorty tend to argue that there is little to be gained from positing the existence
of any such external standard; pragmatists following in the tradition of Peirce tend to
disagree. See id. at 2075-76 & n.23, 2078 n.31, 2081 n.40. For a forceful critique of some
contemporary legal thinkers' apparent adoption of the Peircean view, see Richard
Warner, Why Pragmatism? The Puzzling Place of Pragmatism in Critical Theory, 1993 U.
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our beliefs and norms in some transcendent standard or all-
encompassing "grand theory."15 Instead, for the pragmatist the truth
is, in Williams James's famous phrase, "whatever proves itself to be
good in the way of belief""--whatever proves itself useful, in light of
all its consequences, to the task at hand. On this view, what may
seem "true" "from one angle, for one purpose, at one time, might not
serve as well from another perspective, rooted in another temporal
context, and aimed at different goals." '
Like any other human institution, law can be viewed both as a
product of past experience and as an instrument for the attainment of
specific human purposes. A focus on the instrumental character of
law leads many legal pragmatists to emphasize the importance, for
purposes of choosing among various possible legal rules, of being
able to predict the consequences of those rules through the use of
theories or models of human behavior." At the same time, a
pragmatic emphasis on context and perspective suggests that no
human theory is perfect, but rather that our theories are tentative
and revisable, provisionally serving to illuminate certain phenomena
only at the inevitable cost of obscuring others.- 4 Legal pragmatists
ILL. L. REv. 535,541-44,549-51,555-62.
150. See Warner, supra note 149, at 542-43 (arguing that, for the pragmatist, "there
can be no external standard of evaluation; our norms of justification neither have nor need
a ground outside themselves"); Cotter, supra note 19, at 2075-78, 2082-84; Grey, supra
note 148, at 799; Radin, supra note 146, at 134.
151. JAMES, supra note 146, at 43 (emphasis omitted).
152. Grey, supra note 148, at 804-05; see also Cotter, supra note 19, at 2078-79
(discussing "perspectivism").
153. See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 148, at 15-21; CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LEGAL
REASONING AND POLITICAL CoNFLIcr 19, 97-98 (1996); cf. Michael L. Seigel, A
Pragmatic Critique of Modern Evidence Scholarship, 88 Nw. U. L. REV. 995, 1039-44
(1994) (discussing advantages and disadvantages of applying social scientific methodology
to legal issues). It is important to note, however, that a pragmatic interest in
consequences need not result in the equation of pragmatism with utilitarianism. A
pragmatist may be interested not only in the substantive consequences of a given rule, but
also in its systemic and expressive consequences. A rule constraining judicial discretion
over a specific matter, for example, may be viewed as serving the systemic purpose of
promoting consistency and predictability, which in turn facilitates planning and reliance.
Similarly, a rule prohibiting discrimination on the basis of race or sex may be viewed as
serving the purpose of expressing a common value, aside from whatever other
consequences the rule may have. For further discussion of the similarities and differences
between pragmatism and utilitarianism, see generally Cotter, supra note 19, at 2085
nn.55-56, 2091-95, 2135.
154. See, e.g., GREY, supra note 146, at 106 (describing "[t]heory as the pragmatist
conceives it" as "no more than articulate reflection sufficiently detached from everyday
practice so as to extend premises extracted from that practice, or imported from other
practices, beyond their usual limits"); Cotter, supra note 19, at 2084 n.53 (discussing the
inevitability and limitations of theory); cf SUNSTEIN, supra note 153, at 97-98 (1996)
(observing that while "economic analysis helps untangle the social consequences of legal
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therefore tend to reject the idea (known as foundationalism) that any
one theory can adequately explain a given body of law, as well as the
belief (known as formalism) that "correct" outcomes in individual
cases can always be deduced from such foundational principles.' 5
For purposes of deciding legal and policy issues, legal pragmatists
advocate instead the use of "practical reason"-a method that
emphasizes the need for choice, deliberation, and communication in
the face of radical uncertainty-as a way of simultaneously affirming
and mediating among our conflicting norms.156
The rebirth of interest in pragmatic thought over the past twenty
years has brought with it a renewed attention to the long-neglected
subject of pragmatic aesthetics." Although different writers stress
different aspects of the relationship between pragmatism and art, one
common thread is the view that the creation, interpretation, and
appreciation of art objects are, like other human activities,
simultaneously rooted in past experience and instrumental to the
engendering of new experience."8 Jonathan Levin, for example, has
rules," it is "far too sectarian" to serve as a "complete guide to the goals of the legal
system").
155. See Cotter, supra note 19, at 2083-85 (discussing pragmatists' rejection of
foundationalism and formalism); see also SUNSTEIN, supra note 153, at 14-17 (discussing
limitations of general theoretical approaches to law).
156. Drawing upon the work of Aristotle and of contemporary philosophers such as
Gadamer, Habermas, and Rorty, Richard Bernstein describes practical reason (phronesis)
as "a form of reasoning that is concerned with choice and involves deliberation,"
involving "a mediation between general principles and a concrete particular situation that
requires choice and decision." BERNSTEIN, supra note 146, at 56. Legal pragmatists tend
to emphasize similar characteristics. See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 146, at 71-73
(describing practical reason as "the methods by which people who are not credulous form
beliefs about matters that cannot be verified by logic or exact observation"); Daniel A.
Farber, The Inevitability of Practical Reason: Statutes, Formalism, and the Rule of Law, 45
VAND. L. REV. 533, 536-37 (1992) (describing practical reason as a method of decision
"not by deductive logic, but by a less structured problem-solving process involving
common sense, respect for precedent, and an appreciation of society's needs" (footnotes
omitted)); Joseph William Singer, The Player and the Cards: Nihilism and Legal Theory,
94 YALE L.J. 1, 65 (1984) (comparing the way judges decide cases to the way people make
everyday moral decisions); Vincent A. Wellman, Practical Reasoning and Judicial
Justification: Toward an Adequate Theory, 57 U. COLO. L. REv. 45, 87 (1985) (describing
practical reason as the methods people use to reason from ends to means). For further
discussion and criticism of the concept of practical reason, see Cotter, supra note 19, at
2086-91.
157. See, e.g., THOMAS M. ALEXANDER, JOHN DEWEY'S THEORY OF ART,
EXPERIENCE, AND NATURE: THE HORIZONS OF FEELING (1987); GREY, supra note 146;
JOHN J. MCDERMOTr, THE CULTURE OF EXPERIENCE: PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS IN THE
AMERICAN GRAIN (1976); POIRIER, supra note 146; RICHARD SHUSTERMAN,
PRAGMATIST AESTHETICS: LIVING BEAUTY, RETH NG ART (1992); Jonathan Levin,
The Esthetics of Pragmatism, 6 AM. LITERARY HIST. 658 (1994).
158. As Richard Shusterman points out, with its stress on context, instrumentality, and
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noted how James's contemporary, George Santayana, applied the
pragmatic concepts of contextuality, nonfoundationalism, and
instrumentality in his writings on aesthetics. Levin describes as "the
key to Santayana's esthetic and religious attitudes" the idea that
felt unities and harmonies are valuable not because they
point to some overarching or transempirical unity or
harmony (be it God's, Nature's, or Self's) but because they
animate experience, render it meaningful and purposeful,
and provide a concrete discipline for sustaining and
developing its possible meanings and purposes."'
Similarly, Richard Poirier finds pragmatic ideas at work in the
aesthetic writings of Ralph Waldo Emerson (whom he views as
having anticipated much of James), claiming that
Emerson never asks us to reclaim some heritage of civic or
rational virtues as these have been embedded, so it is
assumed, in works of the past; he wants us instead to
discover traces of productive energy that pass through a text
or a composition or an author, pointing always beyond any
one of them. "[T]he arts, as we know them, are but
initial[,]" he says. "Our best praise is given to what they
aimed and promised, not to the actual result. He has
conceived meanly of the resources of man, who believes that
the best age of production is past. The real value of the
Iliad, or the Transfiguration, is as signs of power ... tokens
of the everlasting effort to produce, which even in the worst
estate the soul betrays.""
According to these readings of Santayana and Emerson, then, the
value of a work of art inheres not so much in the "truth" it reveals as
in the experience it generates in the reader or interpreter, which in
turn creates new possibilities for future experience. As John Dewey
was later to argue, "there is no final term in appreciation of a work of
art."1
16
Building on the works of his predecessors, Dewey, in his 1934
work Art as Experience, went so far as to claim that the term "work
of art" describes neither a physical embodiment (such as a painting
or sculpture) nor an intangible work of authorship (such as a poem or
experience, pragmatic aesthetics turns much of conventional analytic aesthetics-with its
commitment to formalism, which denies the importance of context, and
noninstrumentality as the defining features of the aesthetic-on its head. See
SHUSTERMAN, supra note 157, at 6-33.
159. Levin, supra note 157, at 660.
160. P oIRIER, supra note 146, at 37-38 (quoting RALPH WALDO EMERSON, Art, in
ESSAYS & LECTURES 437 (1983), with several minor changes).
161. JOHN DEWEY, ART AS EXPERIENCE 139 (1934).
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musical composition), but rather what this tangible or intangible
thing "does with and in experience.', 62 In constructing his theory,
Dewey distinguished between generic "experience"-that which an
organism undergoes as it interacts with its environment 163-- and "an
experience," which occurs when "the material experienced runs its
course to fulfillment."' ' 4  "An experience" can be "something of
tremendous importance-a quarrel with one who was once an
intimate, a catastrophe finally averted by a hair's breadth"-or as
simple as eating a good meal or carrying on a conversation; what
distinguishes "an experience" is the unity "that pervades the entire
experience in spite of the variation of its constituent parts,' 65 leaving
the encounter "so rounded out that its close is a consummation and
not a cessation."' Dewey considered aesthetic experience to be a
"clarified and intensified" form of such consummated experience, 67
in which that which we perceive is neither exclusively an end in itself,
162. Id. at 3, 162 (emphasis added). In an essay published in 1939, Stephen Pepper
praised Art as Experience as "one of the four or five great books on esthetics," but he
argued that Dewey's theory departs from pragmatism in some crucial respects. Stephen
C. Pepper, Some Questions on Dewey's Esthetics, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF JOHN DEWEY
371, 389 (Paul Arthur Schilp & Lewis Edwin Hahn eds., Open Court 3d ed. 1989) (1939).
For Pepper, the principal criteria of value under a pragmatic aesthetic are "the extensity,
depth, and degree of vividness of quality in experience." Id. at 374-76. Pepper contrasts
this perspective with a position he associates with the neo-Hegelian Bernard Bosanquet
and which he refers to as that of an "organic idealist." See id. at 371-73. According to
Pepper, the general principle of organic idealism is that "experience is intrinsically
coherent or internally related, from which it follows, that the process of elucidating or of
comprehending or of adequately seeing into experience consists in making explicit out of
the fragments of experience as we originally find them the implicit coherence that lies
there." Id. at 373. Under an organic idealist aesthetics, then, aesthetic value is
determined by the degree to which a work "coheres." See id. at 379-88. As Jonathan
Levin has pointed out, some influential modern pragmatists, including Cornel West and
Richard Rorty, agree with Pepper in finding too much idealism and too little pragmatism
in Art as Experience. See Levin, supra note 157, at 672-74. In response to Pepper's
critique, however, Dewey and his defenders argue that when Dewey uses terms (such as
coherence, integration, and whole) that Pepper associates with organic idealism, he hardly
means to suggest that these entities exist as universal categories, "out there" waiting to be
discovered; rather, he considers these concepts, like other human constructs, to be
instrumental to the purpose.of organizing, classifying, and perceiving experience so as to
intensify the satisfaction and meaning we derive from that experience. See John Dewey,
Experience, Knowledge and Value: A Rejoinder, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF JOHN DEWEY,
supra, at 515,549-54; ALEXANDER, supra note 157, at 1-13, 198-213, 233-66; ALAN RYAN,
JOHN DEWEY AND THE HIGH TIDE OF AMERICAN LIBERALISM 253 (1995); Levin, supra
note 157, at 671-81.
163. See DEWEY, supra note 161, at22,35.
164. Id. at 35.
165. Id. at 36-37.
166. Id. at 35.
167. Id. at 46.
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nor solely a means to further experience, but simultaneously both
means and ends.' 6 For Dewey, then, as for Emerson and Santayana,
the beholder of an object of art creates his own experience, both by
recreating, in a sense, the artist's process of fashioning disparate
elements into an ordered whole,169 and by relating the work to his
own previous experience; 170 at the same time, the work itself serves
the instrumental functions of instilling a "refreshed attitude toward
the circumstances and exigencies of ordinary experience,'' and of
creating a springboard for new experience. 2
Although what typifies those works we come to think of as great
is the inexhaustibility of their ability to "inspire new personal
realizations in experience, ' '1  one important aspect of Dewey's
aesthetics is that its subject matter is not limited to what traditionally
is referred to as the "fine arts." Dewey, like Emerson and Santayana
before him,"' rejected any rigid distinction between "fine" and
"useful" art, arguing instead that
168. See id. at 197-98 (describing aesthetic experience as successful integration of ends
and means into satisfying whole); see also JOHN DEWEY, EXPERIENCE AND NATURE 361,
364-65 (Dover Publications 1958) (1929) [hereinafter DEWEY, EXPERIENCE AND
NATURE] (describing art as unification of "means and consequence, process and product,
the instrumental and consummatory"); DEWEY, supra note 146, at 236 (stating that all
experienced objects are both consummatory and instrumental); SHUSTERMAN, supra note
157, at 46-50 (discussing Dewey's theory of art as simultaneously consummatory and
instrumental); ROBERT B. WESTBROOK, JOHN DEWEY AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY
338-39, 383-85 (1991) (same).
Dewey's attempt to transcend the traditional dichotomy between means and ends
was in part a response to the criticism that pragmatism, with its emphasis on the
instrumental nature of thought, threatens to degenerate into nothing more than a crass
utilitarianism-in Dewey's words, "a doctrine of tools which are not tools for anything
except for more tools." See JOHN DEWEY, The Pragmatic Acquiescence, in 3 THE LATER
WORKS 147, 150-51 (JoAnn Boydston ed., S. Ill. Univ. Press 1984) (1927), quoted in
WESTBROOK, supra, at 384. For further discussion, see Cotter, supra note 19, at 2092-93,
and Grey, supra note 148, at 854-55.
169. See DEWEY, supra note 161, at 48-49, 54, 273-74, 325; see also POIRIER, supra
note 146, at 98 (discussing act of reading as duplication of actions that went into writing).
170. See DEWEY, supra note 161, at 54,309-10.
171. Id. at 139; see also id. at 214 (stating that "[t]he work takes place when a human
being cooperates with the product so that the outcome is an experience that is enjoyed
because of its liberating and ordered properties"); WESTBROOK, supra note 168, at 338-39
(discussing Dewey's theory that great art has the "capacity to provide satisfaction under
changing conditions and on repeated approach"); Levin, supra note 157, at 678 (noting
that, instead of focusing on aesthetic finality or autonomy, "Dewey looks to art as an
agency of continuous recreation and renewal").
172. See DEWEY, supra note 161, at 273-74.
173. Id. at 109; see also DEWEY, EXPERIENCE AND NATURE, supra note 168, at 365
(stating that "[t]he 'eternal' quality of great art is its renewed instrumentality for further
consummatory experiences").
174. See Levin, supra note 157, at 661.
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[i]t is [the] degree of completeness of living in the
experience of making and of perceiving that makes the
difference between what is fine or esthetic in art and what is
not.... Wherever conditions are such as to prevent the act
of production from being an experience in which the whole
creature is alive and in which he possesses his living through
enjoyment, the product will lack something of being
esthetic. No matter how useful it is for special and limited
ends, it will not be useful in the ultimate degree-that of
contributing directly and liberally to an expanding and
enriched life.'75
Dewey's goal, therefore, was to transcend the dichotomy between
fine and useful art by "recovering the continuity of esthetic [sic]
experience with normal processes of living."'76 As Levin writes, for
Dewey "artistically based rituals provided the glue that not only held
a culture together but made an individual life meaningful within that
culture," providing a "vital and compelling link between individuals
and the natural and social environments in which they live their
lives.""l It was in this spirit that Dewey called for the reorganization
of modem industrial society in ways that, he hoped, would lend a
unifying, enriching, aesthetic quality to everyday experience. 78
The capacity of artworks to enrich experience is also a central
theme in the writings of contemporary neopragmatists such as
Richard Rorty. Although Rorty eschews Dewey's efforts to describe
the "'"generic traits"' of experience,""' 7 Rorty shares with Dewey
the conviction that meaning is something that is neither fixed nor
final, but rather always subject to imaginative revision and
reinterpretation.'O As Richard Shusterman notes, Rorty views
175. DEWEY, supra note 161, at 26-27.
176. Id. at 10.
177. Levin, supra note 157, at 676-77; see generally DEWEY, supra note 161, at 80-81
(arguing that "[w]orks of art that are not remote from common life, that are widely
enjoyed in a community," are both "signs of a unified collective life" and "also marvelous
aids in the creation of such a life"); DEWEY, EXPERIENCE AND NATURE, supra note 168,
at 204-05 (describing communication "as a sharing in the objects and arts precious to a
community, a sharing whereby meanings are enhanced, deepened and solidified in the
sense of communion").
17& See, e.g., DEWEY, supra note 161, at 8-11, 80-81, 261-62, 341-44; DEWEY,
EXPERIENCE AND NATURE, supra note 168, at 362-70; JOHN DEWEY, RECONSTRUCION
INPHILOSOPHY 185-86 (Beacon Press 1948) (1920).
179. Levin, supra note 157, at 673 (quoting RORTY, supra note 146, at 73 (quoting
DEWEY, EXPERIENCE AND NATURE, supra note 168, at 412)).
180. See, e.g., RORTY, supra note 146, at 16 (approving Dewey's vision that "the arts,
the sciences, the sense of right and wrong, and the institutions of society are not attempts
to embody or formulate truth or goodness or beauty," but rather "attempts to solve
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interpretation as " 'a matter of choice,' always the product of a
recontextualizing redescription aimed to 'get us what we want' by
reweaving our web of beliefs and desires," creating "new meanings,
new vocabularies, 'new ways of speaking.' ,,181 Rorty therefore
suggests that we avoid asking ourselves questions such as "Does this
book aim at truth?" or "What is the aim of the writer?" and that we
focus instead on the purposes the work serves." Adhering to a
traditional (and often criticized") distinction between public and
private, Rorty argues that some books are better used to fashion our
own private morality ("What shall I be?"), while others better serve
to "work[] out a newpublic final vocabulary,"'8' helping us to see how
social practices and institutions, as well as our own private
idiosyncracies, affect others)8
Although Rorty's commitment to nonfoundationalism and
instrumentalism is evident, his theory seems vulnerable in some
respects to a variety of pragmatic critiques. One problem is that
Rorty's focus on art as an instrument for personal change seems to
omit any consideration of the aesthetic as an end in itself. This
omission in turn threatens to undercut the instrumentalism, for, as
Levin suggests, it may be impossible to "envision change and
articulate a viable cultural criticism except by entertaining new
harmonies, imagining possible unities and beautiful relations, that are
satisfying as ideals and therefore compelling as motivating forces.""'
problems-to modify our beliefs and desires and activities in ways that will bring us
greater happiness than we have now"); RICHARD RORTY, CONTINGENCY, IRONY, AND
SOLIDARITY 80 (1989) [hereinafter RORTY, CONTINGENCY] ("For us ironists, nothing
can serve as a criticism of a final vocabulary save another such vocabulary; there is no
answer to a redescription save a re-re-redescription.").
181. SHUSTERMAN, supra note 157, at 101 (quoting Richard Rorty, Philosophy
Without Principles, in AGAINST THEORY: LITERARY STUDIES AND THE NEW
PRAGMATISM 132, 134 (W.J.T. Mitchell ed., 1985), and RORTY, supra note 146, at 150
(citations omitted)); see also GREY, supra note 146, at 31-32 (discussing Rorty on
literature); Levin, supra note 157, at 673-74 (same).
182. RORTY, CONTINGENCY, supra note 180, at 142, 145; cf. DEWEY, EXPERIENCE
AND NATURE, supra note 168, at 411 ("Poetic meanings, moral meanings, a large part of
the goods of life are matters of richness and freedom of meanings, rather than of truth; a
large part of our life is carried on in a realm of meanings to which truth and falsity as such
are irrelevant.").
183. See, e.g., SHUSTERMAN, supra note 157, at 255-57; Allan C. Hutchinson, The
Three 'Rs': Reading/Rorty/Radically, 103 HARV. L. REV. 555, 566-69 (1989) (reviewing
RORTY, CONTINGENCY, supra note 180); Joseph William Singer, Should Lawyers Care
About Philosophy?, 1989 DUKE L.J. 1752, 1761-62 (reviewing RORTY, CONTINGENCY,
supra note 180).
184. RORTY, CONTINGENCY, supra note 180, at 142-43.
185. See SHUSTERMAN, supra note 157, at 141-42.
186. Levin, supra note 157, at 680.
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Another difficulty, which Shusterman has noted, is the implicit
elitism in Rorty's privileging of innovative interpretation over more
commonplace reactions to works of art-the "shared background of
meaning which enables us to identify what we agree to call 'the same
text' so that we can then proceed to interpret it differently"-as if the
former were the only type of aesthetic experience worth having.'87
Shusterman also argues that, by placing so much emphasis on art as a
tool for personal change, Rorty accords too little weight both to
competing personal values, such as the need for stability, and to the
role of society in shaping our responses to works of art." If Dewey
at times threatens to slip into metaphysical speculation, Rorty
sometimes seems perilously close to solipsism.
B. Pragmatic Aesthetics and Moral Rights
In this section, I discuss some of the implications of pragmatic
aesthetic theory for the doctrine of moral right. I will argue that
considerations derived from pragmatic aesthetics relating to the value
of art and artists provide some support for endowing artists with
moral rights protection, as a means of cultural preservation and of
affording respect to the artist and her work. I conclude, however,
that aesthetic theory alone provides insufficient guidance as to the
desirable scope of the droit moral, in the absence of further
theoretical and empirical analysis regarding its likely consequences.
One possible implication of pragmatic aesthetics centers on art's
distinctive power, as described in the writings of, among others,
Emerson, Santayana, Dewey, and Rorty."9 If works of art have a
unique power to transform the way we interact with our
environment, by providing us with new ways of redescribing and
reinterpreting our existence'--or if, as Dewey argued, there is
something exceptionally satisfying about the way in which aesthetic
experience merges the consummatory with the instrumental, 9' then
the recognition of some form of special protection for these works
might seem compelling. Works bearing this unique power, after all,
187. SHUSTERMAN, supra note 157, at 132-33,257.
18& See id. at 239-61.
189. See supra notes 157-88 and accompanying text.
190. See supra notes 157-88 and accompanying text; cf. DEWEY, supra note 161, at 95
("The conception that objects have fixed and unalterable values is precisely the prejudice
from which art emancipates us. The intrinsic qualities of things come out with startling
vigor and freshness just because conventional associations are removed.").
191. See supra notes 162-72 and accompanying text; see also DEWEY, supra note 161,
at 84 (arguing that art has the unique quality of "clarifying and concentrating meanings
contained in scattered and weakened ways in the material of other experiences").
[Vol. 76
THE DROIT MORAL
need to be preserved if they are to continue to serve this function for
us and for our descendants; if we destroy or alter them, future
generations will not be able to share this experience.
Although this view of moral rights as a means of protecting the
public interest in the preservation of art departs from the French
view that moral rights serve exclusively to protect the artist's interest
in her unique personality,' it is consistent with some aspects of
American moral rights legislation. Both VARA and the California
Act, for example, prohibit not only the alteration of protected works,
but also their destruction;93 this latter proscription arguably serves
the public interest in preservation more than it serves the artist's
interest in respect for her personality.'94 The California Act also
empowers public interest organizations to sue for damage to works of
art under some circumstances, 9' and explicitly recognizes "the public
interest in preserving the integrity of cultural and artistic creations"
as one reason for protecting those works.'96
The argument that moral rights serve the public interest in art
preservation nevertheless may be challenged on at least three
grounds. The first is that endowing artists with moral rights is a
haphazard way of protecting the public interest in art because even
under a system of nonwaivable rights the artist may choose not to
object to the alteration or destruction of her work."' One possible
192. Courts and commentators who adhere to this traditional understanding therefore
reject the idea that the doctrine of moral rights should be viewed as serving any interest
other than that of respecting the artist's personality. See Damich, supra note 45, at 1748-
49 (noting that, under French law, moral rights doctrine is viewed as protecting creator's
interest, not public interest; separate national treasures law protects public interest in
preservation of works of outstanding artistic or historic value). France and some other
countries also have statutes that permit the public enforcement of moral rights in the
works of deceased authors under some circumstances. See Kwall, supra note 17, at 16 &
n.65.
193. See 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(3)(B) (1994);'CAL. CIV. CODE § 987(C)(1) (West Supp.
1997).
194. See, e.g., Carter v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 861 F. Supp. 303, 328 (S.D.N.Y. 1994)
(stating that VARA protects the public interest in the preservation of cultural resources),
affd in part, rev'd and vacated in part, 71 F.3d 77, 81-82 (2d Cir. 1995) ("If integrity is
meant to stress the public interest in preserving a nation's culture, destruction is
prohibited ... ."), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1824 (1996). As we have seen, however, in a few
instances courts in France have held that destruction violated the author's moral right, see
supra note 60, presumably on the theory that destruction can be an affront to the author's
personality.
195. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 989(c).
196. Id. § 987(a).
197. See Ellen R. Porges, Note, Protecting the Public Interest in Art, 91 YALE L.J. 121,
125 (1981) (arguing that moral rights are inadequate to protect the public interest because
they are enforceable only by the artist or his heirs); cf. Palmer, supra note 20, at 848
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response to this problem might be to vest rights in the public as well
as in the artist, as the California Act attempts to do; but this solution
is also fraught with difficulty, relying as it does upon the expectation
that a self-appointed organization not only will have the initiative to
litigate but also will adequately represent the public interest.'
Moreover, in many jurisdictions (France being one notable
exception) moral rights are not perpetual; under German law, for
example, all of the artist's rights expire seventy years after the artist's
death, and under VARA moral rights in works created after June 1,
1991, terminate immediately upon the artist's death.9 9 Moral rights
therefore may fail to secure the interest, such as it is, of future
generations in the preservation of the artist's work.
A second difficulty arises if we agree with Dewey in rejecting the
traditional dichotomy between fine and useful art.20' If, as Dewey
argued, any work in which the consummatory and instrumental
successfully merge is an aesthetic object, then, to borrow Congress's
words, virtually "anything under the sun that is made by man"' is at
(arguing that "if special personal rights governing works of art are to be recognized
anywhere, they should be in the audience, and not in the artist, for it is on the audience
that the art work depends for its continued existence, and not on the artist").
198. Other possible solutions within the moral rights framework seem even more
flawed. For example, instead of relying upon public interest organizations to do the work,
we could invest a public official, or establish a public commission, with the authority to
seek injunctions against buyers who plan to alter or destroy certain works of art. The
more works we decide to cloak with the protection of moral rights, however, the more
complicated such a system would become and the greater would be the possibility of
abuse or governmental favoritism. Moreover, even under European law some alterations
are permitted-for example, alterations that are necessary when a work is being
translated into a different medium. See supra notes 68-70 and accompanying text.
Subjecting the buyer who wishes to make some arguably reasonable alteration to the risk
of being sued not only by the artist but also by some official or commission may have a
significant negative effect on the demand for art. Every work of art covered by this
hypothetical legislation in effect would become the subject of a historic preservation
scheme, requiring the owner to seek public approval before making any alterations.
While this type of regulation may make sense in the context of architectural works of
historic significance, requiring such approval in other contexts might impose substantial
costs on buyers and the public.
199. See 17 U.S.C. § 106A(d)(1) (1994).
200. See Porges, supra note 197, at 125. Even in France, where moral rights are
perpetual, those rights may not adequately protect the interest of future generations in
preservation. After the artist's death, her moral rights are enforceable only if she has
heirs who are willing to invest the time and money to enforce them or, in the absence of
heirs, if the state or National Literary Fund decides to do so. See Kwall, supra note 17, at
16 n.65.
201. See supra notes 173-78 and accompanying text; see also DEWEY, supra note 161,
at 26-27, 116 (challenging that dichotomy).
202. Diamond v. Chakrabartry, 447 U.S. 303,309 (1980) (quoting S. REP. No. 82-1979,
at 5 (1952), reprinted in 1952 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2394, 2399; H.R. REP. No. 82-1923, at 6
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least potentially endowed with the moral rights of its creator; and yet,
as Jamie Boyle has noted, it is difficult to imagine "granting a
plumber control over the pipes she installs even after the work is paid
for, or a cabinet maker the right to veto the conversion of her writing
desk into a television cabinet." 3 One reason, of course, that it is
difficult to imagine such things is that to recognize moral rights in
these objects would pose insurmountable conflicts with our need to
use them as objects; prohibiting the alteration of the pipes or cabinet
probably would impose more serious hardships on their owners than
would imposing similar prohibitions on the owners or licensees of
works of authorship. A realistic assessment of the capabilities of
judges and legislators also makes it difficult to imagine successfully
establishing a moral rights regime premised on the assumption that
policymakers can accurately apply Deweyan criteria to distinguish
between the aesthetic and the non-aesthetic in everyday objects.'
Given these limitations, then, one might still choose to recognize
moral rights only in works that fit within traditional definitions of art,
on the theory that some protection, however imperfect, is better than
none. It is nevertheless important to recognize that, from the
standpoint of Deweyan aesthetics, so confining the right will be
simultaneously over- and underinclusive-overinclusive because
some hackneyed works that fall into traditional definitions of art will
be protected, underinclusive because some aesthetic but useful
articles will not-and may tend to fortify the very distinction that
Dewey and other pragmatists attempted to transcend between the
fine and useful arts.
(1952) (not reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N.)). Although the quotation above was made in the
context of patent law (it describes what qualifies as patentable subject matter), it seems
equally applicable to the subject at hand.
203. James D.A. Boyle, The Search for an Author: Shakespeare and the Framers, 37
AM. U. L. REv. 625,629 (1988).
204. This is not to deny that, in determining whether a product feature qualifies as
intellectual property, courts sometimes are called upon to draw what may at first blush
appear to be similar distinctions. For example, the design of a useful article may qualify
as a copyrightable sculptural work if it incorporates features that are physically or
conceptually separable from the article. See 17 U.S.C. § 101; Brandir Int'l, Inc. v. Cascade
Pac. Lumber Co., 834 F.2d 1142, 1145 (2d Cir. 1987). Similarly, a product design may
qualify as a trademark only if the design is not functional (that is, something that
competitors must be able to use on their products in order to compete). See generally
Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 164-65 (1995) (discussing whether
product colors are functional); Wallace Int'l Silversmiths, Inc. v. Godinger Silver Art Co.,
916 F.2d 76, 79-83 (2d Cir. 1990) (discussing whether baroque silver pattern is
"aesthetically functional"). The distinctions that a judge would have to draw under
Dewey's criteria, however, for purposes of determining whether a product is aesthetic or
non-aesthetic, seem to be qualitatively different, and even less subject to any sort of
objective oversight.
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A third problem arises from what may be viewed as a tendency
on the part of pragmatist theoreticians to value the experience of the
reader or interpreter over the authenticity and physical integrity of
the text or art object. As noted above, for example, in Dewey's
aesthetics the work of art is not an object at all, but rather the
experience derived from the interaction of observer with the text or
object. If the meaning of a text or object resides in its
consequences," however, then considerations of authenticity and
integrity might appear to be a matter of less importance than assuring
the desirability of those consequences.' Moreover, each new
reading or interpretation has the potential to change that meaning
and, therefore, from a pragmatic perspective, to change the work
itself. As Shusterman observes:
[A]n artwork turns out to be a continuous and contested
construction of the efforts to determine its understanding
and interpretation-that is, of efforts to determine how and
what the work will be taken to be, which amounts,
pragmatically speaking, to how and what it actually is....
... Since our individuation of textual objects depends
on our literary interests and values, radically changing our
understanding and experience of texts can result in changing
their individuation. We may no longer find them worth
individuating in the same way, no longer care about
distinguishing their authentic copies from drastically
abridged or bowdlerized versions. In other words, though
we can and must distinguish individuation of the work from
205. See Cotter, supra note 19, at 2078 (stating that, for pragmatists, "the meaning of a
proposition resides in its consequences, such that two propositions with the same
consequences have (for all relevant intents and purposes) the same meaning" (citations
omitted)).
206. As Richard Poirier notes:
This effort to remake history requires the most strenuous sort of writing/reading,
of ourselves no less than of those in the past whose work we recreate by our
readings of it. Since we literally make the past, it is a dereliction of duty to
worship texts, monuments, and artifacts, including literature, as if these are
products only the past has produced.
POIRIER, supra note 146, at 13. In a similar vein, Shusterman claims that Dewey's "most
important aesthetic theme" is
the privileging of dynamic aesthetic experience over the fixed material object
which our conventional thinking identifies-and then commodifies and
fetishizes-as the work of art. For Dewey, the essence and value of art are not
in the mere artifacts we typically regard as art, but in the dynamic and
developing experiential activity through which they are created and perceived.
SHUSTERMAN, supra note 157, at 25.
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the particular meanings and content interpretively ascribed
to it, the latter can sometimes reciprocally modify our
determining of the former. °7
On this view, efforts to preserve the authenticity and integrity of
works of art might seem not only undesirable-because of the
constraints imposed upon subsequent users or interpreters-but also
futile. If we re-create a work of art every time we read or interpret a
text or object, moral rights can never eliminate our ability to alter
those texts and objects for our own purposes.
These last arguments nevertheless seem to overstate the
potential drawbacks of moral rights protection: The fact that reading
or interpretation may involve the reader or interpreter in an act of re-
creation, after all, hardly suggests that we should advocate the
slashing of canvases and the bowdlerizing of books. Thus, even if our
principal concern is with the value of interpretive experience, we
might support some form of moral rights protection as a way of
preserving the very texts and objects from which new interpretive
experiences may continue to be forged. Perhaps more importantly,
these arguments tend to overemphasize the instrumental benefits of
artistic creation, to the neglect of its consummatory value. Dewey
was careful to avoid the conclusion that the work of art is "just a
stimulus to and means of an overt course of action,"2°s viewing the art
object as a connecting link that allows a message (though one not
necessarily fully contemplated, intended, or delimited by the artist)
to be communicated from artist to interpreter. 9  Thus, as
Shusterman notes, Dewey "does not deny the importance of art's
material objects" and insists "on the unavoidable 'need for
objectification,' for something reasonably fixed and qualitatively
conducive to guide and structure the creation of aesthetic
207. SHUSTERMAN, supra note 157, at 94-95, 104. For a similar, but negative, view of
the potential for interpretation to affect the way we view art, see Michiko Kakutani,
Culture Zone: The Trickle-Down Theory, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 22, 1996, § 6 (Magazine), at
28:
The black-and-white television ad that uses Fellini-esque imagery (a fat woman
on a swing, a little girl dressed as a ballerina, etc.) to sell mortgages not only rips
off Fellini for the crudest of purposes, but also makes people who see it less
likely to appreciate the radical achievement of "8 1/2" if and when they see it. If
familiarity does not exactly breed contempt, it does breed indifference and
impatience.
208. DEWEY, supra note 161, at 273-74; see also id at 214 (stating that work of art
"takes place when a human being cooperates with the product so that the outcome is an
experience that is enjoyed because of its liberating and ordered properties").
209. See id at 104, 106.
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experience., 210 Altering or destroying texts and objects may remove
this necessary focus, rendering the text or object merely a stimulus to
a cheapened experience.2 n
A pragmatic analysis therefore suggests that there are good
reasons for preserving those objects that communicate aesthetic
experience, and that the recognition of moral rights is one means
(albeit an imperfect one) of achieving this result. 12 A second
pragmatic argument in favor of moral rights centers not so much on
the work of art or its effect on the reader or interpreter as on the
person of the artist.213 A pragmatist committed to the idea of human
flourishing, for example, might conclude that according respect to the
integrity of the artist's work also shows respect for the person of the
artist, and that showing respect for this person (who is, after all, a
member of the human community) is a satisfying end in itself. 24
210. SHUSTERMAN, supra note 157, at 25 (quoting THEODOR W. ADORNO,
AESTHETIC THEORY 263 (1984)); see also Netanel, supra note 17, at 404-07 ("[E]ven if
authors do not control the thematic interpretation of their work, they do set forth the
basic vocabulary of signs-words, sounds and images-that serves as a framework of
reference for the work's meaning.").
211. Cf. DEWEY, supra note 161, at 197 ("Esthetic objects belong intrinsically to their
medium; when another medium is substituted, we have a stunt rather than an object of
art.").
212. Note, however, that this rationale may suggest only that the original physical
embodiment of a work, such as a canvas or a manuscript, should be preserved from
alteration or destruction. Neither a performance that departs from the author's intent,
nor an altered copy of an original work, necessarily prevents subsequent interpreters from
enjoying the original. But see Kakutani, supra note 207, at 28 (arguing that appropriation
of artist's imagery may prevent subsequent audiences from appreciating innovativeness of
original).
213. In other words, a pragmatist might agree with a Kantian or Hegelian analyst that
the personality of the artist is deserving of some form of special protection, though not for
the reasons propounded by the German idealists and their followers. See supra notes 22-
39 and accompanying text (discussing Kantian and Hegelian theories of intellectual
property).
214. There is, of course, nothing inherently "in" pragmatism that requires a
commitment to human flourishing, as Richard Rorty and Stanley Fish, among others,
have pointed out. See Stanley Fish, Almost Pragmatism, in PRAGMATISM IN LAW &
SOCIETY, supra note 146, at 57; Richard Rorty, The Banality of Pragmatism and the
Poetry of Justice, 63 S. CAL. L. REv. 1811, 1815-16, 1819 (1990) [hereinafter Rorty,
Banality]. One aspect of human experience, however, is to have commitments, even if
one believes that these commitments cannot be grounded in any universal, transcendental
standard. See, e.g., GREY, supra note 146, at 76 (relating Stevens's idea of the "supreme
fiction" to James's "will to believe" (second quote from LEIrERS OF WALLACE STEVENS
430 (Holly Stevens ed., 1966)); POIRIER, supra note 146, at 24 (similar); RORTY,
CONTINGENCY, supra note 180, at 189 (arguing that having a system of values is
inescapable even if one believes that these values are supported by "nothing deeper than
contingent historical circumstance"). The analysis above therefore assumes that our
pragmatist policymaker is committed to a vision of human flourishing, even though, in
Rorty's words, other people may well "dream different dreams." Rorty, Banality, supra,
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Similarly, one might argue that endowing artists with moral rights
sends a message that art is not just a commodity, to be traded off
against other commodities, but rather that artists' contributions to
society are specially valued and appreciated. Moral rights therefore
may be viewed as a means of alleviating the otherwise alienating
conditions imposed upon artists by an economic system that, at
present, may leave them little choice but to consent to the
commodification and defilement of their work.215 Finally, according
respect to the personality of the artist may serve an instrumental
function of encouraging artists to create, by fostering a climate that is
conducive to artistic activity."
The preceding analysis, however, raises the issue of whether due
respect for the personality of the artist necessarily requires legal
protection of the integrity of her work. Neil Netanel argues that it
does, because the retention of control over one's expression is vital to
"individual self-development, autonomy, and identity., 217  Netanel
observes that, in expressing herself, the artist chooses which aspects
of her identity to reveal and achieves greater knowledge of herself
and her individuality;28  therefore, a special attachment and
commitment to her works of authorship as manifestations of her
identity and individuality may be essential to the artist's conception
of her own personhood."9 Thus, according to Netanel, the author's
work is an example of what Margaret Radin refers to as property for
personhood:
As [Radin] has shown, personhood requires "contextuality,"
a set of stable relationships with "the environment of things
and other people," as well as a certain continuity of identity
and ability to exert one's will. Accordingly, certain objects,
such as one's home or family keepsakes, may be no less
at 1816 (citation omitted).
215. Cf. DEWEY, supra note 161, at 341-44 (arguing that the modern industrial worker,
in his transition from skilled artisan to mass production laborer, lost much of the aesthetic
pleasure in creation that makes life satisfying and meaningful).
216. Cf. H.R. REP. No. 101-514, at 5 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6915,6915
("'The theory of moral rights is that they result in a climate of artistic worth and honor
that encourages the author in the arduous act of creation.'" (quoting The Visual Artists'
Rights Act of 1989: Hearing on H.R. 2690 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Intellectual
Property, and the Administration of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st
Cong. 32 (1990) (statement of Hon. Ralph Oman at 3))).
217. Netanel, supra note 17, at 400.
218. See id, at 401.
219. See id. at 423. Netanel recognizes that one can express oneself in ways that do
not involve the creation of original works-for example, by reciting or performing the
works of another-but he argues that the expression of one's own creative work "carries a
far greater potential for self-realization than do imitations and recitals." Id. at 402.
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integral to one's sense of self than are one's beliefs,
commitments, loved ones or personal attributes. Such
objects may properly be the subject of marketability
restrictions where free exchange would be injurious to
personhood. They are both commodities, in the sense that
they may be bought and sold, and non-commodities, in the
sense that their sale is regulated in order to protect personal
contextuality, identity and autonomy."
On the basis of this analysis, Netanel suggests that the state should
accord the artist an ongoing legal interest in the integrity of her work;
and that this interest should be inalienable, even if the artist is
otherwise free to alienate the physical embodiment of and copyright
to her work." Requiring the artist to bargain for something so
central to her sense of self, he submits, may be destructive of the
artist's self-integrity.m
One might nevertheless argue that, although some (perhaps
most) artists and authors have strong negative feelings concerning
the potential alteration or destruction of their works, the provision of
an ongoing right to the integrity of these works cannot be justified
solely by reference to principles of self-development, autonomy, and
identity. Lawrence Adam Beyer, for example, argues that a right of
integrity has no bearing on the author's freedom to create and to
express because those freedoms do not depend upon the preservation
of works that have already been completed. m Similarly, the right
promotes neither self-knowledge, which the artist presumably
acquired during the creation of the work,24 nor self-confidence,
inasmuch as the right stops short of providing artists with the power
to demand subsequent alterations to their work.' Viewing the
creation of a work of authorship as "only the first step in the author's
assertion of self in the external world," ' however, Netanel responds
that "[e]xpression fulfills a self-realization function... not just in the
formulation of words or images, but also in their communication to
220. Id. at 422-23 (citing Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L.
REV. 1849,1904-06, 1919 (1987)).
221. See id. at 423.
222. See id. at 411-15.
223. See Beyer, supra note 17, at 1094.
224. See id. at 1094-95. After the creation of the work, Beyer argues, the artist can
rely upon memory, "supplemented, if necessary, by photos or other aids," to preserve the
self-knowledge she gained during its creation. Id. at 1094.
225. See id. at 1095. Beyer ignores the possibility, however, that under French and
German law the artist may have a right to correct or withdraw some works from
publication. See supra note 42.
226. Netanel, supra note 17, at 403 (emphasis added).
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others."' 7  Netanel therefore concludes, contra Beyer, that
"continuing authorial control is vital to self-realization and
autonomy."2'  Moreover, while recognizing that an "author's
subjective feeling of identification with a work might diminish as the
initial creative impetus becomes more remote,"' 9 Netanel suggests
that this consideration is balanced by the ability to transmit the work
to "many people in diverse times and places," which "greatly
magnifies the force and meaning of the work and its communication
for most authors."m
A second objection to Netanel's conception of moral rights as a
means for promoting self-autonomy is that a system of nonwaivable
moral rights, of the type Netanel advocates, takes away one aspect of
the author's autonomy-namely her freedom to bargain-and that
some artists may prefer to exercise this aspect of their autonomy by
waiving their moral rights in exchange for higher sales prices. With
this problem in mind, Beyer argues that allowing artists so to
"commodify" their integrity interests is a positive good because
commodification itself can pave the way for personal change and self-
formation; freedom of contract and private property, after all, which
make commodification possible, also allow us to control physical
things in ways that may be crucial to self-innovation. 31 In response,
however, Netanel points out that the adoption of either a waivable or
nonwaivable rule threatens to take away someone's autonomy: while
a nonwaivable rule takes away the freedom of those who would
prefer to waive, a rule of free alienability takes away the sovereignty
of those who lack the means to bargain freely because they may have
little choice other than to waive their rights if they wish to sell their
works.'2 Netanel suggests that, on balance, a nonwaivable right is the
lesser threat to autonomy, given what he views as an emerging social
consensus as to the importance of moral rights, as evidenced by (1)
the importance of autonomy of expression in First Amendment
227. Id. By focusing on the work as the author's communication to the public, Netanel
hearkens back to Kant's argument, see supra notes 27-31 and accompanying text, that
publication constitutes "an ongoing presentation of the author's discourse to the public."
Netanel, supra note 17, at 403.
228. Netanel, supra note 17, at 403; see also id. at 412-15 (arguing that inalienable right
to continuing authorial control is vital to preservation of individual identity and
autonomy).
229. Id. at 404.
230. Id.
231. See Beyer, supra note 17, at 1104; cf. RADIN, supra note 25, at 60-63 (arguing that
both stability and flexibility of context are important for personal development).
232. See Netanel, supra note 17, at 411-12.
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jurisprudence; (2) "the increasing, if hesitant support" for moral
rights in the courts and legislatures; and (3) "the numerous public
statements in which authors themselves have expressed a profound
sense that their creations are inextricably related to their person."'
Netanel concedes, however, that these factors are not conclusive.'M
My own sense of the matter is that, in the abstract, Netanel has
the better of the argument concerning the potential for moral rights
to promote important values such as authorial self-realization and
self-autonomy; if the Stravinsky example with which I began this
Article is any guide, many artists do seem to feel that their identities
continue to be embodied in their works after the works' completion.
If we agree with the pragmatists, however, that legal rules should be
assessed in light of their consequences, it would be helpful to have a
better idea precisely what the consequences of various moral rights
regimes may be-and in particular whether there are likely to be any
unintended consequences that writers such as Netanel and Beyer
have failed to take into account. Should we, for example, expect the
adoption of a waivable or nonwaivable moral right to affect the
demand for works of art? Should the rule that applies to one class of
works, such as works of visual art, apply to others such as musical
works? Are the consequences of a rigorous system of moral rights
likely to depend upon other factors, such as the level of government
subsidization of the arts?
In previous work, I have argued that economic analysis often can
provide the pragmatic policymaker with reasonably accurate
predictions concerning the likely consequences of legal rules and can
assist her by clarifying some of the tradeoffs between efficiency and
equity inherent in choices among competing rules. 3 The resulting
information may be useful in either of two ways. First, it may
provide an additional reason for supporting (or opposing) a choice of
rule that is already supported (or opposed) by other reasons such as
text, history, and moral intuition.26 As Daniel Farber and Philip
Frickey have argued, a legal outcome that is supported by a "web" of
various arguments is inherently more satisfying and stable than one
that is supported by one foundational theory alone.237 On the other
233. Id. at 412-15.
234. See iA. at 412 & n.250.
235. See Cotter, supra note 19, at 2137-39.
236. See id. at 2139.
237. See Daniel A. Farber, Legal Pragmatism and the Constitution, 72 MINN. L. REV.
1331, 1336 (1988); Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, Practical Reason and the First
Amendment, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1615, 1640-43 (1987); cf. Charles Sanders Peirce, Some
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hand, the predictions generated by economic analysis may help to
challenge the policymaker's initial reaction to the desirability of a
given rule-by suggesting, for example, that a rule that on its face
appears to benefit one class of persons actually may wind up harming
them.28 At the same time, I have emphasized the importance of
recognizing the limitations of the economic paradigm, including the
highly contestable nature of the assumptions upon which economic
analysis is based and the difficulty of falsifying its predictions.z9
Recognizing that the paradigm at best illuminates only a portion of
reality, while obscuring other portions, I have suggested that the
pragmatic policymaker can incorporate economic analysis into her
"grab bag" of practical reasoning methods, "balancing the relative
precision it offers in terms of policy analysis against the fuzziness of
less quantifiable, but more inclusive, measures of social welfare."'
In light of these considerations, I present in the following
subsection an economic analysis of moral rights. I begin by analyzing
the likely consequences of a system of waivable rights, of the type
established under VARA, for the parties to a typical artist-buyer
transaction. I then consider the likely effects of a system of
nonwaivable rights, on both the parties and the rest of society.
Finally, I consider how to assess this analysis in light of the economic
paradigm's inherent limitations.
C. The Economics of Moral Rights
1. Waivable Moral Rights vs. No Moral Rights
Suppose that Georgia, an artist, creates a work that she is
prepared to sell to a prospective buyer, Alfred. Suppose further that
the work is a painting-though it could just as easily be a sculpture,
photograph, musical composition, film, or dramatic work-and that,
just prior to selling the work, Georgia owns both its physical
Consequences of Four Incapacities, in 5 COLLECTED PAPERS, supra note 146, 156, 5.265,
at 157 (arguing that philosophy ought "to trust rather to the multitude and variety of its
arguments than to the conclusiveness of any one").
238. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 153, at 19; Cotter, supra note 19, at 2139.
239. See Cotter, supra note 19, at 2114-29. Many other scholars have recognized these
limitations. See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 146, at 363-65 (arguing that nature of economic
inquiry lends itself more to confirmation than falsification); Jeffrey L. Harrison, Egoism,
Altruism, and Market Illusions: The Limits of Law and Economics, 33 UCLA L. REV.
1309, 1314-25, 1352-62 (1986) (discussing assumptions); Herbert Hovenkamp, Positivism
in Law and Economics, 78 CAL. L. REv. 815, 822-23 (1990) (arguing that very little work
in law and economics "could be described as a rigorous attempt to falsify alternative
explanations for a given phenomenon").
240. Cotter, supra note 19, at 2134.
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embodiment (the canvas) and its copyright."' Depending on the
governing law, either (1) Georgia also owns a moral right in the
work, or (2) Alfred owns a right to distort, mutilate, modify, or
destroy any physical property he owns. (In the interest of brevity, I
will refer to Alfred's right as the "alteration right" or "right to
alter.") Focusing exclusively on the well-being of Georgia and
Alfred, does it make any difference whether Georgia's bundle of
rights, or "initial endowment," includes a moral right of integrity, or
whether Alfred instead owns a right of alteration?
The answer, of course, may depend on how one defines "well-
being." In analyzing issues of this nature, legal economists generally
proceed upon the following assumptions: (1) The value that each
party accords to a right is stable and "exogenous," or innate; (2) at
least in theory, these values can be measured along a common metric
and summed; and (3) value is defined by the amount each party
would be willing to pay to acquire the right, or the amount he or she
would be willing to accept to give it up (otherwise known,
respectively, as the parties' "offer" and "asking" prices).4 The
validity of each of these assumptions is open to debate, and in
following subsections I will consider the implications of relaxing or
eliminating them. For present purposes, however, I would like to
explore first the implications of accepting these assumptions as true.
What, if anything, can a conventional law and economics analysis tell
us about the likely consequences of a system of waivable moral
rights?
As good a place as any to begin the analysis of this question is
with an application of the Coase Theorem to the transaction between
Georgia and Alfred. 3 The Theorem posits that, if transaction costs
(and other obstacles to bargaining, such as strategic behavior2 ) are
241. Under the 1976 Copyright Act, ownership of copyright vests in the author of the
work. See 17 U.S.C. § 201(a) (1994). Normally the author is the individual who creates
the work, but an employer or commissioning party is deemed to be the author of works
made for hire. See ic §§ 101, 201(b); see also supra note 114 (defining works made for
hire). In this section, I assume that the painting is not a work made for hire.
242. See Cotter, supra note 19, at 2114-29 (discussing contours of economic paradigm);
see also ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 16-18 (2d ed. 1997)
(discussing assumptions common to economic analysis); A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN
INTRODUCTIONTO LAW AND ECONOMICS 10 (2d ed. 1989) (same); RICHARD A. POSNER,
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 1.1, at 3-12 (4th ed. 1992) (same); Harrison, supra note
239, at 1329-30 (discussing commensurability).
243. See Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 passim
(1960). For further discussion of the Coase Theorem, see COOTER & ULEN, supra note
242, at 4-6 (1988); POSNER, supra note 242, § 3.6, at 49-52.
244. Strategic behavior, which occurs when "what one individual is prepared to do
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not present, the initial assignment of rights as between parties such as
Georgia and Alfred is irrelevant to the maximization of their
aggregate wealth24-- although different initial endowments will have
different distributional consequences. Perhaps more importantly, the
Theorem also predicts that when transaction costs are not zero, the
initial endowment may affect the parties' ability to increase their
well-being.'4 Thus, as I have argued previously, the Coase Theorem
can be useful in at least three ways: first, by predicting the
consequences of different initial endowments in light of the specific
transaction costs that are likely to arise in the real world;247 second, by
predicting when the alteration of legal rules may generate desirable
depends on his assessment of what others are likely to do," JEFFRIE G. MURPHY & JULES
L. COLEMAN, PHILOSOPHY OF LAW: AN INTRODUCrION TO JURISPRUDENCE 200 (rev.
ed. 1990), is the principal subject matter of game theory. See generally DOUGLAS G.
BAIRD ET AL, GAME THEORY AND THE LAW 1-5 (1994) (introducing concept of strategic
behavior).
245. That is, the Theorem claims that the initial allocation of endowments is irrelevant
to the attainment of Kaldor-Hicks efficiency-otherwise known as "potential Pareto
efficiency," "wealth maximization," or "value maximization"-but it is not necessarily
irrelevant to the attainment of Pareto superiority or utility maximization.
To illustrate the differences among these concepts, suppose that we have a two-
person economy consisting of A and B; that A is initially endowed with a good that she is
willing to trade for $5; and that B, whose initial endowment consists of $10 in cash, is
willing to pay as much as $8 for A's good. The end result of a voluntary exchange of (say)
$6 for the good is that A owns $6 in cash, which she values more highly than she valued
the good, and B owns both $4 and a good that he values at $8; aggregate wealth has thus
increased from $5 + $10 = $15 to $6 + $8 + $4 = $18. The end result is "Pareto superior"
to the initial state, because both' parties are better off than they were under the status
quo; it is also Pareto efficient, because no further allocation can be made that would
render one party better off without rendering the other worse off, assuming that each
party derives equal pleasure from an additional increment of value. For further
discussions of Pareto efficiency, see COOTER & ULEN, supra note 242, at 44-45,
POLINSKY, supra note 242, at 7 n.4, and POSNER, supra note 242, § 1.2, at 13-14. The end
result is also value- or wealth-maximizing because no further rearrangement can increase
aggregate wealth beyond $18. Note, however, that a forced transfer of the good from A
to B also would have been wealth maximizing-A would have wound up with $0, and B
with $10 in cash plus a good he values at $8, resulting again in aggregate wealth of $18-
but that this allocation would not have been Pareto superior to the status quo because one
party, A, would have been rendered worse off in comparison with her initial state. In
addition, the end result of the forced transfer may or may not be utility-maximizing. If A
would derive greater pleasure from an extra dollar than would B, a possible result if B's
marginal utility (the pleasure he derives from each additional dollar added to his pocket)
declines, a further forced transfer from B to A would increase aggregate utility.
Aggregate wealth, however, would remain constant. For further discussion, see Cotter,
supra note 19, at 2099-2100, 2115-29.
246. See, e.g., NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECr ALTERNATIVES 110 & n.21 (1994); see
also infra text accompanying notes 252-70 (discussing, among other things, how presence
of transaction costs may prevent artist from "purchasing" moral right from art buyer).
247. See Cotter, supra note 19, at 2103-04.
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distributional effects;2480 and third, by focusing attention on the
deficiencies of the conventional economic model, when real world
observation conflicts with Coasean predictions.249
Applying the Coase Theorem, then, to the hypothetical
transaction between Georgia and Alfred, suppose first that Georgia's
initial endowment includes a waivable right of integrity. The
Theorem predicts that, in the absence of transaction costs, if Alfred
values the right to alter the work more than Georgia values the right
of integrity, Georgia will agree to waive the latter; and that otherwise
Georgia will retain her moral right. In the alternative, suppose
instead that Alfred's initial endowment includes the alteration right.
In the absence of transaction costs, Georgia (in effect) will "buy" a
right of integrity from Alfred, by accepting a lower purchase price for
her work, if Georgia values the right of integrity more highly than
Alfred values the right to alter; she will not do so if she values
integrity less than Alfred values alteration. Whether the legal system
initially endows Georgia with a moral right or Alfred with an
alteration right, therefore, the parties' aggregate welfare is exactly
the same: the relevant right, either to alter or prevent alteration,
winds up in the hands of the party who values it more highly (where
value is defined by the parties' offer and asking prices). Endowing
Georgia with a moral right, however, will affect the distribution of
wealth because if Georgia's endowment includes such a right, Alfred
must pay more to acquire Georgia's work; if her endowment does not
include a moral right, Georgia must demand a lower price for her
work if she wishes to prevent its alteration.
Once we step outside this hypothetical world of no transaction
costs, however, the initial endowment of rights may either facilitate
or hinder the parties' ability to maximize their aggregate welfare.
Suppose, for example, that assigning an integrity right to Georgia
would generate higher transaction costs than would assigning an
alteration right to Alfred; the higher these costs, the greater the
aggregate loss and the greater the likelihood that some exchanges
that would make both Alfred and. Georgia better off will be
foregone."' It is also possible, for reasons discussed hereafter, that
Georgia may be willing to pay less to acquire a moral right than she
would be willing to accept to give up a right that is part of her initial
endowment. This potential gap between offer and asking prices can
248. See id. at 2104-05,2il n.181.
249. See id. at 2137 & n.277.
250. See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 242, § 3.6, at 52.
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have significant welfare consequences."' In the following subsection,
I consider the transaction costs that are likely to arise in the context
of negotiations over moral rights, as well as the efficiency and
distributional consequences of these costs. I then consider the
possible existence and consequences of an offer/asking price gap.
a. Transaction cost analysis
One transaction cost that would arise in connection with
negotiations over moral rights is, simply, the cost of negotiating-the
cost of getting together and bargaining over whether Georgia will
have an ongoing right in her work. This cost will be minimized if (1)
Georgia is initially endowed with a moral right and she values that
right more highly than Alfred values alteration, or (2) Alfred is
endowed with an alteration right and he values it more highly than
Georgia values the integrity of her work. In either case, there will be
little need to negotiate over moral or alteration rights, because the
relevant right already has been assigned to the party who values it
more highly, and therefore no negotiating costs will be incurred as an
incident thereto. Thus, if we knew that, in a world without
transaction costs, most artists would wind up owning moral rights, we
could minimize negotiating costs by assigning those rights to them in
advance; and if we knew instead that most buyers would wind up
owning alteration rights, we could minimize these costs by assigning
alteration rights to buyers.2
The difficulty lies in knowing which of these two outcomes-
artists owning moral rights, or buyers owning alteration rights-
would be more common in a transaction-cost-free world. In a recent
251. See infra notes 271-305 and accompanying text.
252. In general, a policymaker interested in maximizing aggregate wealth may choose
from among three types of rules to reduce transaction costs. First, she may assign the
right to the party who probably would have wound up owning it in the absence of
transaction costs. If the policymaker guesses correctly, her assignment obviates the need
for any further transactions; but the efficacy of this strategy depends upon her ability to
guess correctly. See POSNER, supra note 242, § 3.6, at 52; Robert Cooter, The Cost of
Coase, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 18 (1982). Second, the policymaker may assign the right to
the party who can facilitate an exchange at lower cost. For example, if it costs $100 for A
to transfer the right to B and only $50 for B to transfer the right to A, then, all other
things being equal, the right should be assigned to B. See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas
Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral,
85 HARv. L. REv. 1089, 1097 & n.18 (1972); Cooter, supra, at 18 & n.20. Third, the
policymaker may impose rules that reduce the incentives for the parties to engage in
strategic behavior. See Cooter, supra, at 18-19. See generally Ian Ayres & Eric Talley,
Solomonic Bargaining: Dividing a Legal Entitlement to Facilitate Coasean Trade, 104
YALE L.J. 1027 (1995) (demonstrating how divided entitlements to property can reduce
incentive to engage in strategic behavior).
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article, Henry Hansmann and Marina Santilli suggest that the artist
may place a high value upon his moral right not only because he feels
attached to his work and wishes to communicate a message, but also
out of the pecuniary motive of wishing to protect his reputation; the
alteration or distortion of one work may affect the market for the
artist's other work.z 3 The results of a recent Copyright Office survey
also suggest that many artists endowed with moral rights under
VARA prefer to retain those rights, even when doing so raises a risk
of obtaining fewer commissions.2 On the other hand, the fact that
there appear to be few attempts in the real world to create moral
rights protection by agreement 5 might suggest that few artists would
negotiate for moral rights protection, absent a redistribution of
wealth or power in their favor, in a transaction-cost-free world. Even
if negotiation and other transaction costs are generally high, after all,
one would expect some artists and buyers to find it in their interest to
create moral rights by contract, if in fact artists generally value these
rights more highly than buyers value their absence. One might also
hazard a guess that buyers of works that, once installed, cannot be
removed from the premises without being dismantled or destroyed
(murals and some sculptures, for example) would be hesitant to
consent to the installation of such works if the artist demanded a
253. See Hansmann & Santilli, supra note 135, at 102-05.
254. See REPORT, supra note 139, at 136-37 (indicating that 50% of artists surveyed
stated they would not waive their moral rights if asked (42% were unsure), and that 55%
of those expressing an opinion on the subject believed that rejecting a requested waiver
would preclude a sale). Some economists, though, might question the empirical validity
of such self-reporting. Compare POSNER, supra note 148, at 554 ("Economists are known
for their distrust of people's declared motives and their consequent insistence on inferring
preferences from behavior ('revealed preference,' or putting one's money where one's
mouth is)"), with Harrison, supra note 239, at 1316-19 (criticizing revealed preference
theory).
255. My research, at any rate, has failed to uncover relevant examples. I am not aware
of any case law involving attempts to create moral rights protection solely by contract;
moreover, oral contracts appear to predominate in the art world, at least in transactions
involving moveable works of visual art, see REPORT, supra note 139, at 118 (statement of
Professor John Henry Merryman); id. at 135 (noting a survey indicating 61% agreement
with the statement that "oral contracts are most common in the art world"); Merryman,
supra note 17, at 1043. It seems unlikely that parties would attempt to create something
as novel and difficult to enforce as moral rights protection by oral agreement. See infra
notes 258-65 and accompanying text. Parties sometimes may attempt, however, to
prevent others from altering their works either by retaining the right to prepare
derivative works, or by transferring that right only on condition that it be exercised in
certain ways (as in the Gilliam case, see supra notes 78-92 and accompanying text). Cf.
Kwall, supra note 17, at 38-56 (discussing how existing copyright doctrines can be used to
protect moral rights); infra note 265 (discussing possible alternative ways of advancing
interests protected by moral rights).
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moral right.f6 Of course, if these latter arguments are correct, even
the limited protection created under VARA may be inefficient
because the costs VARA generates in connection with the
negotiation of waivers would be avoided under a system that does not
endow artists with moral rights.'
There may be reasons, however, other than artists' placing a low
value upon moral rights, that explain why parties so infrequently
attempt to create these rights by contract. One possible reason is the
difficulty of enforcing moral rights agreements against remote
purchasers." Suppose that Alfred is initially endowed with an
alteration right, but that Georgia wants to "buy" a right of integrity
as an incident to the sale of her work to him. Although the parties
can agree to whatever they want as between themselves, Georgia
may have a difficult time enforcing her integrity right against the
person who subsequently buys the painting from Alfred. Contract
law provides no direct method for Georgia to bind the remote
purchaser because Georgia and the remote purchaser are not in
privity. 9 One possible option would be for Georgia to create an
equitable servitude in her painting, by affixing to it some sort of
256. See REPORT, supra note 139, at 159 (stating that "[n]early all participants" in
Copyright Office proceedings concerning report "expected waivers to increase for works
incorporated into buildings following the decision of the U.S. District Court in Carter v.
Helmsley-Spear").
257. Except, of course, to the extent these works are considered works made for hire,
they are exempted from coverage under VARA. See supra note 114 and accompanying
text.
258. An analysis similar to that which follows can be found in Hansmann & Santilli,
supra note 135, at 100-02, 125. Hansmann and Santilli argue, among other things, that the
artist may wish to retain a moral right of integrity because a modification made to any
one embodiment of her work may affect her reputation, and therefore the value of her
other works; "[i]n effect, each of an artist's works is an advertisement for all of the
others." Id. at 104-05.
259. Suppose, for example, that A sells a painting to B, who promises that he will not
destroy it; B then resells the painting to C, who destroys the painting. A has no claim
against B, who did not breach his promise not to destroy the painting, or against C, with
whom he is not in privity. Conceivably, A and B might agree that if B ever resells the
painting, he will require purchaser C (1) to assume a duty not to destroy it, and (2) to
promise to include a similar clause in any subsequent resale contract. This is, to say the
least, a cumbersome method of enforcing obligations against C. See generally
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 316 cnt. b, 318 (1979) (discussing privity of
contract); Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Equitable Servitudes on Chattels, 41 HARV. L. REV. 945,
951-52 (1928) (discussing method for obligating C to A); Kwall, supra note 17, at 9 n.32
(noting that moral rights "cannot always be vindicated in an action by the creator for
breach of contract because the creator may not have a direct contractual relationship with
the alleged wrongful perpetrator" (citing Sidney A. Diamond, Legal Protection for the
"Moral Rights" of Authors and Other Creators, 68 TRADEMARK REP. 244, 257, 261
(1978))).
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notice that subsequent owners may not alter the work,260 but
Georgia's right to enforce an obligation of this nature against a
remote purchaser is uncertain. There are few reported decisions in
which parties have attempted to enforce servitudes in chattels, and
the few that exist have elicited mixed results.261 Professor Merryman
also suggests that some artists may view the affixation of such a
notice as itself a defacement of their work. 2 One other possible
option would be for Georgia to retain her right, under the Copyright
Act, to prepare derivative works. Under Gilliam this option might
provide Georgia with the right to prevent some unauthorized
alterations of her work, but the scope of this right remains uncertain
and (to my knowledge) has never been construed to cover a proposed
destruction of a work.63
By contrast, suppose instead that Georgia is initially endowed
with a right of integrity and that Alfred wishes to induce a waiver. In
comparison with the cost of creating an enforceable equitable
servitude, the cost of creating an effective waiver of Georgia's rights
260. See Merryman, supra note 17, at 1043-44.
261. See generally Zechariah Chafee, Jr., The Music Goes Round and Round:
Equitable Servitudes and Chattels, 69 HARV. L. REv. 1250 (1956) (discussing whether
equitable servitudes in chattels are enforceable); Chafee, supra note 259, at 953-1013
(same). My research has uncovered only two reported cases decided since Chafee's 1956
article (other than the case that was the subject of the article, and that also was the
subject of a subsequent proceeding) in which a court has expressly enforced an equitable
servitude in a chattel. See Tri-Continental Fin. Corp. v. Tropical Marine Enters., 265 F.2d
619, 625-26 (5th Cir. 1959); Nadell & Co. v. Grasso, 346 P.2d 505, 508-12 (Cal. Ct. App.
1959). Other courts have expressed doubt as to the enforceability of servitudes in
chattels. See Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v. Granada Elecs., Inc., 816 F.2d 68,
75-76 (2d Cir. 1987); American Bell Inc. v. Federation of Tel. Workers, 736 F.2d 879, 887
(3d Cir. 1984).
262. See Merryman, supra note 17, at 1044 ("[M]ost works of art would be
unacceptably defaced by any attempt to attach notice of restrictions to them in some
permanent and indelible, and at the same time reasonably apparent, way."). On the other
hand, one might question whether many artists would object to placing such a notice on,
say, the back of a painting or the base of a sculpture. The objection also seems to carry
little force with regard to literary works, films, musical compositions, and dramatic works.
263. Suppose, for example, that Georgia retains her right to prepare derivative works,
and that Alfred or a remote buyer paints over a portion of the painting. Has Alfred or
the remote buyer created an infringing derivative work, or does the Gilliam principle not
cover alterations to the original work? Cf. Yonover, supra note 58, at 964, 966-67
(raising, but not resolving, issue of whether drawing a mustache on another's original
painting violates Lanham Act § 43, under Gilliam). Compare Mirage Editions, Inc. v.
Albuquerque A.R.T. Co., 856 F.2d 1341, 1342-44 (9th Cir. 1988) (finding that cutting
pictures from book and gluing them onto tiles created derivative work), with Paramount
Pictures Corp. v. Video Broad. Sys., 724 F. Supp. 808, 821 (D. Kan. 1989) (finding that
placing commercials at beginning of videocassettes did not create derivative work).
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should be minimal. Perhaps, then, endowing Georgia with a moral
right can be viewed as economically efficient because this endowment
allows the parties to avoid the transaction costs that otherwise would
be incurred as an incident to an attempt to create a servitude
enforceable against remote purchasers.'
This rationale, however, still fails to explain why, if artists
generally place a higher value on the integrity of their works than
buyers place on the alteration of those works, artists do not negotiate
for integrity rights that would be enforceable against their immediate
purchasers, even if not against remote buyers. Perhaps, though, the
failure to include moral rights provisions in agreements for the sale of
works of art can be attributed more to lack of foresight than to lack
of demand on the part of artists. Presumably, few people buy works
of art with the present intention of materially altering them (unless
they plan to adapt the work to another medium, in which case they
are likely to obtain an express assignment or license of the adaptation
right), much less destroying them. Unexpected conflicts between the
artist's interest in integrity and the buyer's interest in alteration
nevertheless can arise for any number of reasons: Alfred may grow
tired of the work, or his tastes may change so that what he once
264. Under VARA, for example, a waiver generally needs only to be in writing and to
specifically identify the work. See 17 U.S.C. § 106A(e)(1) (1994). There is some
question, however, whether waivers under VARA are enforceable by subsequent
purchasers. See supra note 120.
265. Of course, there may be other ways to reduce this cost. One way might be to
clarify whether equitable servitudes in chattels are enforceable, rather than (in effect) to
read a servitude into every contract for the sale of art. Another option might be to
establish a registration system to record servitudes in works of art. See Merryman, supra
note 17, at 1044 (noting the nonexistence of such a system as of 1976); cf. Richard A.
Epstein, Notice and Freedom of Contract in the Law of Servitudes, 55 S. CAL. L. REV.
1353, 1354-58 (1982) (arguing that equitable servitudes in real property should be
generally enforceable, in light of the fact that recording statutes put remote purchasers on
notice). However, experience thus far with the voluntary registry set up under VARA,
which allows the author of a work of visual art that has been incorporated in or made part
of a building to record his identity with the Copyright Office, see 17 U.S.C. § 113(d)(3),
has been disappointing. Since the statute took effect in 1991, only one entry has been
submitted to the registry. See REPORT, supra note 139, at 193; cf. Carl H. Settlemyer III,
Between Thought and Possession: Artists' "Moral Rights" and Public Access to Creative
Works, 81 GEO. L.J. 2291, 2334 n.206 (1993) (recounting opposition due to privacy
interests to proposed public registration of details of purchases and sales of works of art
during congressional hearings on droit de suite legislation). A third option would be to
clarify, and perhaps expand, the circumstances under which Gilliam renders alterations
actionable under either the Copyright or Lanham Act. A fourth would be to provide
visual artists with a more effective right to control the display of their works. Under
current law, the "first sale" doctrine prevents the author from controlling the owner's
public display of the work. See 17 U.S.C. § 109(c); Hansmann & Santilli, supra note 135,
at 117-20 (discussing advantages and disadvantages of an expanded display right).
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enjoyed he later finds to be trite or offensive; or Alfred may discover
that the public display of Georgia's work renders his property less
valuable;' or (assuming, for the moment, that the work is a book,
score, drama, or film instead of a painting) he may decide that he
would like to adapt or perform the work in a manner that is contrary
to Georgia's express directions, or that was technologically infeasible
at the time of agreement.27 If the risk of these events is low,
however, the parties' failure to bargain over moral rights conceivably
may owe more to simple lack of imagination than to a lack of interest
on the artist's part in the work's integrity.
Even if this argument concerning foresight is correct, however, it
provides the policymaker with little guidance in deciding whether in
the absence of express agreement artists or buyers should bear the
risk of the events described in the preceding paragraph. As before,
the policymaker is faced with the dilemma of trying to guess what the
parties' agreement would have been if transaction costs (in this case,
the cost of foresight) had been zero. VARA clearly allocates these
risks to buyers, by requiring an affirmative act of waiver to give rise
to an alteration right; and perhaps this choice can be defended on the
grounds that the buyer of a work of visual art is likely to have greater
insight into the magnitude of these potential risks than is the artist
(inasmuch as the risks all involve the buyer's subsequent use of the
work), and that the buyer will have better access to advice in
structuring the transaction. "' If buyers are rational actors, however,
one would expect that, even in the absence of a moral rights rule they
would invest in acquiring knowledge of the potential risks up to the
point at which it no longer becomes profitable to do so, and that they
would disclose those risks whenever disclosure would be helpful in
266. When the work is not complete at the time the parties come to terms, it may be
particularly difficult to foresee its final form and how it will interact with its surroundings.
Cf. REPORT, supra note 139, app. part IX, at 37-38 (relating statement of artist Johnny
Swing that if parties in Carter had foreseen moral rights conflict, artists would have
designed the project so as to be removable; and that "clearly predetermin[ing]" final
version of works of art "is contradictory to the nature of making art").
267. But see Beyer, supra note 17, at 1048 (stating that "[u]nforeseen technological
and social changes are a common fact of life," and that "there exist contractual ways to
prepare for such eventualities").
268. At least, one might expect some buyers of works of visual art-for example,
building owners and public entities that commission public or semi-public works of art, or
producers of motions pictures or sound recordings-to be in a better position than many
artists to initiate discussions concerning moral rights. Cf. REPORT, supra note 139, at 133,
143, 152 n.552 (discussing varying levels of awareness among visual artists of moral
rights). On the other hand, individual buyers may be less familiar with the relevant legal
principles than, are artists, but they are also probably less likely to be interested in
retaining a right to alter. See infra notes 290-92 and accompanying text.
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inducing the artist to contract for moral rights. The fact that buyers
generally do not act in this fashion once again might suggest that
artists are unlikely to value moral rights protection more than buyers
value alteration.
One final consideration is the distributive consequences of a rule
endowing artists with waivable moral rights, versus a rule endowing
buyers with a waivable right of alteration. If transaction costs are
low, either rule will facilitate transactions that leave each party better
off than before; the former, however, will distribute wealth in favor
of artists, while the latter favors buyers. If transaction costs are low,
then, a rule endowing artists with a waivable moral right works
unambiguously to the advantage of artists. 9 If transaction costs are
high, however, one rule may be more efficient than the other, and the
policymaker may have to choose between a rule that maximizes
wealth and one that distributes income to the favored party20
To summarize, then, in the absence of any endowment or third-
party effects, two advantages of endowing the artist with a waivable
moral right are that this arrangement (1) facilitates some voluntary
bargains that otherwise would be difficult to enforce, and (2) may
distribute income in favor of artists. The principal disadvantage of
this endowment is that it increases transaction costs when the artist
values the integrity of her work less than the buyer values the right to
alter. Even if the latter situation is more common than its opposite,
however, the increase in transaction costs attributable to waivers may
be small, and it may be outweighed by the (arguably more
substantial) decrease in the cost of enforcing moral rights against
269. Whether this attempt to redistribute income in favor of artists would succeed in
the long run, however, is unclear. If the return on investing in becoming an artist goes up,
one would expect more people to decide to become artists; precisely how many, of course,
will depend on the elasticity of would-be artists' supply curves, and it may be the case that
most artists are not significantly affected by the prospect of financial reward. Similarly, if
the return on investing in patronage goes down, one would expect fewer people to
become patrons, though again the magnitude of the effect is unknown. Attempts to
redistribute income by the manipulation of initial entitlements raise many complex issues
and, in the opinion of some commentators, may be futile. For further discussion, see, for
example, RONALD H. COASE, THE FIRM, THE MARKET, AND THE LAW 170-74 (1988),
POSNER, supra note 242, § 3.12, at 81-83, and Robert P. Merges, Of Property Rules,
Coase, and Intellectual Property, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2655,2672-73 n.18 (1994).
270. An economist might argue, however, that the efficient rule is always preferable
because the resulting surplus over the wealth that would have been created under the
inefficient rule can be redistributed so as to render everyone better off. See, e.g., Louis
Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Why the Legal System Is Less Efficient than the Income Tax in
Redistributing Income, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 667, 667-74 (1994). I have taken issue with this
argument on practical and theoretical grounds in my previous work. See Cotter, supra
note 19, at 2106-14.
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remote purchasers, even if the latter cost is incurred in only a
minority of cases. A system of waivable moral rights therefore may
have a positive welfare effect within the context of the artist/buyer
transaction, as well as a small positive distributional effect if the
policymaker's goal is to distribute income to artists. No stronger
conclusion is forthcoming, however, in the absence of further
empirical evidence.
b. Offer/asking price gaps
Aside from transaction costs, a second phenomenon that may
cause the initial allocation to affect whether Georgia or Alfred winds
up owning the relevant right is the "offer/asking price gap" or
"endowment effect."'" To illustrate the phenomenon, suppose first
that the policymaker initially endows Alfred with an alteration right,
which he is willing to waive for a price of $100. Suppose further that
Georgia is willing to pay $X to induce a waiver. The Coase Theorem
predicts that, if X > 100, Georgia and Alfred will agree to confer
moral rights upon Georgia by contract (in the absence of prohibitive
transaction costs), and that if X < 100 no agreement will take place.2'
Now suppose instead that the policymaker initially endows
Georgia with a waivable moral right; that Alfred still values the
absence of moral rights protection at $100 (that is, Alfred is willing to
pay $100 for Georgia's consent to a waiver); but that Georgia now
values moral rights protection at $Y (meaning that she is willing to
accept that amount, rather than $X, in exchange for waiving her
right). On these facts, if both X and Y are greater than 100, or both
X and Y are less than 100, the initial allocation of rights does not
affect their ultimate distribution; if the former is true, Georgia winds
up owning a moral right, and if the latter is true, Alfred winds up
owning an alteration right. If, however, Y > 100 > X, Georgia will
wind up retaining a moral right if her initial allocation includes such a
right, but she will wind up not owning a moral right if her initial
allocation does not include such a right. In other words, where there
is a gap between a party's offer and asking prices, the initial
allocation of a right may determine where the right comes to rest; as
we shall see, it also may determine, contrary to the Coase Theorem,
271. Some commentators use the term "endowment effect" as a synonym for the
offer/asking price gap, while others use the term exclusively to refer to gaps that are not
attributable to wealth or substitution effects. See infra notes 279-84 and accompanying
text (discussing gaps not attributable to wealth or substitution effects). I will use the
terms synonymously.
272. See supra paragraph following text accompanying note 249.
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whether aggregate wealth will be maximized.
A growing body of empirical evidence suggests that offer/asking
price gaps are more common and larger than conventional
neoclassical economic theory had predicted.2  One possible
explanation for these gaps is the wealth or income effect-that is, the
tendency to demand more of a good as a result of an increase in one's
wealth or income. 4 Suppose, for example, that Georgia's initial net
worth is X if her initial endowment does not include a moral right,
and that it is X + Y (where Y is the value she attributes to the right) if
her initial endowment does include it; as long as Y > 0, Georgia is
wealthier if her initial endowment includes a moral right. On these
facts, the price Georgia would be willing to accept to waive her right
will exceed the price she would be willing to pay to purchase it. 5
Although neoclassical economic theory suggests that the
offer/asking price gap caused by wealth effects often will be small
(much smaller, in fact, than the disparity typically observed in
experiments designed to measure the endowment effect),276 scholars
have demonstrated that the effect may be substantial when there are
no close substitutes for the relevant good, especially when the value
of the good constitutes a large portion of a party's wealth.2' Suppose,
for example, that Georgia has a strong desire to retain control over
the integrity of her work, but that she has a net worth of only $500. If
273. See, e.g., DOUGLAS D. DAVIS & CHARLES A. HOLT, EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS
457-60 (1993); Harrison, supra note 239, at 1358-61; Elizabeth Hoffman & Matthew
Spitzer, Willingness to Pay vs. Willingness to Accept: Legal and Economic Implications,
71 WASH. U. L.Q. 59, 66-85 (1993); Herbert Hovenkamp, Legal Policy and the
Endowment Effect, 20 J. LEGAL STUD. 224, 227-28 (1991); Daniel Kahneman et al.,
Experimental Tests of the Endowment Effect and the Coase Theorem, 98 J. POL. ECON.
1325 passim (1990); Russell Korobkin, Policymaking and the Offer/Asking Price Gap:
Toward a Theory of Efficient Entitlement Allocation, 46 STAN. L. REV. 663,667-69 (1994);
Cass R. Sunstein, EndogenousoPreferences, Environmental Law, 22 1. LEGAL STUD. 217,
225-27 (1993).
274. See, e.g., GEORGE J. STIGLER, THE THEORY OF PRICE 63-65 (3d ed. 1966)
(discussing the income effect).
275. See, e.g., Hovenkamp, supra note 273, at 225-26 (footnote omitted) ("Someone
will generally be willing to pay less to have something than he would accept as
compensation for giving up the same thing because the dollars in the first transaction
come out of his current money income or savings, while the second adds to his income or
savings. Under diminishing marginal utility of income, the money added to his wealth
gives him less utility per dollar than the money he already has, so he would demand more
in exchange.").
276. See DAVIS & HOLT, supra note 273, at 458; W. Michael Hanemann, Willingness to
Pay and Willingness to Accept: How Much Can They Differ?, 81 AM. ECON. REV. 635
passim (1991); Hovenkamp, supra note 273, at 226.
277. See Hanemann, supra note 276, at 635-37; Hoffman & Spitzer, supra note 273, at
85-87.
1997]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
the policymaker initially endows Alfred with a right of alteration, the
most Georgia can offer to induce Alfred to waive is $500. If instead
the policymaker initially endows Georgia with a moral right, Georgia
may demand a much higher price in exchange for a waiver-
potentially an infinite price, if Georgia feels that no amount of money
is an adequate substitute for the integrity of her work.278 Under these
circumstances, then, the fact that Georgia's offer price is lower than
Alfred's asking price does not rule out the possibility that Georgia's
asking price exceeds Alfred's offer price; the initial endowment
therefore may dictate where the right comes to rest.
A second situation in which the endowment effect may arise
occurs when a party derives greater disutility from negative
departures from her initial endowment than she derives positive
utility from upward departures from that same endowment. 9  To
illustrate, assume again that the artist has a net worth of $500, and
that her asking price is only a small portion of this total-say $10-
perhaps because she needs the remaining $490 to satisfy other, more
basic needs, such as food and shelter. Assume further that giving up
$10 to acquire moral rights from the buyer would increase her net
satisfaction by x "utils." If instead the policymaker initially allocates
moral rights to the artist, the artist's net worth is equal to $500 plus
whatever value she accords these rights. If $500 is Georgia's
"reference point," however, the price she will demand to acquire the
same x utils that cost her $10 under the first scenario will be greater
than $10:
278. See Hanemann, supra note 276, at 635-36. Thus, one explanation for some
endowment effects may be that no amount of money can adequately compensate for the
loss of certain goods, or that trading these goods for money is inconsistent with the way
we value them. See Korobkin, supra note 273, at 691-95; see also infra notes 360-74 and
accompanying text (discussing incommensurability).
279. The initial endowment is sometimes referred to as the party's "reference point."
For discussions, see Hoffman & Spitzer, supra note 273, at 87-91 (reviewing the work of
Daniel Kahneman, Jack Knetsch, Richard Thaler, and Amos Tversky). Again
Hovenkamp offers a good description of this phenomenon:
One explanation for the endowment effect is that the individual's marginal
utility curve for money is steeper than once thought. It may also have a "kink,"
or sudden change in slope, at or near the point of the individual's current
income. That is, for many individuals, money subtracted from current income is
worth much more, in utility per dollar, than money added to current income.
Or, to put it another way, the burden of a downward shift in one's standard of
living is felt more heavily than is the benefit of an upward shift of the same
dollar amount.
Hovenkamp, supra note 273, at 228; see also Hovenkamp, Marginal Utility and the Coase
Theorem, 75 CORNELL L. REv. 738, 800-01 (1990) [hereinafter Hovenkamp, Marginal
Utility] (describing phenomenon similarly).
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If an individual owns a good and is offered money to
relinquish it, he regards the potential sale as the loss of the
good. If he does not own the good, however, and is
considering purchasing it, he views the potential purchase as
a gain of the good. Because losses loom larger than gains,
the individual will demand more to part with a good he
aleady owns than he will be willing to pay for the same
good.
Once again, then, the initial allocation of the right may determine its
ultimate disposition.
Scholars have suggested various psychological explanations both
as to why people may value losses more heavily than gains, and as
independent reasons for the existence of endowment effects. One
explanation is that people tend to become psychologically attached to
their initial endowments, perhaps because they come to view these
endowments as aspects of their personalities rather than as
exchangeable commodities, s1 or because the trait of being reasonably
content with what one already owns provided human beings, at some
point in the distant past, with some evolutionary advantage.'
Another possible explanation is that people have a desire to "close"
transactions; having once closed a transaction by, for example,
purchasing a commodity, the buyer suffers some psychic disutility
when another offers to buy the good from him.m Yet another
explanation combines the loss-aversion theory with the theory that
people often are uncertain about their own preferences, and that they
suffer regret over "bad" transactions; thus, in order to avoid incurring
feelings of regret, they tend to overvalue their initial entitlements.'
The preceding analysis suggests that, if an endowment effect
exists in the context of the artist/buyer transaction, it is probably
more likely to affect artists' offer and asking prices for moral rights
than to affect buyers' offer and asking prices for alteration rights.
One reason is that a substantial number of buyers are commercial
entities such as corporate and governmental patrons and motion
280. Hoffman & Spitzer, supra note 273, at 89.
281. See id. at 90-91 (citing Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN.
L. REV. 957, 959 (1982)); Korobkin, supra note 273, at 689-91.
282. See Hoffman & Spitzer, supra note 273, at 89-90; Sunstein, supra note 273, at 227-
28.
283. See Hoffman & Spitzer, supra note 273, at 91-93 (discussing Mark Kelman,
Consumption Theory, Production Theory, and Ideology in the Coase Theorem, 52 S. CAL.
L. REv. 669, 691-93 (1979)); Korobkin, supra note 273, at 695-96.
284. See Hoffman & Spitzer, supra note 273, at 94-96; Korobkin, supra note 273, at
696-97; Sunstein, supra note 273, at 228-29.
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picture production companies, and that endowment effects are
probably less likely to affect these entities than they are to affect
human beings. As noted above, one explanation for the endowment
effect attributes it to a combination of wealth constraints and a low
elasticity of substitution between the relevant good and all other
goods, including money.m Firms are, in general, less likely than are
individuals to find their offer prices prohibitively constrained by
wealth, due to better access to wealth itself and to credit; they are
also probably less likely to have a low elasticity of substitution
between the relevant good and money.2" The alternative explanation
for endowment effects-that they arise due to a steep change in the
marginal utility curve just to the right of one's "reference point" ---is
also less likely to affect the commercial buyer because a firm whose
goal is profit maximization will have a constant marginal utility curve
that precludes the loss-aversion phenomenon.2 It also seems less
likely that a firm would be as susceptible as an individual to any
emotional or sentimental attachment to its initial endowment2 9
Finally, all of the empirical studies documenting endowment effects
of which I am aware have involved human beings, not business
entities, although this fact hardly constitutes affirmative proof that
the phenomenon cannot affect the latter.
Of course, not all buyers are corporate or other commercial
actors. Individuals also buy art, and some artists engage in the
production of art as a business (perhaps all artists do so to varying
degrees). It may well be the case, then, that in some circumstances
the endowment effect will work in a direction precisely opposite to
that which I have just described, affecting buyers' offer and asking
prices more extensively than artists'. If we focus our attention
exclusively on those transactions in which buyers are likely to place
some positive value on the right to alter the artist's work, however,
285. See supra notes 274-78 and accompanying text.
286. See generally Cotter, supra note 19, at 2132 (suggesting that firms "are more
likely than individuals to be guided by the norm of wealth maximization (as well as to
have better access to credit, information, and insurance against losses)"); Hovenkamp,
Marginal Utility, supra note 279, at 801,804-05 (suggesting that firms are more likely than
individuals to be wealth maximizers); Korobkin, supra note 273, at 672-73 (same).
287. See supra notes 279-80 and accompanying text.
288. See Hovenkamp, Marginal Utility, supra note 279, at 801. Hovenkamp notes,
however, that this generalization may not always hold: "A growth conscious manager
might regard an annual report showing a 10 cent per share decline in profits as far more
harmful than a report showing a 10 cent increase as beneficial. But this would be an
indicator that the manager was maximizing output, not profits." IaL at 801 n.59.
289. Cf. supra text accompanying note 281 (suggesting that individuals may come to
view initial endowments as aspects of their personalities).
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the analysis above appears to remain generally valid. As we have
seen, some of the more common situations in which the interests of
artist and buyer conflict arise when, for example, the buyer wants to
remove a work from a building or public space, or to translate it into
another medium;2" at least in these circumstances, the stereotype of
the individual artist pitted against the commercial buyer seems to
hold. In contrast, I would suspect that, in the vast majority of cases
involving noncommercial buyers, the right to alter the artist's work is
probably of little value to the buyer, so that even if there were a gap
between the buyer's offer and asking prices it would probably be de
minimis.29' Finally, one might expect even the typical, individual,
noncommercial buyer to be wealthier than the typical artist; this
disparity in wealth suggests, once again, that gaps induced by the
wealth effect are more likely to affect artists.2'
The hypothesis that endowment effects more frequently affect
artists than buyers nevertheless would have little bite if the resulting
gap between artists' offer and asking prices were small. But there is
reason to expect that the gap may be substantial. Some of the
empirical studies suggest that a person's asking price sometimes will
be several times his offer price for the same good;293 to the extent that
these findings are valid, there is no obvious reason to expect artists'
gaps to differ substantially from the mean. Indeed, one might expect
artists' offer and asking prices for moral rights to be even greater
than the gaps observed in other contexts. The fact that so many
290. See, e.g., supra notes 58,60,78-85, 124-31 and accompanying text.
291. The next time you buy a painting at your local gallery or art fair, consider
whether you would value the painting more if you knew that you would have the right,
when you tire of it, to slash it, or to paint over it, or to cut it into panels. My guess is that
for most of us occasional, noncommercial buyers of art these rights would mean very
little. There may be some situations, though, in which the noncommercial buyer places
substantial value on alteration: a garage band may want to perform a songwriter's
musical composition in a way that distorts the songwriter's intent, for example, or a local
acting troupe may want to stage a play in a way that the playwright finds objectionable (as
in the Beckett case, see supra note 62). But then maybe these are not good examples of
purely private, noncommercial use.
292. Although, as before, the stereotype does not always hold; some artists are far
wealthier than the typical consumer of their works. See, e.g., Robert La Franco, The Top
40, FoRBES, Sept. 23, 1996, at 164, 164-78 (listing 40 entertainers and other celebrities
whose two-year income was estimated at $25 million or higher). Even outside the field of
popular entertainment, some artists eventually achieve substantial commercial success
within their lifetimes. See, e.g., Laura Stewart, The Arts: What Price Willem de Kooning?,
DAILY TELEGRAPH, Apr. 7, 1997, at 18, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File
(estimating value of estate of late abstract expressionist painter at $75 million).
293. See generally sources cited supra note 273 (discussing experimental evidence).
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artists make little money from their calling294 suggests that their offer
prices are likely to be highly constrained by wealth, and this
constraint may correlate with a substantial endowment effect.29 In
addition, a strong psychological attachment to the work may translate
into a strong attachment to the work's integrity, when a right to the
latter is viewed as part of the artist's initial endowment. This
attachment may render the artist relatively loss averse with respect to
her moral right.296 And perhaps for many artists there are no close
substitutes for their integrity interests; the very idea of accepting
money in exchange for the right to alter or destroy one's work may
strike many artists as barbaric. A lack of close substitutes, as we have
seen, also may correlate with a substantial endowment effect.2"
If I am correct in concluding that there is likely to be a large gap
between the typical artist's offer and asking prices for moral rights,
and little or no gap between the typical buyer's offer and asking
prices for alteration rights, a comparison of artists' and buyers' offer
and asking prices yields three possible outcomes. Outcome Number
One is that the artist's offer price exceeds the buyer's asking price,
and that the artist's asking price exceeds the buyer's offer price.
When this is the case, the artist will retain her moral right if it is part
of her initial endowment and otherwise will "buy" one from the
buyer; the efficient solution is to endow the artist with a moral right.
Outcome Number Two is that the artist's offer price is less than the
buyer's asking price, and that her asking price is less than the buyer's
offer price. When this is the case, assigning a moral right to the artist
is inefficient because it requires the parties to engage in an otherwise
unnecessary transaction.298 Outcome Number Three is that the
artist's offer price is lower than the buyer's asking price, and that the
artist's asking price is higher than the buyer's offer price. To whom
should the policymaker allocate the right under Outcome Number
Three, given that the right will remain with the person to whom it is
initially assigned?
Unfortunately, there is no clear answer to the preceding
294. See, e.g., REPORT, supra note 139, at 132-33 (73% of survey participants reported
earning less than $10,000 in gross income from their artwork in an average year); Linda J.
Lacey, Of Bread and Roses and Copyrights, 1989 DuKE L.J. 1532, 1568-80 (discussing
statistics relating to artists' earnings).
295. See supra notes 274-78 and accompanying text.
296. Cf. supra notes 281-84 and accompanying text (offering psychological
explanations for why people may value losses more heavily than gains).
297. See supra notes 276-78 and accompanying text.
298. See supra notes 252-57 and accompanying text.
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question. On the one hand, scholars such as Herbert Hovenkamp
argue that it is always preferable to assign the right to the party with
the higher asking price because asking prices are less dependent on
wealth and therefore are more likely to reflect a party's "true"
valuation.2' If Hovenkamp is correct, the policymaker confronted
with Outcome Number Three should assign the right to the artist:
Because the buyer's offer and asking prices are assumed to be
equivalent, and the artist's asking price is higher than the buyer's
offer price, the artist's asking price is necessarily the higher of the
two asking prices.
On the other hand, Russell Korobkin has argued that the
policymaker should inquire into the source of the offer/asking gap
before deciding whether to assign the right to the party with the
higher offer or asking price.' Korobkin challenges Hovenkamp's
view that asking prices are always preferable on the ground, among
others, that a party who lacks wealth-and whose offer price is
therefore correspondingly low-may value nonmarket goods, such as
leisure, more than he values money; under these circumstances, the
party's offer price may be a more accurate measure of value."
Korobkin therefore argues that offer prices better reflect value
if the claimant can acquire the dollars necessary to raise his
bid, if he so chooses. [Willingness to pay] can be an invalid
measure of value ... but only when a claimant's inability to
offer [an offer] price as high as his [asking] price does not
reflect ex ante choices about wealth acquisition versus other
activities.'
Even if Korobkin is correct, however, it is unclear whether the artist's
inability to raise the money necessary to increase her offer price
reflects a conscious choice to forgo wealth acquisition in favor of
299. See Hovenkamp, supra note 273, at 229-30, 236-37; Hovenkamp, Marginal Utility,
supra note 279, at 809-10; see also Richard S. Markovits, Duncan's Do Nots: Cost-Benefit
Analysis and the Determination of Legal Entitlements, 36 STAN. L. REV. 1169, 1179-82
(1984) (recommending that policymaker should imagine transfer of right to party who
does not have it under status quo, then compare hypothetical transferee's asking price
with hypothetical transferor's offer price, and compel transfer if former exceeds latter).
In the present context, Hovenkamp's and Markovits's proposals become indistinguishable
because the buyer's offer and asking prices are assumed to be equivalent.
300. See Korobkin, supra note 273, at 682-84,697-706.
301. See id. at 685-86.
302. kd at 686. To illustrate his point, Korobkin uses the example of a lazy man who
enjoys opera. Because he prefers leisure to work, he has little money, and his offer price
for an opera ticket is only $5; his asking price, however, is $30. Korobkin argues that if
the man's lack of wealth is due to his choice not to work, his offer price is a better
measure of value. See &L at 685-86.
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other pursuits. In one sense, of course, it clearly does-few people go
into the arts expecting to become millionaires-though at the same
time the artist's decision about which career to pursue may be largely
an inescapable aspect of her personality. 3° On these facts, which
measure better estimates the value the artist places on the integrity of
her work?
Korobkin also suggests that other factors not related to wealth
may in some cases render either offer or asking prices more
appropriate as a measure of value. To the extent that the assumed
endowment effect is based upon the artist's attachment to her
interest in the integrity of her work, for example, Korobkin would
argue that the asking price more accurately measures her
appreciation, perhaps built up over time, for that interest." On the
other hand, Korobkin advocates the use of offer prices when the
endowment effect derives from a low elasticity of substitution, the
psychic disutility of bargaining, or the ex ante fear of regret, on the
ground that in these situations "the offer/asking price gap is caused
by disutility from selling an entitlement, as opposed to increased
utility from owning one."3 5 If Korobkin's analysis is correct, whether
to value the artist's rights by reference to offer or asking prices is
indeterminate, absent further evidence as to the source of the gap.
Until the theoretical argument is resolved, therefore, it is
difficult to conclude whether assigning an integrity or an alteration
right is efficient in the one instance-Outcome Number Three-in
which an endowment effect would cause the right to remain with the
party to whom it is initially allocated. For the present, then, the
possible existence of an endowment effect remains at best only a
potential justification for assigning the artist a waivable moral right.
Of course, one might still defend such an assignment on the grounds
that (1) the losses otherwise incurred under Outcome Number One
may be great; (2) the additional transaction costs incurred under
Outcome Number Two probably are not; (3) the assignment is
arguably, though not dispositively, efficient under Outcome Number
Three; and (4) the assignment redistributes income in favor of artists.
These conclusions are far from certain, however, and they are subject
to confirmation or refutation only by further theoretical or empirical
analysis.
303. See Lacey, supra note 294, at 1574.
304. See Korobkin, supra note 273, at 691.
305. Id. at 696.
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2. Nonwaivable Moral Rights vs. No Moral Rights
The preceding analysis demonstrates that a plausible, though
hardly dispositive, case can be made from within the framework of
neoclassical economics in support of endowing the artist with a
waivable moral right. A system of nonwaivable rights, however, is
more problematic. Suppose once again that Georgia is prepared to
sell her work to Alfred. On the one hand, if Georgia values the
integrity of the work more than Alfred values the right to alter,
endowing Georgia with either a waivable or nonwaivable right
achieves the same result: Georgia retains her right; both parties are
better off than they were before the transaction occurred; and
Georgia is better off than she would have been if she had had to
"buy" a moral right from Alfred. But if Georgia values the integrity
of her work less than Alfred values its alteration, endowing Georgia
with a nonwaivable right prevents the parties from entering into a
transaction-the sale of an alteration right to Alfred-that would
have rendered both of them better off. 6 Thus, under a system of
nonwaivable rights, either (1) Alfred will buy Georgia's work at a
lower price than he would have been willing to pay had her moral
right been waivable, or (2) Alfred will decline to buy the work at all.
I provide a mathematical demonstration of these conclusions in the
margin,37 but the underlying intuition is straightforward: If I know
306. Technically, of course, the rule does not prevent Georgia and Alfred from
agreeing to whatever they want; it only renders a waiver of Georgia's right legally
unenforceable. The parties therefore may go forward with a waiver agreement if Alfred
thinks he can trust Georgia to abide by a promise not to interfere with any alterations.
But if Georgia subsequently changes her mind, the agreement is a nullity.
307. To illustrate, assume first that Georgia is endowed with a waivable right and that
she is willing either to (1) waive that right and sell her work to Alfred for price WTAI
(where "WTA" stands for "willing to accept"), or (2) retain her right and sell her work to
Alfred for price WTA2 . The difference between WTA, and WTA, therefore is the price
Georgia is willing to accept to waive her right. Assume further that Alfred is willing to
pay price WTP, ("WTP" stands for "willing to pay") if Georgia is willing to waive her
right and price wrP2 if she is not; WTP , - WTP2 then is the price Alfred is willing to pay
to induce a waiver. Finally, assume that WTP, > WTA, (that is, that Alfred is willing to
buy the work if Georgia waives her moral right). If the price Alfred is willing to pay to
induce the waiver (WTP, - wrP,) is greater than the price Georgia is willing to accept to
waive (WTA, - WTA,), Georgia will waive her right and sell the work at price p , where
WTAI _ p, < WTP?,. At the close of the transaction, Georgia's wealth has increased in the
amount of p, - WrA, and Alfred's by WTP, - p,, causing aggregate wealth to increase in
the amount of WTP, - WTA,. Alternatively, if (1) Georgia values her moral right more
than Alfred values the waiver (that is, wrP, - WTP, < WTA, - WTA,), and (2) Alfred is
still willing to buy the work even if Georgia retains her right (that is, WTP, > WTAaJ, then
Georgia will retain the right and sell the work for p,, where WITA2  p2 -5 WTP2. At the
close of the transaction, Georgia's wealth has increased in the amount of p2 - WTA2 , and
Alfred's by WT? 2 - p,, causing aggregate wealth to increase in the amount of WTP, -
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that, once I commission a mural, I may never be able to get rid of it, I
may be less willing to commission it in the first place. A conventional
economic analysis therefore suggests that a nonwaivable moral right
threatens to render both artist and buyer worse off than would a
system of waivable rights.
One might nevertheless argue that a nonwaivable right could be
wealth-maximizing under certain conditions. A crude paternalism,
for example, might suggest that artists, like children, need to be
protected from their own poor judgment; perhaps Georgia values the
integrity of her work more highly than Alfred values its potential
alteration, but somehow or another Georgia will be tricked into
waiving her right if left to her own devices.?8 The obvious flaw in this
argument, however, as a rationale for endowing the artist with a
nonwaivable moral right, is its overbreadth.' Surely some artists
would benefit from protection against their own bad judgment, but
then so would some people in every other walk of life, and there is no
reason to believe that artists generally, or even a significant plurality
of them, are more inept than others in deciding where their interests
lie. Moreover, even if the stereotype were correct, the paternalist
WTA..
Now assume that Georgia's initial endowment includes a nonwaivable moral right
instead. If Georgia values this right more than Alfred values alteration, the fact that the
right is nonwaivable makes no difference; as before, if WTP, > WTA2, Georgia will retain
the right and sell her work for p2, where WTA2  P2 < WTP, resulting in a net increase in
aggregate wealth of WrP 2 - WTA. If Alfred values alteration more than Georgia values
integrity, however, the assignment of a nonwaivable right changes the outcome. If WTP2
< WTA., Alfred will decline to buy Georgia's work, resulting in a stagnant aggregate
wealth. If, on the other hand, WTP, > WTA2, Alfred will still agree to buy the work, but
he will pay p2 instead of p,, resulting in an increase in aggregate wealth of WTP, - WTA,
(as opposed to WTP, - WTA, under a waivable-right rule). By hypothesis, however,
WTA, - WTA2 < WrP, - WTP2 (because Alfred values alteration more than Georgia
values integrity), and this equation can be rearranged as WTP, - WTA2 < WTP, - WTA.
Thus, even if the sale of the work goes forward, aggregate wealth is lower than it would
have been under the nonwaivable rule. So too is Georgia's individual wealth (which will
be p2 + WTA, - WTA, as opposed to p under the waivable rule), if the price Georgia and
Alfred negotiate under either rule is equal to WTA plus a constant fraction X of the
difference between WTP and WTA, where 0 < X < 1. To prove, substitute (WTP -
WTA)X + WTA for p in both sides of the equation p2 + WTA, - WTA2 < p,; this gives us(WTP - WTAz,)X + WTA2 + WrA, - WTA < (WTP, - WTA,)X + WTA, or WTP 2 -WTA2 < WTP, - WTA,. Notice, however, that this result does not necessarily follow if X
is not a constant. For the possible implications of assuming that X may be variable, see
infra notes 315-18 and accompanying text.
308. See Netanel, supra note 17, at 418 n.270 & 418-19 (dismissing Jerome Frank's
assertion that "authors are hopelessly inept in business transactions" as a stereotype).
309. See Hansmann & Santilli, supra note 135, at 126-27 (suggesting the unlikelihood
that "artists commonly undervalue the benefits they derive from the right of integrity");
Netanel, supra note 17, at 418-19.
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would need some reason to believe that the adoption of a
nonwaivable rule would better serve the artist's "true" interests
before adopting such a rule; the fact that the artist's judgment may be
flawed hardly counsels in favor of imposing someone else's judgment
in its place, absent some reason to believe that the other's judgment
is more likely than the artist's to be correct.
A more sophisticated argument in favor of nonwaivable moral
rights might be based upon the notion that the artist will be better off
if the policymaker prevents her from waiving because the long-term
benefits of refusing to waive (preservation of the mature artist's
reputation, perhaps) outweigh the short-term financial benefits of
waiving."'  This argument may be viewed as resting upon an
application of "multiple selves" analysis-the idea that, for some
purposes, it is useful to consider our present and future selves not as
one but rather as two different people, such that decisions of the
present self that affect the future self's well-being are likely to
discount significantly that future self's interests. This tendency to
discount the interests of the future self may, in turn, justify measures
designed to protect that self, such as compulsory savings for
retirement and the criminalization of addictive substances.31 In the
present context, then, the analysis might suggest that the "young"
artist should be prevented from waiving her moral right because of
the regret to be incurred by the "old" artist-who, since she does not
yet exist, cannot otherwise protect her interest in the integrity of the
work.12
310. See Netanel, supra note 17, at 419-20.
311. For an interesting discussion of multiple selves analysis and further citations, see
RICHARD A. POSNER, AGING AND OLD AGE 84-95 (1995) [hereinafter POSNER, AGING
AND OLD AGE]; see also Richard A. Posner, Are We One Self or Multiple Selves?
Implications for Law and Public Policy, 3 LEGAL THEORY 23 (1997) (further elaborating
upon multiple selves analysis). Whether to include future persons in one's utilitarian
calculus is, of course, a question that economic theory itself cannot answer. As Posner
states:
[W]elfare economics does not provide an answer to the question whether future
selves should be considered members of the community whose utility is to be
taken into account, along with the utility of the present self, by the community's
legal and ethical rules....
... [I]t cannot answer the question of what the boundaries of the society
are.
POSNER, AGING AND OLD AGE, supra, at 88-89.
312. This same theory might be viewed as supporting § 203 of the Copyright Act,
which grants the author an inalienable right to terminate any post-1977 transfer of
copyright after 35 years, see 17 U.S.C. § 203 (1994), inasmuch as this provision restrains
the present-day author from entering into an enforceable agreement that might work to
the detriment of his future self. On the other hand, since the present value of the
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The use of multiple selves analysis as a justification for endowing
artists with an inalienable moral right nevertheless also seems highly
speculative.13 One problem is the assumption that the artist's future
self would disagree with the present self's decision to waive its moral
right in a given work. The future self, after all, may feel less
connection with the work than the present self that created it; and (if
she really is a future self) she may have reason to believe that the
work will be of little interest to future connoisseurs or critics anyway,
whether it retains its integrity or not. Thus, in some circumstances
we may expect the future self to be more, not less, willing than the
present self to waive its rights and accept the highest price the work
will command today. A second problem is that there is no consensus
on how precisely to balance present and future interests."4 While this
lack of agreement may not dissuade us from concluding that the
disadvantages facing the improvident or addicted person's future self
probably outweigh the pleasures of the moment, a similar confidence
in our ability to balance correctly the interests of the present and
future artist seems much less warranted. Finally, even if multiple
selves analysis were persuasive in the present context, it would
suggest only that relatively young artists should be given nonwaivable
moral rights because older artists are less likely to live long enough to
ripen into significantly different future selves. Yet any decision as to
which artists are sufficiently young to merit moral rights may well
seem arbitrary, and to my knowledge no regime has yet considered
assigning nonwaivable moral rights only to the young.
Perhaps a more persuasive argument in favor of nonwaivable
moral rights rests upon what might be referred to as the "false
consciousness" rationale.31 5 Jeffrey Harrison has argued that under
some circumstances endowing a party with a nonwaivable right may
render that party better off, by altering her expectations about what
constitutes a "fair" bargain. Specifically, Harrison contends that the
expanded use of the doctrine of unconscionability in contract law
would help to empower people-primarily those poor and working
class persons whose low self-esteem and self-worth may be viewed as
the product of an unjust social system-to demand a larger share of
copyright in the year 2032 of a work that is created today is likely to be next to nothing,
§ 203 is probably better viewed as a mechanism for redistributing wealth to authors,
rather than as a means of protecting the future self's unrepresented interest. See Sterk,
supra note 20, at 1228-29.
313. See Netanel, supra note 17, at 419-20.
314. See POSNER, AGING AND OLD AGE, supra note 311, at 89.
315. See Netanel, supra note 17, at 420-21.
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the surplus value generated by exchanges. 1 Harrison's theory
therefore rejects the conventional economic assumption that
preferences are exogenous and posits instead that legal rules can
shape preferences in ways that will lead to the attainment of greater
satisfaction.317
In the present context, the false consciousness argument might
suggest that endowing the artist with a nonwaivable moral right will
empower her to grab a larger share of the value created by the sale of
her work, thus rendering the artist, though not the buyer, better off
than she would have been under a waivable rule.318  As with the
preceding arguments, however, the problem is one of overbreadth.
Even if we assume that the adoption of some nonwaivable legal
entitlements may empower the poor to achieve greater self-
actualization, is it fair to assume that the same principle justifies
granting artists nonwaivable moral rights? Granted, many artists are
indeed poor, or at least make very little money from their art. One
316. See Jeffrey L. Harrison, Class, Personality, Contrac4 and Unconscionability, 35
WM. & MARY L. REv. 445,489-500 (1994).
317. See id. at 480-81; see also Cotter, supra note 19, at 2125 (discussing problems with
assuming that all preferences are exogenous).
318. For example, suppose that Georgia would be willing to accept $20 in exchange for
her work if she were to retain her moral right, and $25 if she were to waive that right; and
that Alfred would be willing to pay $30 to acquire the work if Georgia were to retain her
right, and $40 if she were to waive. Suppose further that, regardless of whether Georgia
is endowed with a waivable or nonwaivable right, she and Alfred will negotiate to a price
that is equal to (1) the lowestprice Georgia is willing to accept for her work, plus (2) a
constant fraction (say, one-fourth) of the difference between the highest price Alfred is
willing to pay and the lowest price Georgia is willing to accept. See supra note 307.
Under a waivable rule, Georgia will agree to waive her right and sell her work for 25 +
(40 - 25)/4 = $28.75. Under a nonwaivable rule, Georgia will sell her work for 20 + (30 -
20)/4 = $22.50, while retaining a right she values at $5, leaving her with a net worth of
$27.50. Thus, her net worth under the nonwaivable rule is lower than it would have been
under the waivable rule; and so is the increase in the parties' aggregate wealth ($10 versus
$15).
Harrison's empowerment theory suggests, however, that the parties will not always
bargain to the same fraction of the difference between the artist's lowest acceptance price
and the buyer's highest offer price, but rather that the choice of rule will affect the
amount of that fraction. See Harrison, supra note 316, at 478 (arguing that "a change in
the parties' relative senses of compensatory justice affects the division of the surplus
created by the exchange"); id. at 479-80 (applying theory to unconscionability doctrine).
In other words, perhaps a nonwaivable rule will empower Georgia to demand a "fair"
share-say, one half, as opposed to one fourth-of the difference between her lowest
acceptance price and the buyer's highest offer price. Under the nonwaivable rule, then,
Georgia will agree to sell her work for 20 + (30-20)/2 = $25, while retaining a right she
values at $5. At the end of the day, Georgia has a net worth of $30, as opposed to $28.75
under the waivable rule. Aggregate wealth is still lower than it would have been under
the waivable rule, but only Alfred is worse off than he would have been under a waivable-
right system.
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nevertheless might expect the typical artist to be somewhat better
educated and more literate than the average member of the working
poor-and if so, for artists as a class to encounter no greater
obstacles than does the average non-poor person in the course of
negotiating for a share of the surplus that is generated by voluntary
transactions.19 Moreover, even if Harrison is correct in asserting that
a more robust unconscionability standard would empower consumers
to demand "fairer" terms ("You can't make me agree to that-it's
illegal!"), the effect of a nonwaivable moral right upon artist/buyer
exchanges seems much less direct. For the latter effectively to
redistribute income in favor of artists, we would have to assume, first,
that the right does, in fact, raise artists' self-esteem; and second, that
this increase in self-esteem translates into a demand for a greater
share of the surplus. Given the potential for a nonwaivable rule to
render artists worse off, however, the absence of strong evidence that
both conditions are likely to hold suggests that the false
consciousness argument provides only weak support for the adoption
of a nonwaivable rule.
One final argument in favor of the efficiency of nonwaivable
rights is that, "if the overwhelming majority of artists would not agree
to waive their moral rights, then giving them the opportunity to do
so" will be inefficient if the act of deciding whether or not to waive
itself causes sufficient disutility.32  To illustrate this argument,
Hansmann and Santilli provide the example of a struggling artist
who, each time he sells a painting, must decide whether to waive his
right in return for a higher income with which to provide for his wife
and children. If artists rarely would agree to waive their rights even
under these circumstances, the result of a waivable right "may be
needless angst and guilt."32' The success of this argument, however,
depends on whether such waivers would in fact be rare; if even a
substantial minority of artists would choose to waive, the aggregate
gains from permitting waivers are likely to outweigh the attendant
mental anguish. Thus far, at least, the empirical evidence does not
prove that the "overwhelming majority of artists" would never agree
to waive their rights.Y
319. Cf. John Kreidler, Leverage Lost: The Nonprofit Arts in the Post-Ford Era 4
(Aug. 31, 1995) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (suggesting that
"educational attainment may be the strongest predictor of an individual's likelihood of
becoming an arts consumer or an artist").
320. Hansmann & Santilli, supra note 135, at 127.
321. Id.
322. See REPORT, supra note 139, at 136 (stating that 8% of survey respondents would
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3. Third-Party Effects
The above analysis assumes that the artist/buyer transaction
affects only the artist, the buyer, and remote purchasers of the work,
but a more comprehensive model should take into account the
potential effects of the transaction upon third parties. Suppose, once
again, that Georgia sells a painting to Alfred, this time in a
jurisdiction that does not recognize moral rights, or else that Georgia
agrees to waive her right in a jurisdiction that permits waivers. A
decision on the part of Alfred to exercise his right to alter or destroy
the painting effectively prevents the rest of the world from thereafter
being able to enjoy the work in its original state.' An alteration that
injures Georgia's reputation also may affect those third parties who
own Georgia's other works, to the extent that the value of those
other works is in part a function of her reputation.2 4 To the extent
that the public values the integrity of the work, an agreement
providing Alfred with an alteration right therefore potentially
imposes a negative external cost (an externality) upon third parties to
the transaction.3' Of course, if transaction costs were zero, these
third parties could offer to pay Alfred in exchange for Alfred's
promise to preserve the work, and one would expect Alfred to accept
that payment if the third parties value the integrity of the work more
highly than Alfred values the right to alter. As the number of third
parties affected by the externality increases, however, the likelihood
of any such agreement diminishes, due to the presence of transaction
costs (the more parties, the higher the costs) as well as strategic
behavior (each third party having an incentive to free ride on the
others' efforts).2' Moreover, if we take into account the interests not
only of third parties who are alive today, but also of future
generations who may wish to enjoy the work in its unaltered state (as
some commentators suggest we should),327 these obstacles to
be willing to waive their rights and that 42% were unsure).
323. See Hansmann & Santilli, supra note 135, at 105-07,127.
324. See id at 105, 127-28. Hansmann and Santilli argue that owners of an artist's
other work, in order to protect the value of their investment in that work, might want
some assurance that the artist will never compromise the integrity of her work; and that a
nonwaivable moral right makes such an assurance more credible than it otherwise would
be, given the difficulty of structuring assurance as an enforceable contractual obligation.
See id. The fact that the artist may choose not to enforce even a nonwaivable moral right,
however, suggests once again that the right is a highly imperfect means of securing third-
party benefits. See idU at 127-28.
325. See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 242, at 38-40 (discussing externalities);
POSNER, supra note 242, § 3.9, at 71 (same).
326. See, e.g., KOMESAR, supra note 246, at 18; POSNER, supra note 242, § 3.6, at 51.
327. See, e.g., Gorman, supra note 111, at 234 (stating that integrity right serves "both
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bargaining become even more significant. The inability to obtain
consent from unborn individuals to the alteration or destruction of a
work, after all, is "the ultimate transaction cost."3 Perhaps, then,
moral rights can be justified on economic grounds as a means of
correcting for a failure in the market for cultural preservation.29
This analysis is problematic, however, for several reasons. One
difficulty, as we have seen, is that endowing the artist with a moral
right is a rather awkward method for protecting the public interest in
the preservation of art.3" A more substantial problem is that
adopting a system of moral rights imposes costs as well as benefits
upon third parties. Perhaps the most obvious cost is administrative.
A society that endows artists with moral rights necessarily incurs
costs related to the enforcement and administration of those rights,
whereas a society that chooses not to recognize them incurs
analogous costs only on the rare occasion that someone chooses to
attempt to create moral rights by contract. Experience thus far under
VARA, however, suggests that the costs incurred under a limited
system of waivable moral rights may not be very substantial either; as
noted above, in the past six years there have been only two reported
decisions interpreting VARA's substantive provisions.331 But more
expansive systems will generate higher costs-and these costs may be
substantial indeed in a system in which rights are nonwaivable
because virtually every transaction involving a work of art under such
to protect the artist's reputation and to preserve the work for posterity as an artifact of
our present culture"); Merryman, supra note 17, at 1041 (arguing that moral rights
enforce public interest in authenticity of works of art); cf. Albert Elsen, Why Do We Care
About Art?, 27 HASTINGS L.J. 951, 955 (1976) ("[A]n artist's standing in history depends
on the quality of all his work, not just his most celebrated pieces."); John Moustakas,
Group Rights in Cultural Property: Justifying Strict Inalienability, 74 CORNELL L. REV.
1179, 1211 (1989) ("Ascertained group members simply cannot account for the
preferences of unascertained members."). Whether to include future generations'
interests in one's utilitarian calculus (and if so, how much weight to accord it) is, however,
a moral, not an economic, issue. Economics does not define the scope of the group whose
utility or wealth is to be maximized. See supra note 311.
328. Stewart E. Sterk, Freedom from Freedom of Contract: The Enduring Value of
Servitude Restrictions, 70 IowA L. REV. 615, 634 n.86 (1985), quoted in Moustakas, supra
note 327, at 1212 n.132.
329. In this light, the American statutes that expressly prohibit the destruction or
modification of works of recognized stature-and in particular the California Act, which
authorizes third parties to sue for moral rights violations-may be viewed as having some
advantages over the European model. At the same time, the fact that moral rights are
waivable under VARA and the California Act may be viewed as potentially undermining
this interest in preservation. See supra notes 93-100 (outlining the California Act); supra
notes 109-21 (outlining VARA).
330. See Porges, supra note 197, at 125.
331. See supra notes 122-31 and accompanying text.
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a system carries with it a risk of future litigation. 2
Even more significant are the potential costs incurred by third
parties who do not value preservation. Perhaps the public would be
happier if some works were not preserved, as critics sometimes
suggest with respect to controversial examples of public art;333 and the
fact that such complaints may reflect nothing more than poor taste or
philistinism counts for little within the economics paradigm, where
the philistine's dollar-vote carries as much weight as the
connoisseur's." Critics of moral rights also frequently argue that
enjoining others from interfering with the integrity of the artist's
work threatens to stifle the creativity of present and future authors
and interpreters-thereby rendering both those authors and
interpreters, on the one hand, and the present and future consumers
of their new creations, on the other, worse off.35 This argument may
have little force with respect to original works of visual art, however;
332. See Gorman, supra note 68, at 422-24 (arguing that recognition of moral rights is
likely to be costly, "particularly if these rights are statutorily declared to be inalienable
and non-waivable," given that many artists collaborate on certain works such as motion
pictures, and given the large number of subsidiary uses of such works); cf. Hansmann &
Santilli, supra note 135, at 111 (suggesting that permitting destruction of less famous,
possibly lower quality, works is efficient, due to high cost of preservation). Gorman also
alludes to the uncertainty that may arise when judges and juries must decide issues of
aesthetics, see Gorman, supra note 68, at 428, as arguably they must under statutes such
as VARA, see 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(3)(B) (1994) (extending protection against
destruction to works of "recognized stature"). Damich argues, however, that these issues
are not necessarily more difficult than other issues judges routinely confront, see Damich,
supra note 135, at 415-16, a position that arguably was vindicated in Carter, see Carter v.
Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 861 F. Supp. 303, 325-26 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (reviewing expert
testimony on whether artists' work was recognized as meritorious by other members of
arts community), affid in part, vacated and rev'd in part, 71 F.3d 77 (2d Cir. 1995), cerL
denied, 116 S. Ct. 1824 (1996).
333. See, eg., ALICE GOLDFARB MARQUIS, ART LESSONS: LEARNING FROM THE RISE
AND FALL OF PUBLIC ARTS FUNDING 191-99 (1995) (discussing works of art funded by
the National Endowment for the Arts that have met with widespread public distaste). But
see Richard Serra, "Tilted Arc" Destroyed, 14 NOVA L. REv. 385, 392-94 (1990)
(disputing claim that author's own dismantled public sculpture was widely disliked).
334. See Cotter, supta note 19, at 2136 (discussing how economic view of preferences
differs from common moral intuitions).
335. See, e.g., Beyer, supra note 17, at 1026 (arguing that moral rights inhibit
"interpretive creativity," which "contributes enormously to cultural development"); Peter
Jaszi, Toward a Theory of Copyright: The Metamorphoses of "Authorship", 1991 DUKE
L.J. 455, 497 (arguing that moral rights are "a charter for private censorship"). Of course,
if the artist's right is waivable, a third-party performer or interpreter can acquire a waiver,
as long as the price he is willing to pay is one the artist is willing to accept. If the artist's
asking price exceeds the performer's offer price, on the other hand, the efficient result is
that the performance not take place. From the standpoint of value-maximization,
therefore, the "stifling" problem discussed above arises only when the moral right cannot
be waived (or when transaction costs are prohibitive).
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enjoining third parties from interfering with these works does not
impose substantial costs when the interference would consist of
destroying an original painting or sculpture, as long as there are other
avenues open for third parties to express their creativity. But
restrictions may impose substantial costs when the interference
would take the form of an innovative performance of a musical or
dramatic composition, or an adaptation of a literary work or motion
picture. Who is to say that a production of Waiting for Godot with
two women in the lead roles,3- or a colorized version of The Asphalt
Jungle,3 37 would not render third parties in the aggregate better off, as
long as they are willing to pay for such adaptations? 3m
An economic analysis of third-party effects therefore casts
substantial doubt upon the proposition that moral rights serve to
reduce the negative externalities imposed by the artist/buyer
transaction upon present and future generations. The argument is
strongest when moral rights are limited to original works of visual art,
but even with respect to these works moral rights may be a mixed
blessing. Perhaps, though, economic analysis simply fails to capture
some of the nonquantifiable benefits of moral rights, or errs in
assuming that the preferences of third parties can be meaningfully
summed and compared with those of the artist. It is to arguments of
this nature that I now turn.
4. Limitations of the Economic Approach
[P]roblems of welfare economics must ultimately dissolve
into a study of aesthetics and morals.
-Ronald H. Coase339
Critics of economic analysis of law sometimes charge that this
analysis depends upon assumptions that are contradicted by
observable reality-for example, that human beings are rational and
have stable, innate preferences, and that, as a result, economic
predictions are, at best, frequently wrong, and, at worst, a
smokescreen for a right-wing, free-market ideology.' In my own
336. See supra note 62.
337. See supra note 65.
338. But see infra notes 344-48 and accompanying text (discussing whether third
parties would be better off under a strict system of moral rights if, contrary to
conventional economic wisdom, preferences are endogenous).
339. Coase, supra note 243, at 43.
340. See, e.g., MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES 114-85 (1987).
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previous work, I have expressed agreement with these critiques up to
a point, arguing that economic analysis threatens to lead us astray
when we lose track of its strengths and weaknesses in comparison
with other decision-making paradigms?.4 Among the potential
weaknesses of conventional economic analysis are its assumptions
that preferences are entirely exogenous; that these preferences are
revealed exclusively through offers to pay or accept; and that all
preferences can be measured and compared along a common metric.
While these assumptions render the analysis more tractable and
sometimes generate sufficiently accurate predictions as to the likely
consequences of alternative systems of rules, I have argued that the
policymaker cannot safely ignore the fact that the economic
paradigm illuminates some issues only at the cost of simultaneously
obscuring others. At the very least, she needs to be aware of what is
being obscured in order to assess its significance to the task at hand.
Perhaps the economic paradigm obscures some matters of
particular importance to the issue of moral rights. If preferences are
not entirely innate, for example, but rather are at least in part the
product of legal rules, the conventional economic wisdom against
nonwaivable rights may be incorrect for two reasons. First, as noted
above, endowing the artist with a moral right may empower her to
demand a larger share of the surplus generated by the artist/buyer
transaction, potentially leaving her better off than she would have
been in the absence of moral rights.'42 For reasons already discussed,
however, I believe that this argument provides only weak support for
a nonwaivable moral right.m"
A second way in which legal rules might affect preferences in the
present context, however, is by their ability to help shape public taste.
Netanel argues, for example, that publishers, producers, and other
entities that often wind up owning a creator's copyright have no
inherent interest in communicating that author's expression, and
therefore that they frequently market distorted versions of the
author's work so as to appeal to the lowest common denominator of
public taste; in Netanel's view, this marketing strategy results in a
diminished level of "cultural diversity and resonance."' In response
to the argument that at least some segment of the market apparently
prefers these altered works, Netanel questions the blind reliance
341. See Cotter, supra note 19, at 2130.
342. See supra text accompanying notes 315-17.
343. See supra notes 318-19 and accompanying text.
344. Netanel, supra note 17, at 431-39.
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upon consumer demand as an adequate measure of social well-being,
arguing that the preferences on which this demand is based are
themselves creatures of the marketplace. 5  Netanel's analysis
therefore suggests that the recognition of moral fights preserves and
promotes eccentric authorial visions, which a public accustomed to
less challenging fare would otherwise reject; and that, if public taste is
itself shaped by experience and discourse, including the discourse of
legal institutions, then a legal system that accords greater respect to
the preservation of these visions may, in the long run, change
preferences in ways that lead to greater satisfaction.
With its focus on the transformative power of art, pragmatic
aesthetics might at first blush seem more consistent with Netanel's
theory than with the conventional economic view of preferences as
static and innate. Even if Netanel is generally correct, however, in
perceiving a shortage of "cultural diversity and resonance,"' ' 6 it does
not necessarily follow that moral rights are the optimal tool for
remedying this problem. Netanel neither considers other possible
methods of raising audience consciousness-a point to which I shall
return in the following section-nor discusses the potential for moral
rights to diminish cultural diversity, either by reducing the demand
for art or by stifling creative interpretations and performances of
which the author disapproves?47 Of course, one might argue that
some of these latter examples of diversity should be discouraged, on
the theory, as suggested by Michiko Kakutani's comments on the use
of Felliniesque imagery in commercial advertising, that a public
accustomed to a distorted or sanitized version of a work will never
appreciate the beauty or innovativeness of the original.4 If this is
correct, however, the argument seems to be that moral rights should
345. See id. at 439.
346. See supra note 344. I will assume, for the sake of argument, that Netanel's
perception is correct, although he offers no criteria for determining when we have
attained the optimal degree of cultural diversity. It seems at least as likely to me,
however, that the greater threat to the continued vitality of the arts in America is the lack
of public appreciation of the arts, rather than the lack of cultural diversity; in other words,
while the general public may prefer less challenging, more homogeneous works, more
diverse and demanding works are available for those who wish to enjoy them.
347. Cf. Beyer, supra note 17, at 1028-31 (arguing that opponents of film colorization
underestimate its artistic potential).
348. See supra note 207. But then we may simply be deluding ourselves if we think
that any audience ever can appreciate the artist's original conception of the work, given
all the differences between the context in which the work was created and the context in
which future interpretive communities find themselves. For discussions, see Beyer, supra
note 17, at 1034-35, and Sanford Levinson & J.M. Balkin, Law, Music, and Other
Performing Arts, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1597, 1598-1601, 1615-27, 1634-39 (1991).
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be promoted as a means of inhibiting, rather than promoting, some
forms of cultural diversity. Perhaps, then, the most we can say is that
the recognition of moral rights may help to instill greater public
respect for and understanding of the artist's vision; whether
recognition actually has the effect of increasing the supply of
visionary works remains open to question.
A second reason to question the economic analysis of moral
rights is based upon the economist's use of revealed preference
theory to generate predictions. Economists tend to be skeptical of
people's statements concerning how they would react in response to
hypothetical situations, preferring instead to infer what an
individual's preferences are by observing her behavior."
Specifically, an economist will infer the value that a person accords to
a given thing by observing how much she is willing to pay or willing
to accept in exchange for it.3" Thus, when an economist states that, in
the absence of transaction costs, a right will wind up in the hands of
the person who values it more highly, he generally means that
ownership will come to rest in the person who is willing to pay the
most for it.35'
This reliance upon revealed preference theory has been
subjected to criticism on several grounds. One problem is that the
relationship between preferences and willingness to pay may not be
as simple as the economist assumes; for example, preferences may be
unstable, or may depend upon the specific context in which the
choice among two or more goods is presented, or may be expressed
in certain ways but not others due to cultural norms.352 A second
problem arises from the bias inherent in defining value in terms of
willingness to pay, given that willingness to pay is in part a function of
ability to pay, or wealth.353 Suppose, for example, that a poor person
has a stronger desire for a new drug (without which he will suffer
serious harm or die) than does a rich person (for whom the drug will
only marginally improve his quality of life). Because the rich person
has more dollar-votes with which to register his preference for the
drug, he may be willing to pay more for it than the indigent. From
349. See Cotter, supra note 19, at 2125-26; see also supra note 254 (contrasting
Posner's and Harrison's views on revealed preference theory).
350. See Cotter, supra note 19, at 2125-26.
351. See supra notes 242,245 and accompanying text.
352. See Harrison, supra note 239, at 1351-62; Sunstein, supra note 273, at 242-53; Cass
R. Sunstein, Incommensurability and Valuation in Law, 92 MICH. L. REV. 779, 794 n.48
(1994) [hereinafter Sunstein, Incommensurability].
353. See Cotter, supra note 19, at 2127.
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the standpoint of economics, therefore, the efficient or "value-
maximizing" solution is to allocate the drug to the rich man.3 M Doing
so nevertheless strikes many people as both unjust (in that the rich
man has no greater moral entitlement to the drug than the indigent)
and nonutilitarian (in that aggregate utility would be increased by
allocating the drug to the person who would derive more happiness
from it, whether he can afford to pay for it or not).3 5
Perhaps a similar criticism can be brought to bear in the context
of moral rights. Suppose, for example, that Georgia has an intense
desire to protect the integrity of her work but would be unable to
translate this preference into an offer price due to constraints upon
her wealth. Endowing her with an integrity right may be inefficient
(if the typical buyer's asking price for moral rights protection exceeds
the typical artist's offer price) and yet utility-maximizing (if the artist
would gain more happiness from the ownership of the right than the
buyer would forgo). On this reasoning, the fact that real-world artists
and buyers generally do not voluntarily agree to the creation of moral
rights by contract may be attributable more to the disparity of
bargaining power between them than to transaction-cost economics.
Thus, the argument would go, if our goal is to maximize utility, rather
than value or wealth, we should endow the artist with a moral right.
The soundness of this utility-maximization or disparity-of-
bargaining-power argument, however, is far from certain. One
problem is that it is very difficult to prove the underlying assumption
that the artist would gain more utility from a moral right than the
buyer would lose. Perhaps the intensity of the desire for moral rights
varies considerably from one artist to another or differs depending on
the type or quality of the work. 56 Moreover, even if the assumption
is true, endowing the artist with a nonwaivable right raises serious
questions.357 The fact that a nonwaivable right causes the artist's
354. Cf. POSNER, supra note 146, at 380 (discussing similar hypothetical); Cotter,
supra note 19, at 2127 (discussing similar hypothetical).
355. See Cotter, supra note 19, at 2127; cf POSNER, supra note 146, at 380-81
(discussing ethics of using wealth maximization as criterion for allocating goods in
situations like that described above).
356. Contrast, for example, the attitudes of Stravinsky and Neruda, discussed supra at
notes 1-5, 10 and accompanying text.
357. Endowing the artist with a waivable right may be justified, however, on the
ground that doing so will allow her to reveal her preferences through asking (willingness-
to-accept), as opposed to offer (willingness-to-pay), prices. If the artist's asking price
exceeds her offer price due to the presence of an endowment effect, initially endowing
her with a moral right may maximize aggregate utility. See Korobkin, supra note 273, at
679-82. Whether this initial endowment also maximizes wealth, under these assumptions,
is unresolved. See supra notes 299-305 and accompanying text.
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utility to increase more than the buyer's decreases does not
guarantee that the potential effect on third parties would be positive;
because a nonwaivable rule may impede the ability of third parties to
employ the work for their own purposes, the rule could still lead to
an aggregate decrease in utility.5 Perhaps more importantly to the
artist, there is no guarantee that her utility would really increase
either, given that one of the potential systemic consequences of a
nonwaivable rule is a decline in the demand for art3 9 Attempting to
level the playing field between artists and buyers does not work to
the advantage of artists, if the likely consequence is a decrease in the
commissioning of art.
Perhaps the best reason to question the economic analysis of
moral rights rests upon the concept of incommensurability. In
general, neoclassical economics assumes that an individual's
preferences are reducible to a common metric of utility or happiness,
such that one "good" always can be traded off for some quantity of
other goods." Over a broad range of occurrences this assumption
may well be true, or at least adequate for the purpose of generating
accurate predictions; for example, I may generally prefer apples to
oranges, but at some point enough oranges will more than
compensate me for the loss of a single apple.
As several scholars have argued, however, some human goods
do not appear to be reducible to such a common metric, such that
judgments based upon the assumption of commensurability often will
be deeply flawed. 6' To illustrate by way of some everyday examples,
Cass Sunstein argues that one may not accord a pet's life infinite
value, and yet one nevertheless may refuse any sum of money in
358. Cf. supra notes 333-38 and accompanying text (discussing externalities imposed
by nonwaivable moral right upon future authors, interpreters, and consumers). Even a
waivable rule may decrease aggregate utility when the effects on third parties are taken
into account. Suppose that the amount a third-party performer is wining to pay to acquire
a waiver from the artist is lower than the artist's asking price. On these facts, it is
efficient for the performance to not take place, see supra note 335, but it may not be
utility-maximizing. The performer may have stood to gain more utility from the
performance than the artist stood to lose; but just as the artist's poverty may constrain her
from revealing her preference through a hefty offer price when negotiating with the
buyer, the performer's poverty may constrain him from revealing his, preference when
negotiating with the buyer.
359. See supra notes 306-07 and accompanying text.
360. See Cotter, supra note 19, at 2127-28.
361. See, e.g., RADIN, supra note 25, at 9; Harrison, supra note 239, at 1328-29;
Sunstein, Incommensurability, supra note 352, at 796. For a critical view of
incommensurability, see Richard A. Epstein, Are Values Incommensurable, or Is Utility
the Ruler of the World?, 1995 UTAH L. REV. 683.
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exchange for granting someone permission to perform medical
experiments upon the animal; neither would one offer to pay a friend
money to get out of a luncheon date that has unexpectedly become
inconvenient.32 In both instances, Sunstein claims, it would be
inconsistent with the way in which one values the animal or friend to
reduce one's feelings for them to a monetary amount. Affection and
money therefore are, in Sunstein's view, incommensurable, meaning
that they "cannot be aligned along a single metric without doing
violence to our considered judgments about how these goods are best
characterized. ' '31 In a similar vein, Margaret Radin argues that the
"universal commodification" implicit in economic analysis, in which
all values are reducible to monetary amounts, "cannot capture-and
may debase-the way humans value things important to human
personhood." ' Radin further argues that certain goods, such as
one's body, children, sexual identity, and perhaps even housing and
work, are intrinsic to one's sense of identity and personhood, and that
to treat these "elements of self-constitution" as fungible with other
commodities therefore "does violence to the self."'
If we accept the thesis that some values and goods are not
reducible to a common metric, an economic approach to moral rights
might seem seriously flawed, or at least incomplete. Economic
analysis seems to suggest, for example, that we should recognize
these rights only if the preferences of those who favor the
preservation of works of art in some sense outweigh the preferences
of those who favor the right to alter or destroy them; if all tastes are
fungible, after all, then the alteration or destruction of a work
disliked by the majority may render society better off than would its
preservation?" And yet while some aesthetic theories are more self-
consciously elitist than others, no theory that I am aware of, whether
rooted in pragmatism or any other philosophical tradition, adheres to
the view that aesthetic value is closely correlated with popularity.
Indeed, common experience would suggest just the opposite; there
are many examples of works that initially met with both popular and
critical disapproval, only to become recognized as masterpieces in
later years. 67 Similarly, in everyday life, we commonly find ourselves
362. See Sunstein, Incommensurability, supra note 352, at 785, 839.
363. Id. at 796 (emphasis omitted).
364. RADIN, supra note 25, at 9.
365. Id. at 74-75.
366. See supra text accompanying notes 333-34.
367. For examples, see DEWEY, supra note 161, at 301-04, and WILLIAM GADDIS, A
FROLIC OF HIS OWN 39 (1994).
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arguing that the creators or consumers of some works have better
taste than the creators or consumers of other works. To speak of one
taste as being superior to another, however, suggests the existence of
some criteria of judgment; and whether one views these criteria as
objective, subjective, or somewhere in between, there seems to be no
inherent reason to believe that "good" taste, whatever that happens
to be, will be maximized simply by putting the matter to some form
of majority vote, economic or otherwise. Of course, one might still
argue in favor of an economic approach on the pragmatic ground that
the assumption that tastes are fungible, even if invalid, generates
results that are preferable, in light of some criteria, to those that will
obtain under an approach that entrusts aesthetic decisions to some
other decision-making process. To do so, however, does not detract
from the basic insight that making aesthetic decisions by summing up
preferences among individuals is, to a significant degree, inconsistent
with the way in which we actually value works of art.36
A second, somewhat related way in which incommensurability
may affect the analysis of moral rights relates to Sunstein's view that
some legal rules may express community standards regarding "an
appropriate valuation of an event, person, group, or practice. 369
Sunstein argues, for example, that one might advocate adopting an
antidiscrimination law in light of its expressive value-its ability to
convey the message that skin color is an inappropriate criterion for
evaluating human beings, even in the absence of evidence concerning
the likely consequences of such a law.30 In the same vein, one might
argue that the recognition of moral rights expresses a community
standard that, in light of the unique quality of art objects both to
embody and to stimulate experience, these objects are entitled to
some form of special protection. Allowing one to buy or sell the right
to alter or destroy these works therefore may be viewed as
inconsistent with the community's "considered judgment" concerning
the appropriate way to value them.3
Finally, if we agree with the traditional defenders of moral rights
that in some meaningful sense a work of art embodies the personality
of its creator, then a system that fails to recognize moral rights, or
which allows for the waiver of these rights, might be viewed, in
368. Cf. Cotter, supra note 19, at 2136 (arguing that the incommensurability thesis
suggests that we need not view all preferences as being of equal weight).
369. Sunstein, Incommensurability, supra note 352, at 820-23.
370. See id. at 823.
371. Cf. id. at 849 (arguing that to allow the purchase or sale of some goods means that
the goods "will be wrongly valued in the qualitative sense").
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Radinesque terms, as doing violence to some aspect of the artist's
self. As we have already seen, a strong case can be made in favor of
the proposition that the retention of control over one's expression is
in some way vital to "individual self-development, autonomy, and
identity";3" requiring the artist to bargain for something so critical to
his self-worth therefore may be viewed as conveying a message that
the artist's self is fungible with other commodities.3" For these
reasons, moral rights advocates such as Netanel and Kundera argue
that recognition of a nonwaivable right reflects a more appropriate
valuation of the unique personality or creativity of the artist.
3 4
It should nevertheless be clear that none of these arguments
relating to incommensurability provides a knockdown case in favor of
moral rights protection. One might, for example, reject the
assumption of commensurability altogether and still be concerned
that the recognition of moral rights will, on balance, harm artists by
reducing the demand for their works and the supply of their source
material. Or one might agree that tastes are not fungible and still
conclude that some works simply do not possess sufficient merit to
deserve preservation in perpetuity; does a strict moral rights rule
threaten to divert scarce resources to the protection of kitsch?375 An
awareness of the potential flattening tendency of the economic
approach nevertheless adds an important component to the analysis;
for while economics can tell us something about the possible welfare
and distributional consequences of alternative rules, it cannot supply
the values with which to determine whether a given result is desirable
or not. Deciding what to do therefore involves a complex interplay
of both values and consequences. In the following section of this
Article, I hazard four tentative conclusions as to how the relevant
values and consequences affect the optimal scope of the droit moral.
IV. SOME TENTATIVE CONCLUSIONS
From the standpoint of pragmatic aesthetics, as we have seen,
there is much to admire in the continental system of droit moral, and
in particular the moral right of integrity. Moral rights may assist in
promoting the social interest in the preservation of works that
372. Netanel, supra note 17, at 400; see also supra notes 217-34 and accompanying text
(discussing Netanel's arguments in favor of moral rights).
373. See Netanel, supra note 17, at 411.
374. See KUNDERA, supra note 1, at 271; Netanel, supra note 17, at 429-30.
375. Cf REPORT, supra note 139, at 37-38 (discussing German court's recent rejection
of claim brought by sculptor of Lenin sculpture dismantled and buried after reunification,
on the ground that artist must "accept the effects of historical change").
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simultaneously and uniquely embody, stimulate, and provide us with
new ways of redescribing and reimagining human experience.
Moreover, a commitment to the goal of human flourishing suggests
that according respect to the person of the artist, as well as to works
of art generally, may be desirable ends in and of themselves; moral
rights recognition therefore may be viewed as a communal expression
as to the appropriate way in which to value the unique contribution
and personality of the artist, as well as the unique role of art in civic
life. At the same time, however, moral rights are highly imperfect
both as a means and as an end. As a means of advancing cultural
preservation, moral rights are flawed because they place the
authority to preserve works of art primarily in the hands of the
author, who may or may not choose to exercise that power. As an
end, moral rights tend to reify what pragmatists such as Dewey view
as a false dichotomy between fine and useful art and, more
importantly, threaten to inhibit future experience by preventing
interpretations and performances that are at odds with the intentions
of the author. Moral rights therefore may serve to impose the dead
hand of the past on the desires of present and future generations to
forge new experience from existing reality. 6
In an effort to further clarify the potential consequences of
waivable and nonwaivable rules, I devoted considerable attention in
the preceding section to a hypothetical transaction between an artist
and a buyer, as viewed from the standpoint of economic analysis. On
the basis of this analysis, I predicted that endowing the artist with a
waivable moral right would redistribute income from buyers to artists
and, although the analysis is not conclusive, could have a positive
effect on aggregate wealth by removing legal obstacles to the creation
of what is, in effect, an equitable servitude in a chattel. This analysis
also suggested, however, that a system of nonwaivable rights
threatens to render artists, in the aggregate, worse off, unless the
effect of the rule is either (1) to protect them from their own poor
bargains, to empower them to demand a greater share of the benefits
376. See supra notes 189-234 and accompanying text. Of course, as Professor Kwall
has suggested to me in correspondence, all intellectual property protection is subject to
the critique that it threatens to impose the dead hand of the past on the desires of present
and future generations. See Letter from Roberta Rosenthall Kwall, Professor of Law,
DePaul University College of Law, to Author 7 (Jan. 20, 1997) (on file with author).
Although some scholars find in this critique a compelling reason to abandon all or most of
intellectual property law, see Palmer, supra note 20, at 855, most (including me) conclude
that the potential gains from having some form of patent and copyright protection
outweigh these potential losses. With respect to moral rights, however, the potential
benefits are more attenuated, as I have attempted to demonstrate throughout this Article.
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of trade, or to substantially reduce the cost of anxiety; or (2) to
change the preferences of the consuming public so as to increase its
appreciation for preserving the integrity of works of art. Although I
expressed skepticism as to whether the recognition of moral rights is
likely to have such effects, I left open the possibility that further
experience may prove me wrong. And of course economic analysis
by itself can tell us nothing about the desirability of these or other
potential consequences.
In this final section, I offer some tentative conclusions as to the
optimal scope of moral rights protection-recognizing, however, that
the pragmatic analysis I have employed throughout this discussion
offers no final resolution of these, or any other, issues. Indeed, the
primary virtue of pragmatism, as I view it, lies not in its effectiveness
in guiding us to specific conclusions-I tend to agree with Posner and
Rorty that pragmatism by itself tells us very little about specific
conclusions 3L-but rather in its emphasis on the dialectical nature of
human thought. On the one hand, pragmatism suggests that every
system of human thought is the product of past experience and
therefore is necessarily limited by the finiteness of that experience;
on the other, it recognizes the inevitability of theory-building as a
way of predicting and coping with one's enviroment.3 8 Pragmatism
therefore encourages a skeptical attitude to claims of certainty,
perceiving theory as a continually evolving practice of observation,
testing, and revision in light of further experience.379 Subject to these
caveats, let me suggest four conclusions I draw concerning moral
rights, based upon my own perception of the interplay between
relevant theory and observation.
My first conclusion is that, from several different perspectives, a
system of waivable moral rights has much to recommend it. To the
extent that a system of waivable rights facilitates the author's ability
to bargain for a right to preserve the integrity of her work, the system
potentially increases the number of works preserved from alteration
or destruction; conveys a message that artists and their works are
377. See POSNER, supra note 148, at 395; Rorty, Banality, supra note 214, at 1816.
37& See supra notes 146-54 and accompanying text.
379. Cf Richard A. Posner, The Jurisprudence of Skepticism, 86 MICH. L. REv. 827,
829 (1988) (finding in pragmatism "a disposition to scoff at pretensions to certainty, to
question claims (even my own) to the possession of powerful methodologies founded on
professional expertise, and to disbelieve in absolutes and unobservable entities"); Richard
A. Posner, What Has Pragmatism to Offer Law?, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1653, 1668 (1990)
(describing "pragmatism in the style of Peirce and Dewey" as "a generalization of the
ethic of scientific inquiry-open-minded, forward-looking, respectful of fact, willing to
experiment, disrespectful of sacred cows, anti-metaphysical").
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valued in a special way; redistributes income to the arts community;
and, arguably, may increase both aggregate utility and aggregate
wealth. This interlocking "web of beliefs"' in support of a waivable
moral right provides reasonably strong support for statutes such as
VARA and the California Act, and for decisions such as Gilliam."I
Perhaps the type of protection afforded to works of visual art under
VARA should be expanded, on an experimental basis at least, to
other works of authorship as well, either through a more liberal
application of the Gilliam court's interpretation of the right to
authorize derivative works,3  or through other statutory
amendments.
A second conclusion, however, is that the advantages of a
waivable right may be quite limited if, as some commentators predict,
artists who are asked to waive their rights often will have little choice
but to agree to do so.' Perhaps the most we can expect, then, from a
system of waivable rights is only a small improvement in the well-
being of artists, an incremental increase in respect for them and their
works, and a marginally higher probability that these works will be
preserved for future enjoyment. The expectation of such minimal
effects may seem to make this type of reform hardly worth the effort.
And yet, if the analysis in the preceding section is correct, the
nonwaivable alternative may be undesirable as well, inasmuch as it
threatens to reduce the demand for art and to discourage innovative
interpretations. Are we stuck, then, with a choice between a reform
that accomplishes relatively little, and one that threatens to cause
perverse unintended consequences?
In other contexts, Margaret Radin has referred to similar
unenviable choices as examples of a "double bind." In Radin's view,
there is always a gap between "ideal justice," which she defines as
"the best general ideals we can formulate," and "nonideal justice,"
which is the "theoretical working out of what changes would now
count as social improvements." '' As Radin explains:
Pursuing nonideal justice is linked with a dilemma of
380. See supra note 237 and accompanying text.
381. But see supra note 120 (discussing whether waivers apply to subsequent
purchasers under VARA). To the extent waivers do not apply to subsequent purchasers,
the claim that VARA promotes economic efficiency is weakened.
382. But see Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property
Law, 75 TEX. L. REV. 989, 1029-72, 1074-77 (1997) (arguing that, under current law, the
copyright owner's exclusive right to prepare derivative works leads to underinvestment in
innovation).
383. See, e.g., REPORT, supra note 139, Part IX, at 21 (statement of Debra Benson).
384. RADIN, supra note 25, at 123.
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transition from where we are now to a better world. If we
compromise our ideals too much because of the difficulties
of our circumstances, we may reinforce the status quo
instead of making progress.... On the other hand, if we are
too utopian about our ideals given our circumstances, we
may also make no progress.... This practical dilemma of
nonideal justice is what I call the double bind.""
Using Radin's terminology, one might view a decision to adopt a
system of nonwaivable moral rights as a form of ideal justice-a rule
that ideally would promote respect for artists, their work, and the
preservation of that work-and a system of waivable rights as a form
of nonideal justice that takes into account the potential unintended
consequences of the ideal. At the same time, however, the adoption
of a waivable rule may tend to reinforce the status quo of disrespect
for authors and their works. How might one attempt to mediate
between these ideal and nonideal visions?
Radin suggests that, when confronted with a double bind, one
possibility is to consider alleviating the underlying problem giving
rise to the bind.m With respect to the question, for example, of
whether to allow the commodification of human goods, such as
sexuality, that seem necessary for the development of a sense of
personhood, Radin suggests that the double bind has two
consequences. The first is that, if both permitting and banning a sale
seems inconsistent with respect for personhood, "justice requires that
we consider changing the circumstances that create the dilemma. We
must consider wealth and power redistribution."3 The second is "we
still must choose a regime for the meantime, the transition, in
nonideal circumstances." m  Thus, one might decide that a rule
prohibiting people from selling their bodily organs is desirable
because such sales would be degrading to personhood; and yet, "[i]f
people are so desperate for money that they are trying to sell things
we think cannot be separated from them without significant injury to
personhood," we neither cure their desperation, nor avoid injury to
personhood, by banning sales."9 As Radin notes, "perhaps the
desperation is the social problem we should be looking at, rather than
the market ban."3"
385. Id. at 123-24.
386. See ad at 124.
387. ld.
388. Id.
389. Id. at 125.
390. IL
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Perhaps a similar analysis can be brought to bear on the question
of whether moral rights should be waivable or nonwaivable. I
recognize, of course, that an agreement to permit someone to
interfere with the integrity of one's work of art is unlikely to evidence
the same level of desperation as would an agreement to permit
someone to interfere with the integrity of one's body; but the
difference is more one of degree than of kind. If the advocates of
moral rights are correct, many artists do view distortions of their
work as serious affronts to their sensibilities and agree to waive their
rights only out of necessity. Perhaps, then, in thinking through the
moral rights dilemma, we should consider changing the circumstances
that give rise to it in the first place. If we wish to show respect for
artists and their works, and to advance the public interest in
preservation, what options might we have other than endowing the
artist with a nonwaivable moral right?
One alternative would be to increase the social resources
devoted to the production and promotion of the arts and to arts
education. This option, of course, is hardly a perfect substitute for
the recognition of a nonwaivable moral right. For one thing, it would
continue to leave it up to the artist to bargain for the integrity of her
work; and even an artist who is financially more secure than before
may feel that, with respect to a given project, she has little choice but
to waive her rights. Throwing money at the problem also may seem
like an inadequate response to the argument that works of art are, in
some meaningful sense, incommensurable with money; or that
forcing the artist to bargain for her integrity degrades her. A
substantial increase in funding for the arts nevertheless might enable
artists more frequently, if not universally, to refuse waivers; and by
helping to foster a climate more protective of the arts, a reform of
this nature might also decrease the likelihood that the buyer would
place a high value on the right to alter or destroy the work. Coupled
with a waivable right of integrity, an increase in arts funding and
education might do more to promote the appreciation of artists and
their works than would a system of nonwaivable moral rights, with all
its potential attendant consequences.
In theory, the United States could be devoting significantly more
resources to the funding of the arts. At present, the federal
government provides direct funding for the arts through the National
Endowment for the Arts and the National Endowment for the
Humanities, as well as through a series of other programs, such as
federal funding for arts education and programs that allow a small
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portion of the cost of federal buildings to be spent on artwork.39" '
Altogether, federal, state, and local funding for the arts was
estimated to total approximately $1 billion, or about $4 per capita, in
1996.39" By contrast, national funding for the arts in Great Britain
totals approximately $1.5 billion, or about $25 per capita; while in
Germany and France national funding totals approximately $3
billion, or about $38 and $50 per capita, respectively.393 On the other
hand, private funding of the arts in the United States is higher than in
Europe,3N4 due in part to the greater availability in the United States
of tax deductions for charitable contributions. 395  Nevertheless, and
391. See, e.g., 34 C.F.R. § 75.607 (1996) (permitting up to one percent of cost of certain
projects to be spent on artwork); 36 C.F.R. § 910.35 (1996) (similar); Serra v. United
States Gen. Servs. Admin., 847 F.2d 1045, 1047 (2d Cir. 1988) (describing "Art-in-
Architecture" program); General Services Administration, Public Buildings Service,
Cultural and Environmental Programs (visited July 21, 1997)
<http'//www.gsa.gov/pbs/ptlptslcultural.htm> (discussing activities of General Services
Administration's Cultural and Environmental Programs Division).
392. See Sid Smith, An Awkward Fit: High Culture Is a Tough Sell in an America That
Has Never Quite Connected with the Fine Arts, CH. TRIB., Aug. 25, 1996, § 7, at 1.
393. See id.; Robert Hughes, Pulling the Fuse on Culture: The Conservatives' All-Out
Assault on Federal Funding Is Unenlightened, Uneconomic and Undemocratic, TIME, Aug.
7, 1995, at 60, 64. As Hughes illustrates, local spending on the arts in other countries also
can be lavish. He notes, for example, that for fiscal 1995 the City of Berlin was set to
spend approximately $800 million-2.6% of its total municipal budget, or about $225 per
capita-on art and culture. See id.; see also OUR CREATIVE DIVERSITY: REPORT OF THE
WORLD COMMISSION ON CULTURE AND DEVELOPMENT 248 (UNESCO 1995)
(comparing public sector arts funding with gross national product for several Western
European nations and the United States).
394. See Smith, supra note 392, at 1. Private donations to the arts in the United States
have been estimated at approximately $9.3 billion. See Prepared Testimony of Charles T.
Clotfelter Before the Subcommittee on Education, Arts and Humanities Senate Labor
and Human Resources Committee, Federal News Service, Feb. 23, 1995, available in
LEXIS, News Library, Arcnws File [hereinafter Clotfelter]. North American corporate
sponsorship for the arts was estimated to reach $5.4 billion in 1996. See Howard Reich,
Art Meets Commerce: Cultural Groups Turn to Corporate America for Needed Cash, CHI.
TRIB., Aug. 27, 1996, § 5, at 1.
395. Forgone tax revenues attributable to donations for the arts have been estimated
as falling somewhere between $2 billion and $3 billion. MARQUIS, supra note 333, at 167;
Clotfelter, supra note 394; see also Charles T. Clotfelter, Government Policy Toward Art
Museums in the United States, in THE ECONOMICS OF ART MUSEUMS 239 & n.3 (Martin
Feldstein ed., 1991) (noting widespread reliance in United States upon tax deductions to
support services directly provided by governments in Europe). But see Herbert Stein,
Generous to a Fault, N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 1997, at A23 (estimating forgone tax revenues of
only $1.25 million annually).
Although tax deductions for charitable contributions are more generous in the
United States than in Europe, some other countries do grant artists special tax breaks. In
Ireland, for example, artists (including writers, musicians, visual artists, and filmmakers)
are exempt from income tax. See Shane de Biirca, Artists' Exemption in Ireland.
Guidelines, Film-Makers, 7 ENT. L. REV. 16, 16 (1996); J. Mark Schuster, Questions to
Ask of a Cultural Policy: Who Should Pay? Who Should Decide? 9 (June 28-30, 1995)
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although precise comparisons are difficult, arts funding in the United
States appears to be considerably lower than in Europe.396
In practice, however, the recommendation that we devote
substantially more resources to the promotion of the arts in the
United States is probably not feasible at the present time. It would
be a gross understatement, in my view, to suggest that there is no
popular consensus in this country in favor of significantly increasing
governmental funding for the arts; and while private funding and
corporate sponsorship may continue to increase, it is unclear whether
there is any significant role for government to play in encouraging
this trend."9 Critics are also quick to point out that government
funding for the arts is itself a highly imperfect option that can give
rise to undesirable consequences; one frequently voiced complaint is
that government-sponsored art tends to be safe, unambitious, and
mediocre.398 In any event, and whether it is for the better or the
worse, I think it is safe to say that we are unlikely to observe a
significant increase in the direct or indirect subsidization of the arts
anytime in the foreseeable future.
A more limited alternative might be to expand our laws relating
to historic preservation so as to bring more works within their scope.
One student commentator, for example, has suggested that courts
should consider any artwork donated, sold, or lent to museums as
being cloaked with a public trust that permanently prohibits its owner
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author). The French government, on the other
hand, is in the process of phasing out a long-standing income tax break for journalists.
See David Buchan, French Press Sends an SOS, FIN. TIMES (London), Jan. 13, 1997, at 14;
French Dailies Fail to Appear After Printworkers Back Journalists' Strike, AGENCE
FRANCE PRESSE, Nov. 15, 1996, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File. At one
time, the Dutch government paid qualifying pictorial artists a yearly salary of up to
$16,000, but this practice came to an end in 1987. See Dutch Artists Hunting Alternatives
to the Dole, N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 1987, at C13.
396. According to the figures quoted in the text and notes above, it would appear that
public funding for the arts in the United States by means of direct public expenditures and
tax subsidization amounts to somewhere between $2.5 billion and $4 billion-only $10 to
$16 per capita. See supra notes 391-95 and accompanying text. If private donations of
$9.3 billion are added to this figure, see supra note 394, per capita expenditures from all
sources come to, at most, $53, just slightly higher than France's per capita public
expenditures, at the national level, alone. See supra text accompanying note 393. But see
Smith, supra note 392, at 1 (quoting Daniel Ritter, director of the Center for Arts and
Culture, as professing uncertainty whether American tax structure effectively equalizes
U.S. and European arts subsidies).
397. But see Clotfelter, supra note 394 (discussing possible tax incentives for increasing
arts patronage).
398. See MARQUIS, supra note 333, at 234; Marci A. Hamilton, Art Speech, 49 VAND.
L. REv. 73, 98-99, 115 (1996).
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from treating the work in a manner inconsistent with that trust.39
Expanding the role of historic preservation law in this or some other
manner, in the opinion of the commentator, would be a more
dependable method of preserving the integrity of works of art, in that
enforcement of the rule would rest with the appropriate state or local
officials rather than with the artist or her heirs.4' In addition, a rule
of this type might have less of a disincentive effect than a
nonwaivable moral right because it would affect only works of a
certain stature and would take effect only upon transmittal of the
work to a museum. 1 In light of factors such as these, even critics of
moral rights tend to agree that works in which the public interest is
very strong deserve some form of legal protection from alteration or
destruction.' Like a system of waivable moral rights, however, the
effect of such a rule is likely to be fairly mild; even under a more
liberal system relatively few works are likely to be of the necessary
stature to qualify for historic preservation, let alone find their way
into museums.4°3 Thus, while a reform of this nature may provide
some welcome benefits, it is unlikely to do very much to protect the
average artist's interest in preserving the integrity of her work.
At the end of the day, then, there just may not be very much
more we can do to foster greater respect for the artist and her work.
And so the double bind persists. In the absence of a greater public
commitment to the arts, the weak reform of waivable rights may not
accomplish very much. And yet the adoption of a system of
nonwaivable rights constitutes an even greater threat to its intended
399. See Porges, supra note 197, at 132-33.
400. See id. at 125-26.
401. Of course, one might argue that a rule cloaking a work transmitted to a museum
with a public trust will discourage transmittals to museums. The student commentator
suggests that sales and donations will not be deterred because future owners generally
will intend to treat the work with care whether or not a trust is imposed, see id. at 134
n.69, and that loans will not be deterred because the sale price of the work is likely to rise
after it has been loaned for the purpose of public display, see id. at 134 n.71. If the former
premise is correct, however, it calls into question the need for any rule at all with respect
to works being sold or donated. Perhaps the better view is that sales or donations to
entities that would prefer to have the right to alter or destroy the work are the only ones
that will be deterred, but that it is consistent with the goal of preservation to deter these
transactions.
402. See Beyer, supra note 17, at 1035-40 (endorsing a ban on the alteration of works
that occupy "a special, venerated position in the culture," when such alteration "would so
transform the entity that it would be regarded as having had its essence lost or
destroyed," and the change "would be permanent and irreversible").
403. The easier it becomes for works to qualify for historical preservation, of course,
the more indistinguishable the proposed rule becomes from a nonwaivable moral right,
with all its potential drawbacks.
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beneficiaries, in the absence of a countervailing public commitment
to the production of art; if economic theory is correct in predicting
that a system of nonwaivable rights reduces the demand for art, then
some form of subsidy may be necessary to push the demand back up
to its original position. Perhaps, then, it should come as no surprise
that cultures with a strong commitment to moral rights also engage in
a higher level of government arts funding than we do. The two
phenomena not only spring from the same basic impulse of
enthusiasm for the arts; the one also complements the other. What
the preceding analysis suggests, then, is something of a paradox. In
the absence of a strong public commitment to the arts, a meaningful
system of moral rights threatens to harm the interests of artists and
art consumers; at the same time, the existence of such a commitment
might alleviate much of the need for nonwaivable rights, both by
providing artists with greater bargaining power and by instilling
greater social sanctions against those who interfere with the integrity
of artists' works. Perhaps only those societies in which the role of the
artist is already the most secure can afford to endow the artist with a
nonwaivable moral right!
A third observation is that, even if the ideal form of moral rights
protection were attainable, it is not clear that the ideal would be to
subject all creative works to the same degree of protection. It is
easiest to defend a right to protect the original, physical embodiment
of an author's work from physical alteration or destruction, given the
likely strength of the author's psychic connection to that embodiment
and the likely impossibility of ever reconstituting the work once it has
been destroyed. The protection afforded under VARA and the
California Act to original embodiments of works of visual art is
therefore the least controversial of any form of moral rights
recognition; and it would be only a small, and arguably desirable, step
to expand the protection afforded under these acts to original
embodiments of other works such as motion pictures, 4 photography
produced for other than exhibition purposes, and original
manuscripts. Moreover, in an ideal world-though not necessarily
the nonideal place we actually inhabit-this right of integrity in
original embodiments probably would be both nonwaivable and
perpetual.
Whether the ideal would be to afford similar protection to
404. Cf. 2 U.S.C.A. §§ 1791-179w (West 1997) (authorizing the Librarian of Congress
to maintain a National Film Registry consisting of archival quality copies of films selected
on the basis of cultural, historical, or aesthetic significance).
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reproductions (so as, for example, to prevent the distribution of low-
quality, cropped, or colorized copies of photographs or films) or to
performances of dramatic works or musical compositions is, however,
a much more difficult question. With respect to these works and acts,
there are, as we have seen, substantial countervailing considerations,
including the desires of future audiences and interpreters to subject
existing works to new readings, as well as to use them as the raw
material for their own creative endeavors, and these considerations
conflict with the interest in respecting authorial visions. Even such a
champion of moral rights as Kundera seems to recognize as much
when he writes that he, like Max Brod, would not have found the
strength to fully carry out Franz Kafka's request that his unfinished
manuscripts be burned upon his death. 5 In support of this view,
Kundera cites an episode from Don Quixote in which a poet had
asked his friend Ambrosio to burn the poet's works upon his death."6
As Ambrosio is about to burn the poems at the poet's funeral, a
mourner steps forward and asks him not to accede to the poet's wish.
Before Ambrosio can answer, however, the mourner seizes a few
pages from the ground, prompting Ambrosio to state, "Out of
courtesy, sir, I will permit you to keep those that you have taken; but
it is futile to think that I will refrain from burning the rest."'
Kundera admires Ambrosio's position:
"Out of courtesy, I will permit you"; meaning that even
405. See KUNDERA, supra note 1, at 276. For that matter, Stravinsky too was hardly
immune from the temptation to depart from strict obedience to his predecessors. His
ballet Pulcinella, for example, transforms into a modem idiom music attributed to the
eighteenth-century composer Giovanni Battista Pergolesi. In the words of one critic,
"Pergolesi has been transformed at every moment into something quite new. The
baroque progressions are no longer representatives of a musical direction and motion;
they are literally sound objects or blocks of sound which gain new meanings from new
contexts." ERIC SALZMAN, TWENTIETH CENTURY MUSIC: AN INTRODUCTION 48 (1967).
Cf. Levinson & Balkin, supra note 348, at 1643 (arguing that "Stravinsky's eclecticism and
his demands for 'objectivity' in performance are two sides of the same coin," in that "[i]t
is precisely because one has become so detached from the past and thus from a living
tradition ... that one must make reference to 'objective' indicia-for example, the written
text, the actual size of the musical forces at the first performance, and so on"). Compare
NORMAN LEBRECHT, THE COMPANION TO 20TH-CENTURY Music 342 (1992) (describing
the work as a "rape" of Pergolesi), with Letter from Pierre Monteux to Igor F. Stravinsky
(Mar. 11, 1923), in 2 STRAVINSKY SELECTED CORRESPONDENCE, supra note 2, at 64(stating that some critics had been expecting a "complete deformation" of Pergolesi, and
"regretted that there was not more 'Stravinsky' in the arrangement").
406. See KUNDERA, supra note 1, at 276-77.
407. 1d. at 277 (quoting MIGUEL CERVANTES, DON QUIXOTE). Kundera does not
state which edition of the text he is quoting. A slightly different translation of the passage
quoted above, however, may be found at page 103 of the Penguin Classics edition (J.M.
Cohen trans., 1950).
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though a dead friend's wish has for me the force of law, I am
not a lackey to the laws, I respect them as a free being who
is not blind to other values, values that may stand opposed
to the law, such as, for instance, courtesy or the love of art.
That is why "I will permit you to keep those that you have
taken," while hoping that my friend will forgive me. Still, in
making this exception I have violated his wish, which for me
is law; I have done so on my own responsibility, at my own
risk, and I've done so as a violation of a law, not as a denial
and nullification of it; that is why "it is futile to think that I
will refrain from burning the rest."' 8
Unfortunately, there is no algorithm that tells us precisely how such
conflicts between the individual and the interpretive community
should be resolved. Both individuality and community are important
aspects of human flourishing, and perhaps no proposed reconciliation
can be sufficiently sensitive to both needs.
I would nevertheless suggest that, although there may be no
ideal way to handle this dilemma, perhaps the best we can hope for is
something like the method ordained under the American copyright
system: namely, providing the author with a waivable right, of finite
duration, to authorize the public performance of her work and to
create derivative works based upon that work. Thus, as long as they
retain the copyright to their works, future Stravinskys should be
allowed to prevent conductors from rendering distorted versions of
Jeu de Cartes, and future Becketts should be allowed to enjoin
companies from performing altered versions of Waiting for Godot.
But this right should be both waivable and terminable-perhaps
terminable much sooner than the current span of author's life plus
fifty years, not only for the nonideal reasons relating to the potential
negative consequences of nonwaivable rights, but also because in
these cases a nonwaivable right would conflict with the need of each
generation to reshape and refashion its own experience. Of course, if
moral rights are waivable and nonperpetual, some performers and
some interpreters will abuse the system by trivializing, distorting, or
exploiting for commercial purposes the work of an author who has
given up her rights or whose rights have expired. But if we wish to
have a vital culture, we may need to tolerate some such lapses of
taste and respect; perhaps some "wrongs" cannot be remedied
without creating worse wrongs. In the case of moral rights, the
prospect of worse wrongs is substantial, for a culture that respects,
but refuses to confront, challenge, and remake the works of the past,
408. KUNDERA, supra note 1, at 277-78 (quoting CERvANTES, supra note 407, at 103).
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risks consigning those works to the irrelevance of the museum. 9
My final observation is that the knowledge to be gained from
what might be viewed as different judicial and legislative experiments
with moral rights protection may eventually provide us with
empirical evidence that will be useful in further refining the optimal
scope of these rights. Someday, for example, we may have a firmer
basis for deciding, one way or another, such issues as whether
endowing artists with moral rights is likely to have an effect on the
preferences of either artists or the public; whether most artists will
waive their rights under a waivable rights system;410 and whether the
demand for art really does decrease if artists are endowed with
nonwaivable rights. The only way to learn is to test our theories
against further experience. Perhaps the great variation among
jurisdictions in response to the moral rights dilemma provides the
seeds for the closest we may be able to come to controlled
experimentation on these and other issues.
409. Cf DEWEY, supra note 161, at 8 (arguing that "[o]ur present museums and
galleries to which works of fine art are removed and stored illustrate some of the causes
that have operated to segregate art instead of finding it an attendant of temple, forum,
and other forms of associated life"); POIRIER, supra note 146, at 101-02 (describing the
"Emersonian conviction" that no great writers "ever wholly own or pretend to own what
they produce; it is corporately owned by all of them and issues from a 'genius' to which no
individual can claim exclusive rights. Originality is something in which all of us own a
share.").
410. Compare REPORT, supra note 139, at 184-85 (noting lack of hard evidence thus
far concerning whether need for employment forces artists to waive their rights under
VARA), with Peter H. Karlen, Moral Rights and Real Life Artists, 15 HASTINGS COMM.
& ENr. L.J. 929, 936 (1993) (asserting, without citation, that "[w]ith most commissioned
works, the agreement between the parties usually does not have a waiver clause," but that
"contracts for large public works, commissioned by a developer or public agency, often
contain a waiver clause, albeit usually a defective one"), cited in Hansmann & Santilli,
supra note 135, at 128 n.92.
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